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The scholarly literature on controversial cultural issues like abortion, gay rights, and 
school prayer thus far has focused in large part on the link between public opinion 
and the adoption of what political scientists have termed “morality policy.”  While 
this literature has made significant contributions towards the understanding of the 
politics of the culture wars, the starting point for most studies of morality policy is a 
decision between two alternatives—to adopt or to reject a proposed policy or to cast a 
“yes” or “no” vote on a bill—that are already on the table. Yet, an important part of 
the puzzle—how cultural issues become part of the legislative agenda in the first 
place—has been largely ignored in the morality policy literature.  This dissertation 
advances the literature by addressing the rise of cultural issues on the congressional 
agenda.  More specifically, I examine the factors that make some members more 
likely than others to introduce bills on cultural issues, the circumstances under which 
committees are most likely to hold hearings on such issues, and congressional 
leaders’ decision to schedule floor votes on these controversial issues.  Using rare 
  
events logistic regression, negative binomial regression, and standard logistic 
regression analysis, I show that individual members of Congress and the majority 
party leadership, especially under Republican control, are motivated, in part, by 
electoral considerations, including the timing of elections, when they put cultural 
issues on the agenda of the U.S. Congress.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
On Sunday, March 20, 2005, members of the U.S. House of Representatives 
were called out of their Easter recess into a special session to vote on a bill titled “For 
the Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo.” The private bill would allow the 
parents of a 41-year old brain-damaged Florida woman whose feeding tube had been 
removed after a decade-long review of her case by six different courts to appeal to a 
federal court to have their daughter’s feeding tube reinserted.  On the floor of the 
House, Republican members equated the removal of Schiavo’s feeding tube with 
murder and torture and contended that they had a moral duty to vote in favor of the 
legislation, with Patrick McHenry of North Carolina calling it “one of the great moral 
issues of our day” (Congressional Record, 3/20/2005). Democrats, for their part, 
argued that state courts had found sufficient evidence that Schiavo did not want to 
live in her current condition and accused Republicans of exploiting Schiavo’s 
situation for political gain.  Some, like John Conyers of Michigan, referenced an 
anonymous memo, later discovered to have been authored by a member of 
Republican Senator Mel Martinez’s staff, that urged Republicans to vote for the bill 
and called the Schiavo case “a great political issue” which would excite the pro-life 
base (Allen 2005). After three hours of impassioned debate and with more than one-
third of its members absent, the House approved the legislation by a 203-58 vote.  
Less than two weeks before members of the House were called upon to weigh 
in on Schiavo’s fate, the Senate had convened to debate an amendment offered by 
Democratic Senator Charles Schumer to the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2005.  Schumer’s measure sought to prohibit violent 
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anti-abortion protesters from declaring bankruptcy in order to avoid court-imposed 
fines. In the course of the debate, Schumer and other Democrats highlighted a series 
of incidents in which violence or the threat of violence had been used against abortion 
clinics, women seeking abortions, and abortion doctors and their families.  Schumer 
pointed out that close to 80 percent of all abortion clinics in the country had been shut 
down because of the rise in violent protests.1  Republicans, who believed the measure 
was unnecessary because existing laws already barred people who file for bankruptcy 
from having debt incurred as the result of a malicious act dismissed, accused 
Democrats of manipulating the abortion issue to further their political goals.  Senator 
Charles Grassley of Iowa suggested that the first time Schumer offered a similar 
amendment in 1999, the Democrat from New York had been more concerned with 
helping Vice President Al Gore in his run for the presidency than with the safety of 
abortion providers.  Gore’s primary opponent, former senator Bill Bradley, had 
accused the vice president of not being a strong enough supporter of abortion rights. 
With the Senate evenly split, Grassley contended, Schumer had offered the 
controversial amendment to give Gore the chance to cast the tie-breaking vote, thus 
showing off his pro-choice credentials.  Republicans also claimed that Schumer’s 
amendment was an attempt to kill the entire bankruptcy bill.  In 2004, Republicans in 
the House had rejected the bankruptcy bill because of the provision against anti-
abortion protesters. On March 8, 2005, however, Schumer’s amendment was defeated 
in the Senate.  President George W. Bush signed the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention 
and Consumer Protection Act into law one month later. 
                                                 
1 For a full account of Schumer’s testimony see Congressional Record. 2005. 109th Cong., 1st sess., p. 
S2203. 
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 The debates over Schiavo and Schumer’s amendment on the floor of the 
House and the Senate are just two of numerous examples of the congressional politics 
of what observers of American politics call “culture wars” (Hunter 1991; Layman 
1997; Sharp 1999).  Contrary to earlier cultural conflict in America, in which one 
religion was often pitted against another (e.g. anti-Catholic sentiments among 
Protestants in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, anti-Semitism in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries), contemporary culture wars divide 
Americans into orthodox and progressive camps regardless of the religion they 
practice (Hunter 1991).  On the orthodox side are those who look to a strict 
interpretation of religious text for answers about private and public conduct.  
Progressives, on the other hand, are guided by scientific rationality and personal 
experience (Hunter 1991).  Progressives are often religious themselves, but their 
interpretation of religious text tends to be contextual and subjective. Among the most 
prominent issues in today’s culture wars are abortion, gay rights, pornography, and 
school prayer.  
 Since Hunter (1991) first articulated the concept of the American culture wars, 
several scholars, journalists, and politicians have adopted the framework.  At the 
1992 Republican National Convention, for example, Pat Buchanan declared that 
“There is a religious war going on in our country for the soul of America. It is a 
cultural war, as critical to the kind of nation we will one day be as was the Cold War 
itself.”2  Immediately following the election of George W. Bush in 2000, stories in 
widely circulated newspapers like the New York Times and USA Today began to 
                                                 
2 This speech is widely cited and the transcript can be found at http://www.buchanan.org/index.html 
among several other Internet sources.  
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categorize states won by the Republican presidential candidate—mostly culturally 
conservative, rural states--as red states and those won by Democratic candidate Al 
Gore—mostly culturally progressive, coastal states—as blue states.3   The recent 
characterization of America as a culturally divided country persisted through the 2004 
presidential election and intensified as exit polls indicated that as much as one-fifth of 
Americans cited “moral values” as the most important issue in their voting decision.4  
This, along with the election of social conservative senators like Tom Coburn of 
Oklahoma and Jim DeMint of South Carolina, on the one hand, and social 
progressives like Barak Obama of Illinois, on the other, has led some political 
analysts to conclude that there is a growing cultural divide among the American 
people that has increased the political salience of cultural issues among the public and 
politicians alike. 
 There is little evidence, however, that the American cultural landscape is, in 
fact, changing or that public opinion is becoming more polarized on cultural issues 
than it has previously been (see, for example, Fiorina 2004 and Green 2004).  
Because public opinion on cultural issues is based on deeply held religious or ethical 
beliefs, it is unlikely to fluctuate significantly (Converse and Markus 1979; Adams 
1997; Fiorina 2004).   For example, attitudes on abortion, one of the most 
controversial issues in the culture wars, have remained relatively stable since the 
1970s, when the Supreme Court made the procedure legal.  As Figure 1.1 illustrates, a 
                                                 
3 For several examples of newspaper articles that focus on the red state/blue state dichotomy, see 
Morris P. Fiorina’s Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America.  
 
4 Full exit poll results for the 2004 presidential election are available at 
http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/pagtes/results/states/US/P/00/epolls.0.html. Polling experts 
have since questioned the conclusion that this figure is indicative of heightened polarization along 
cultural lines.  See, for example, ABC News polling director Gary Langer’s “A Question of Values,” 
New York Times, November 6, 2004.  
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majority of Americans believe abortion should be legal under certain circumstances. 
Those circumstances often include cases of rape or incest and situations in which 
carrying the pregnancy to term poses a health risk to the mother.  With the exception 
of a brief period in the late-1980s and early-1990s in which the percentage of 
Americans that believed abortion should always be legal jumped to just above 30 
percent, the percentage of Americans who say abortion should always be legal and 
those who say it should never be legal has hovered around 20 percent.    
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FIGURE 1.1 
Public Attitudes on Abortion
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While the evidence of a culture war among the American public is tenuous, 
the war rages on in the rhetoric of politicians, activists, and media pundits, as the 
battle in Congress over whether or not to allow the parents of the dying Florida 
woman to continue to appeal to judges to have their daughter’s feeding tube 
reinserted, the daily protests outside the woman’s hospice, and the many hours of 
cable news coverage of her final days prove.  In this project, I seek to identify 
conditions that motivate members of Congress to step up the fight over cultural 
issues.  I examine the factors that make some members more likely than others to 
introduce bills on issues like gay rights, abortion, and sex education, the 
circumstances under which committees are most likely to hold hearings on cultural 
issues, and congressional leaders’ decision to schedule floor votes on such issues.  
Defining Cultural Issues 
Political scientists who study cultural issues often refer to such issues as 
morality policy or social regulatory policy, which is broadly defined as “the exercise 
of legal authority to affirm, modify, or replace community values, moral practices, 
and norms of interpersonal conduct” (Tatalovich and Daynes 1998: xxx).  While 
some may interpret this definition so widely as to include, for example, efforts to 
alleviate poverty or to promote racial equality, two goals that are often motivated by 
moral values, it is clear from the many scholarly articles and books on the subject that 
the definition of morality policy issues in the context of this literature does not refer 
to a broad, philosophical conceptualization of morality.  Rather, the literature focuses 
on a narrow set of controversial issues that deal with government regulation of private 
behavior, the expression of religion in the public square, and other matters regarding 
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freedom of expression. Among the issues commonly associated with morality policy 
are abortion, censorship, flag burning, school prayer, and gay rights.  It is this narrow 
definition of cultural or morality policy issues that I adopt in this project.  I use the 
terms “morality policy” and “cultural issues” interchangeably.  While cultural issues 
are not confined to any particular topic or policy area—for example, abortion is 
essentially a health care issue, flag burning is a civil liberties issue, and gay rights is a 
civil rights issue—political scientists have found both theoretical (see, for example, 
Mooney 2001 and Smith and Tatalovich 2003) and empirical (see, for example, 
Layman and Carsey 2002 and Carsey, Green, Herrera, and Layman 2003) 
justification for categorizing them under the cultural issue umbrella.  
Origins of the Contemporary Culture Wars 
 The emergence of contemporary cultural issues in advanced industrial 
societies like the United States has been widely documented, particularly by 
comparative politics scholars.  In an analysis of survey data from over two dozen 
countries, including the United States, South Africa, Japan, and several Eastern and 
Western European countries, from 1970 to 1988, Inglehart (1990) finds that conflicts 
over cultural issues typically arise when religious traditionalists react to a society’s 
shift to postmaterialism.  The trend toward postmaterialism in the postwar era, which 
has been particularly pronounced in the United States and Western Europe, has been 
marked by increasing economic security.  As a result, new social movements have 
emerged which transcend class structures and focus instead on cultural and symbolic 
issues linked to collective identities rather than on economic grievances (Inglehart 
1990; Larana, Johnston, and Gusfield 1994).  Many of the groups that have flourished 
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in this new context have been culturally progressive, such as the gay rights and 
women’s rights movements.  
 As postmaterialists began to embrace culturally progressive values, 
traditionalists perceived changes in society as an attack on their way of life and on the 
traditional roots that, in their view, held society together.  Scholars often call this 
phenomenon “status politics.”  The theory of status politics borrows from the work of 
Max Weber (1946), whose theory of stratification suggests that groups compete not 
only for material resources but also for status and public respect (Hofstadter 1964; 
Moen 1984; Scott 1985; Wald, Owen and Hill 1989).  Moen (1984), for example, 
uses this theory to explain support for school prayer in the wake of the Engel v. Vitale 
(1962) decision, in which the Supreme Court ruled that school prayer violates the 
“establishment clause” of the First Amendment. He finds that those who were most 
likely to support school prayer—those in rural areas, the less educated, and religious 
traditionalists—were also the most likely to feel that contemporary lifestyles posed a 
threat to their traditional values.  Scott (1985) presents a similar finding in his study 
of support for and opposition to the Equal Rights Amendment.  Like Moen (1984), 
Scott (1985) suggests that those who held traditional values perceived the rapid 
structural and ideological changes associated with industrialization and urbanization 
in a pluralistic society as a major threat to their traditional lifestyle.   
 Recently, journalist Thomas Frank articulated a theory he calls “the Great 
Backlash.” Combining aspects of the status politics literature with an analysis of the 
contemporary American political context, Frank (2004) concludes that politicians 
who are conservative on economic issues have been able to win the support of 
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working-class Americans in rural states by convincing them that the domination of 
American culture by coastal elites poses a threat to the their traditional culture and 
that they must fight back.  Frank (2004) suggests that these conservative politicians 
have been effective in mobilizing voters to elect Republicans against their own 
economic interests by couching the culture wars in the language of class conflicts.  In 
this narrative, the liberal elite, spearheaded by Hollywood, university professors, and 
news producers, is attempting to impose its values on Middle America while the less 
powerful struggle to maintain their conservative moral tradition (Frank 2004).   
The Politics of Morality Policy 
 Issues that tap into religious and cultural differences are not new to American 
politics (see, for example, Gusfield 1986 on the Temperance movement of the 19th 
century and the cultural assimilation agenda of the Progressive movement in the 
early-1900s). However, scholars have only recently begun to study these issues as a 
policy area with its own political dynamics and implications.  Perhaps because 
cultural issues are controversial or because their consequences are often difficult to 
quantify, political scientists have traditionally shied away from studying them 
systematically, preferring instead to study distributive and regulatory policies 
(Mooney 2001; Smith and Tatalovich 2003).  However, as symbolic cultural issues 
have become more prominent in the postmodern world, it has become impossible for 
political scientists to continue to avoid studying the political causes and consequences 
of the culture wars. 
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Morality Policy Adoption and Public Opinion 
 The morality policy literature thus far has focused in large part on the link 
between public opinion and the adoption of various morality policies. In 1961, Key 
suggested that “Unless mass views have some place in the shaping of policy, all the 
talk about democracy is nonsense” (7).  While many studies find the link between 
public opinion and public policy to be less than perfect (see, for example, Dye 2001), 
several studies suggest that certain characteristics which are common to all cultural 
issues make political leaders especially inclined to take cues from the public on such 
issues.   
 First, cultural issues are what Carmines and Stimson (1980) call “easy issues,” 
meaning that they elicit gut responses that do not require any conceptual 
sophistication.  Some areas of morality policy are, indeed, technically complex.  For 
example, there are questions about whether or not abortion is acceptable at any stage 
of the pregnancy if the life of the mother is in jeopardy, or about the scope of the 
“establishment clause” of the Constitution and the Founding Fathers’ true intent in 
providing for the separation of church and state in the Bill of Rights.  However, these 
issues can be easily understood as a basic question of values, which is, in fact, how 
most people understand morality policy (Carmines and Stimson 1980; Tatalovich and 
Daynes 1988; Meier 1994; Mooney and Lee 1995; Layman and Carmines 1997).  
Because cultural issues can be understood in simple, non-technical terms, virtually 
everyone has an opinion (Glick and Hutchinson 2001), which makes it nearly 
impossible for politicians to make decisions regarding such issues without taking 
public’s view into account.   
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 A second characteristic of morality policy that makes political leaders more 
likely to respond to public opinion is that people’s positions on these controversial 
policy issues are rooted in deeply held religious and ethical values and, therefore, 
there is little room for compromise (Smith and Tatalovich 2003).  This, some argue, 
makes risk-averse politicians unlikely to voluntarily take sides in morality policy 
debates unless they are prompted by their constituents to do so (Mooney and Lee 
1995; Tatalovich and Daynes 1998; Smith and Tatalovich 2003).    
 Empirically, morality policy scholars have observed a strong link between 
public opinion and morality policy adoption.  In their study of patterns of adoption of 
abortion regulation reform in the states prior to the Roe v. Wade ruling in 1973, 
Mooney and Lee (1995) find that socioeconomic conditions that typically explain 
adoption of distributive, redistributive, and regulatory policies are not good 
determinants of abortion regulation adoption.  Instead, they find that when it comes to 
morality policy in general and abortion policy in particular, elected officials strive to 
reflect the general opinion of their constituents (see also Cohen and Barrilleaux 
1993).  
 Scholars’ heavy focus on policy adoption, including comparative studies of 
patterns of innovation and diffusion, has made state politics an especially conducive 
context for the study of morality policy.  Few studies look at the dynamics of morality 
policy-making at the national level.  Those that do look at such dynamics tend to 
focus on the roll call voting behavior of members of Congress.  For example, Haider-
Markel’s (1999) analysis of roll call voting on gay and lesbian issues in the 95th to 
104th House and Senate shows that gay interest groups influence legislative voting 
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behavior through campaign contributions and grassroots mobilization.  However, 
Haider-Markel (1999) finds, the efforts of gay interest groups are more likely to 
succeed when they attempt to block negative legislation than when they attempt to 
expand the rights of the gay community.  The study also shows that member 
ideology, religion, party affiliation, and constituency preferences are strong predictors 
of voting behavior on gay issues. Chressanthis, Gilbert, and Grimes (1991) and 
Gohmann and Ohsfeldt (1994) find similar patterns of voting behavior in their 
analysis of abortion roll calls.    
Setting the Stage for the Culture Wars in Congress 
 While the morality policy literature has made significant contributions 
towards the understanding of the politics of the culture wars and the determinants of 
policy adoption and roll-call voting behavior, there has not been as much of an effort 
to explain how cultural issues become part of the legislative agenda in the first place.  
The starting point for most studies of such issues is a decision between two 
alternatives, to adopt or to reject a proposed policy or to cast a “yes” or “no” vote on 
a bill that is on the table, for example.  Yet, as Bauer, Pool, and Dexter (1963: 405) 
suggest, “the most important part of the legislative decision process [is] the decision 
about which decision to consider.”   
 Because of limited resources, members of Congress must be selective about 
which issues to promote among the many that compete for prominence on the 
political agenda (Easton 1965; Cobb and Elder 1972; Walker 1977; Carmines and 
Stimson 1989).  Meetings with constituents and staffers, media appearances, and 
committee and subcommittee hearings are only a few of the time-consuming 
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activities senators and representatives undertake routinely.  In addition, the cost of 
acquiring information about potential issues constrains the number of issues Congress 
can realistically tackle at any given time.  Therefore, individual members and 
congressional party leaders consider both the facts surrounding a particular issue, 
including its urgency and the number of people it affects, and their own political 
goals when deciding which issues should constitute the governmental agenda. 
 Members of Congress propose thousands of bills each year.  However, only a 
small percentage of bills introduced reach the House or Senate floor (Davidson and 
Oleszek 2002). In his study of agenda setting in the U.S. Senate, Walker (1977) 
suggests that three conditions determine the likelihood that proposed legislation will 
appear on the chamber’s agenda.   First, the proposed bill must affect a large number 
of people and, therefore, have broad political appeal.  Second, there must be 
convincing evidence that the bill addresses a serious problem that requires 
government intervention (see also Kingdon 1995; Stone 2002). Finally, there must be 
an easily understood solution for the problem.   
 The extent to which morality policy-making fulfills these conditions is 
questionable. For example, even though cultural issues have broad symbolic appeal 
because they are rooted in cultural, ethical, and religious beliefs, there is little 
evidence that policies on these issues affect a large number of people (Studlar 2001; 
Smith and Tatalovich 2003).  In addition, while politicians’ attention to cultural issues 
can sometimes be easily traced to a particular event, such as the increased attention to 
right-to-die issue following widespread media coverage of Dr. Kavorkian’s suicide 
machine (Glick and Hutchinson 2001), it is not always so.  Finally, members of 
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Congress often introduce legislation on cultural issues with the knowledge that, if 
their bill passes, its constitutionality will likely be challenged in the courts because 
many of these issues deal with matters like privacy and the separation between church 
and state.  Therefore, it is not always clear that members of Congress are, indeed, 
offering an easily understood solution for a problem when they elevate a morality 
issue to political prominence.   
 Another, and perhaps more plausible, explanation for the rise of morality 
policy on the legislative agenda is that individual members and congressional leaders 
put cultural issues on the agenda to further political goals.  In 1974, Mayhew 
characterized members of Congress as “single-minded seekers of reelection” 
(Mayhew 1974: 5) whose actions are carefully guided toward the achievement of that 
goal.  More recently, a number of scholars have rejected Mayhew’s contention and 
have adopted, instead, Fenno’s (1973, 1978) theory that members have multiple 
goals, including making good public policy and pursuing institutional power.  For 
example, Aldrich (1995), Erikson and Wright (2001), and Crespin, Gold, and Rohde 
(2003) find evidence that members are motivated by ideological preferences in 
addition to electoral goals.  However, regardless of what other goals members may 
have, the fact remains that they cannot continue to pursue those goals in Congress 
unless they succeed in their bid for reelection (Fiorina 1986; Arnold 1990).  Even 
party leaders, who typically have safe seats and for whom attainment of institutional 
power is likely to be the primary goal, are likely to be empowered or weakened if 
their party gains or loses seats in an election (Aldrich 2001; Davidson and Oleszek 
2002).  
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 Several characteristics of morality issues make them particularly 
advantageous to politicians as an election approaches. First, when members of 
Congress are motivated by reelection, they will emphasize symbol over substance and 
will frame issues in dramatic, often confrontational, terms (Mouw and MacKuen 
1992).  Smith and Tatalovich (2003) suggest that government officials avoid morality 
issues because they offer little room for compromise.  Yet, it is precisely this 
characteristic that makes morality policy attractive at election time.  As Gilmour’s 
(1995) concept of strategic disagreement suggests, politicians often propose bills they 
know will not be acceptable to their opponents because keeping an issue alive can be 
more politically advantageous than getting a bill passed.    
 As congressional districts have become increasingly homogeneous due, to 
some extent, to self-segregation on the part of voters who seek residence among 
others of similar racial, ethnic, and socio-economic background (see, for example, 
Gimpel and Schuknecht 2003 and Stonecash et al. 2003), pursuing a strategy of 
disagreement that emphasizes the differences between the two parties on 
controversial cultural issues has become especially helpful for reelection-minded 
politicians.  Electoral competition in homogeneous districts, where one political party 
is often dominant, is likely to come from within a member’s party (Galderisi, Ezra, 
and Lyons 2001; Goodliffe and Magleby 2001; Hacker and Pierson 2005).  Therefore, 
members of Congress are encouraged to look for issues that excite their party’s 
activists, who typically stand firmly on one side or the other in the culture wars.   
 In addition, because cultural issues evoke deeply held beliefs, they are 
especially susceptible to manipulation by politicians who use emotive, abstract 
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symbols to engage the public and to bring a response from people who had remained 
apathetic in the past (Edelman 1964; Cobb and Elder 1972; Baumgartner and Jones 
1993).  Finally, cultural issues are appealing to politicians because they are wedge 
issues that can lead some voters to abandon their normal party loyalty, even if only 
temporarily (Davidson and Oleszek 2002).  For example, religiously devout blacks, 
Latinos, and ethnic Catholics who support the Democratic Party on social welfare and 
economic issues are often uncomfortable with the party’s pro-choice position while 
middle- and upper-class women who might prefer the economic policies of the 
Republican Party tend to disagree strongly with the party’s position on abortion 
(Davidson and Oleszek 2002).  By putting cultural issues on the agenda, members of 
Congress force their opponents to take a position that could alienate some of their 
otherwise loyal voters while, at the same time, exciting their own party’s base. 
 Both Republicans and Democrats in Congress use legislation on cultural 
issues as a tool to highlight the differences between their position and that of their 
opponents and to force their opponents to take an unpopular position.  It is not 
uncommon, for example, especially in the Senate, where one can circumvent the tight 
grip of the leadership by introducing non-germane amendments, for Democrats to 
offer symbolic measures that simply affirm the chamber’s support for the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade or for women’s right to reproductive freedom more 
generally.  This forces moderate Republicans, whose constituents are often in favor of 
reproductive rights, to either alienate their constituents by voting against the 
Democratic measure or to draw criticism from powerful party leaders and potential 
primary challengers by voting with the opposition.   
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Yet, as Frank (2004) suggests, it is Republicans who have been most 
successful at putting their opponents on the defensive in the culture wars.  Since the 
1970s, Republican operatives have worked closely with conservative religious leaders 
to develop a simple message that resonates with a public that is not otherwise 
engaged in the political process (White 2003).  For example, in 1979, Paul Weyrich, a 
small-government, fiscally conservative Republican who served as press secretary for 
Republican Senator Gordon Allott of Colorado in the late-1960s, co-founded the 
culturally conservative Moral Majority with televangelist Jerry Falwell (Hallow 
2005).  A decade later, Ralph Reed, who started his political career as executive 
director of the College Republicans National Committee, joined Republican 
presidential candidate and Southern Baptist minister Pat Robertson’s Christian 
Coalition as its executive director.  The close ties the Republican Party has forged 
with traditionalist religious leaders who deliver the Republican message to their 
television audience and church membership have given Republicans an advantage in 
translating the narrative of the culture wars into electoral support.  
Democrats, on the other hand, have not been as effective in framing a 
culturally liberal narrative that resonates with a wide audience. This has become 
particularly difficult for Democrats in the aftermath of the Bill Clinton-Monica 
Lewinsky affair, when Clinton’s job approval rating remained high but polls showed 
that an overwhelming majority of Americans questioned the president’s moral 
judgment and did not believe he shared their values (White 2003).  Since then, 
Democrats have gone through great lengths to show voters that they have a deep 
sense of personal morality.  As a result, Democratic candidates for office often feel 
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the need to balance their support for culturally liberal policies with personal 
opposition to these policies.  For example, in the 2004 presidential election, John 
Kerry often qualified his pro-choice position on abortion with statements about his 
religious faith and his personal belief that life begins at conception (Finer 2004).  
Answering a question about same-sex marriage in his third debate with George W. 
Bush, Kerry expressed opposition to a proposed constitutional amendment defining 
marriage as a man and a woman but went on to say, “The president and I share the 
belief that marriage is between a man and a woman. I believe that. I believe marriage 
is between a man and a woman.”5   
Plan of the Dissertation 
 In the pages to come, I test several hypotheses related to the link between the 
electoral considerations of individual members and party leaders in Congress and the 
rise of cultural issues on the congressional agenda.  While there is reason to believe 
that Republican members are particularly inclined to use such issues as part of their 
electoral strategy, I also examine the extent to which such considerations affect 
agenda setting on culturally liberal issues, those that are most closely associated with 
the Democratic Party.  I begin in Chapter 2 with an overview of some of the most 
controversial battles in the culture wars.   
 In Chapter 3, I focus on individual members’ motivations for putting cultural 
issues on the agenda by sponsoring legislation that seeks to move morality policy in a 
liberal or a conservative direction.   Using data from the 108th Congress, I show that 
members respond, in part, to the agenda their primary opponents put forth in the 
                                                 
5 John Kerry, October 13, 2004.  Transcripts from all presidential debates are available on the website 
of the Commission on Presidential Debates, http://www.debates.org/pages/debtrans.htm. 
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previous election and suggest that members introduce bills on cultural issues to 
protect themselves against potential challenges in future primaries.  In addition, I 
show that senators are more likely to introduce bills that advocate a culturally 
conservative position during the last two years of their term, when they are most 
likely to be concerned with reelection.  
 Chapter 4 looks at the role committees play in setting the culture war agenda 
in Congress.  The authority of committees to hold hearings on any issue, even those 
that were not referred to the committee through legislation, gives committee leaders 
tremendous agenda setting powers.  The analysis in this chapter is divided into two 
parts.  First, I present descriptive statistics on committee hearings on cultural issues 
between 1981 and 2004 and show that committees, including those that are described 
in the literature as constituency-oriented committees, often seek out cultural 
controversies on their own.  I then analyze the circumstances under which bills that 
were introduced and referred to a congressional committee during this period are 
most likely to receive a hearing.  Here, the relationship between electoral 
considerations and agenda setting on cultural issues is not as clear as it is in the 
analysis of bill sponsorship. Still, there is evidence that committees under Republican 
control are more likely to hold hearings on cultural issues in a congressional election 
year. 
 In Chapter 5, I seek to explain the extent to which the timing of elections, the 
leadership style of individual leaders, and presidential politics affect the scheduling of 
floor votes once legislation on cultural issues is reported out of committee.  Because 
bills can be brought to the floor at any time, regardless of the order in which they 
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were placed on the floor calendar, the decision to schedule a floor vote is often 
shaped by political considerations.  Looking at the number of votes on cultural issues 
each month of each year between 1977 and 2004 in the House and 1979 and 2004 in 
the Senate, I find that, in an election year, the number of roll call votes on such issues 
increases in the months closest to the election.  This is particularly the case when 
Congress is under Republican leadership.  The analysis also shows that leadership 
matters.  The number of votes on cultural issues was considerably higher under the 
leadership of Newt Gingrich, who was known for his confrontational style. Finally, I 
conclude in Chapter 6 by summarizing the findings of the previous chapters and 
outlining the academic and practical implications of my research.  I present a detailed 
explanation of the data and methods employed in each part of the study in the 
appropriate chapter. 
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Chapter 2:  Key Battles in the Culture Wars 
 
 On August 23, 1992, just days after Pat Buchanan called on delegates at the 
1992 Republican National Convention to join him in a culture war for the soul of 
America, New York Governor Mario Cuomo appeared on CBS’s “Face the Nation” 
to discuss the presidential election.  When asked about the strong focus on religion 
and moral values at the Republican convention, Cuomo criticized Republicans for 
“tearing this country apart, cursing people, dividing us, saints and sinners, you know, 
condemning the people they thought were sinners because they don't live the way 
these Republicans want to live.”6  Cuomo went on to denounce Buchanan for 
“spitting venom in the face of the American people.”  In response to Cuomo’s 
appearance on the Sunday morning show, Buchanan wrote an article defending his 
position.  In it, Buchanan called abortion the “Bosnia of the cultural war” and 
homosexuality “both morally wrong and medically ruinous.”7  He then listed a 
number of issues—abortion, gay rights, prayer in public schools, women in combat, 
pornography—he considered central in this war before concluding with this message 
to Cuomo: “That, Mario, is what the cultural war is all about.”  
This war of words between Mario Cuomo and Pat Buchanan provides a 
snapshot of the divisions between the culturally progressive and the culturally 
orthodox.   In this chapter, I offer some examples of how these divisions have played 
out in local communities, state legislatures, and in the federal government by 
                                                 
6 A transcript of Cuomo’s August 23, 1992, interview on CBS’s “Face the Nation” with host Bob 
Schieffer is available through LexisNexis Academic.   
 
7 Buchanan’s article, “The Cultural War for the Soul of America,” September 14, 1992, is available at 
http://www.buchanan.org/pa-92-0914.html 
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outlining recent developments in some of the most contentious issues in the culture 
wars.   Each of these issues—abortion, gay rights, access to contraceptives, sex 
education, the role of creationism in science education, school prayer, expressions of 
religion in the public square, flag desecration, right-to-die issues, and embryonic stem 
cell research—has a complex history and intricate political and policy dynamics and 
many have been documented extensively by scholars (see, for example, Irvine 2004 
on sex education, Humphry and Clement 1998 on the right to die, and O’Connor 1996 
on abortion).  It is not my intention to offer a comprehensive account of how each of 
these issues has unfolded, but to highlight a few key events that give context to the 
culture wars in Congress.   
The Evolution of Cultural Conflicts 
  Abortion and gay rights are the two most prominent cultural issues today and, 
as such, their development is covered more thoroughly in this chapter than that of 
other issues.  Nevertheless, the other debates I highlight are just as central to the 
contemporary culture wars at the national, state, and local levels.  They frequently 
begin either as a local conflict, like the Stonewall Riots in the fight for gay rights, or 
as a personal event, as was the case in the mobilization for and against abortion 
rights.  As the next few pages show, many of these local controversies and personal 
experiences first attained national status through the involvement of national interest 
groups or the Supreme Court.  While each of these cultural clashes have different 
starting points and address seemingly unrelated issues, they have come under the 
culture war umbrella since the 1970s, when conservative religious leaders began to 
organize politically around these issues  in order to affect the outcome of elections 
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(White 2003).  In recent years, with more congressional and presidential candidates 
taking sides in these controversies and with the advent of 24-hour cable news 
channels and conservative talk radio, the culture wars have become increasingly 
central to the national political discourse.   
The Politics of Abortion Rights 
The abortion issue first captured the interest of the American public in 1962, 
when Sherri Finkbine, the host of a children’s television show in Arizona, traveled to 
Sweden to obtain a legal abortion after being denied one in the United States.  
Finkbine, a married mother of four, had learned that tranquilizers she had taken 
contained thalidomide, a drug associated with severe birth defects (Epstein and 
Kobylka 1992; O’Connor 1996).  The story gained wide media coverage and 
prompted pollsters to ask the public about their opinion on Finkbine’s case in 
particular and on abortion in general (O’Connor 1996).  What ensued was a decades-
long battle that still rages on today between abortion rights advocates and adversaries 
for the hearts and minds of the American people and lawmakers.    
 While the public did not begin to pay attention to the abortion debate until the 
1960s, activists on both sides had already been clashing for over a century.  From the 
1820s, when New York became the first state to adopt laws criminalizing abortion, 
until the Roe v. Wade (1973) Supreme Court ruling, which made abortion legal, 
proponents and opponents of abortion rights focused their attention primarily on state 
legislatures (Goggin 1993; O’Connor 1996).  By the late-1960s, however, abortion 
rights organizations like Planned Parenthood and the National Abortion Rights Action 
League (now knows as NARAL Pro-Choice America) had become convinced that 
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lobbying legislators in all fifty states was neither practical nor cost-effective.  
Drawing on the Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) Supreme Court decision, which 
repealed a Connecticut ban on the sale of contraceptives on the basis that it violated a 
couple’s right to privacy, abortion rights leaders decided to fight state abortion bans 
in the Supreme Court, where they could tackle every state at once (Epstein and 
Kobylka 1992; O’Connor 1996). The new strategy paid off and, in 1973, the Court 
ruled state bans on abortion unconstitutional.  
  Immediately following the Roe decision, antiabortion activists began to 
pursue an aggressive strategy in the states that involved lobbying legislatures—
successfully in many cases—to pass measures to restrict access to abortion.  The goal 
was twofold.  First, they wanted to see how far they could push legislators to impose 
restrictions and still remain within the scope of Roe (Halva-Neubauer 1993).  In some 
cases, however, they pushed for laws they knew were too restrictive so pro-choice 
groups would spend their already limited resources on judicial battles (O’Connor 
1996).  Some of the more questionable laws dictated who was allowed to perform 
abortions and under what circumstances. Others called for parental and spousal 
consent and required physicians to submit detailed reports to the state verifying that 
the fetus was not viable and documenting each procedure (Halva-Neubauer 1993; 
O’Connor 1996).  As antiabortion advocates had intended, pro-choice groups took the 
fight to the courts. In 1976, in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 
the Supreme Court ruled that a 1974 Missouri bill that encompassed restrictions that 
were similar to that of several other states had gone too far (Epstein and Kobylka 
1992; Halva-Neubauer 1993; O’Connor 1996).  
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 Following the favorable 1976 Supreme Court ruling, abortion rights activists 
reduced their political activities to a large extent. O’Connor (1996) suggests that pro-
choice leaders were somewhat complacent after the legal victory.  She quotes 
NARAL’s then-executive director Michael T. Malloy as saying that, “Before you 
know it this will be past history and abortion will just be another medical procedure. 
People will forget about this whole thing” (Malloy, quoted in O’Connor 1996, 63).  In 
the meantime, antiabortion activists continued to mobilize their supporters and to 
advance their cause. 
 After Missouri’s highly restrictive abortion law was struck down by the 
Supreme Court, antiabortion groups shifted their attention to the U.S. Congress, 
although they never completely withdrew from the fight in the states.  The first major 
victory for antiabortion activists in Congress in the post-Roe era was the Hyde 
amendment, some version of which has been adopted each year since 1976 (Goggin 
1993; Tatalovich and Schier 1993; O’Connor 1996). The Hyde amendment prevents 
federal funds from being used to cover the cost of abortions for women on welfare.  
By 1980, Reverend Jerry Falwell’s Moral Majority, an evangelical Protestant 
organization, had joined forces with the mostly Catholic antiabortion groups.  
Together, this new antiabortion alliance invested their resources into the 1980 
congressional and presidential campaigns (O’Connor 1996).  While it is questionable 
that their efforts were the primary reason for the gains, religious conservatives claim 
credit for replacing five pro-choice Democratic senators, thus giving Republicans the 
majority in that chamber, and electing Ronald Reagan president that year. While this 
new conservative majority could not enact some of its most extreme antiabortion 
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proposals, it cut funding for family planning programs significantly (Tatalovich and 
Schier 1993; O’Connor 1996). 
 One of the biggest failures of antiabortion members of Congress in the late-
1970s and early-1980s was their inability to pass the Human Life Amendment, which 
would have established that life begins at conception (O’Connor 1996).  The 
proposed constitutional amendment was the top priority of the antiabortion movement 
and, upon its failure, activists once again turned their attention to the states. This time, 
in addition to lobbying state legislatures to restrict abortion procedures through 
limited funding, as Congress had done, antiabortion activists also introduced 
referenda and ballot initiatives where possible (Halva-Neubauer 1993).  In some 
states in which initiatives were on the ballot, like Michigan, Arkansas, and Colorado, 
voters sided with antiabortion activists against state funding of abortions. In others, 
like Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Oregon, antiabortion ballot initiatives failed 
(Halva-Neubauer 1993).   
 In the late-1980s and early-1990s, a more conservative Supreme Court gave 
antiabortion advocates two important victories.  The first was the Webster v. 
Reproductive Health Services (1989) ruling upholding by a 5-4 margin an 
antiabortion Missouri law that included some of the same restrictions as the 1974 law.  
The second was in 1992, when the Court, again by a 5-4 margin, ruled in Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey that states were permitted to 
restrict abortion rights but not to ban it.  These two decisions empowered the 
antiabortion movement at the state level.  They also served as a wake-up call for pro-
choice activists who, before the rulings, did not believe a woman’s right to choose 
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was truly in jeopardy (Goggin 1993; O’Connor 1996).  Subsequently, a newly 
energized abortion rights movement raised enough money and mobilized enough 
support to help elect four new pro-choice governors, two senators, and nine 
representatives in 1990 and a pro-choice president, Bill Clinton, in 1992 (Goggin 
1993; O’Connor 1996).      
 In recent years, the battle between abortion rights advocates and antiabortion 
groups has focused largely on late-term abortion, often called “partial birth” abortion 
by those who oppose the procedure.  In 1996 and 1997, President Clinton vetoed bills 
banning late-term abortions sent to him by a conservative Congress. Unable to 
generate enough support in the Senate to override the president’s veto, antiabortion 
groups once again looked to state legislatures. As of 2004, more than thirty states had 
passed laws banning the procedure, although the law has been blocked by state courts 
in several of the states.  In 2000, the Supreme Court ruled that Nebraska’s late-term 
abortion ban was unconstitutional because it did not include a provision for the health 
of the mother and its definition of “partial birth” abortion was so broad that it might 
be used to outlaw all abortions (Dailard 2004).  Three years later, George W. Bush 
signed a federal law banning late-term abortions. The 2003 law resembles the 
Nebraska law and has already been deemed unconstitutional by three federal appeals 
courts (Weinstein 2006).  
 While the battle for and against abortion rights has been most intense at the 
state and national levels, local communities have seen their share of conflict over the 
issue.  In Greenville, South Carolina, and Denver, Colorado for example, police 
arrested several members of the antiabortion group Operation Rescue between 1989 
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and 1993 for staging attacks on abortion clinics (Clarke 1999; Woliver 1999).  Today, 
local clinics often rely on volunteer escorts to shield their patients from protesters 
who verbally—and sometimes physically—assault women seeking abortions.    
 Abortion politics at the local level has also focused on zoning laws that 
restrict or facilitate the operation of abortion clinics (Clarke 1999; Woliver 1999).  In 
Greenville, for example, after city officials cracked down on abortion clinic violence 
by arresting and prosecuting the perpetrators in the early-1990s, antiabortion activists 
resorted to challenging city zoning laws and public health requirements.  One group, 
Pastors for Life, went as far as buying a building adjacent to a Greenville clinic in 
order to monitor zoning ordinances violations that could be used in petitions to the 
city council against the abortion providers (Woliver 1999).  Antiabortion activists use 
similar strategies everyday—both violent protests and zoning complaints—in local 
communities across the country.   
The Fight over Gay Rights 
 As was the case with abortion, most states had anti-sodomy laws that 
criminalized sexual relations between gay men prior to the 1970s.  This pattern began 
to change after New York City police raided the Stonewall Inn, a gay bar in 
Greenwich Village on June 27, 1969.  Police raids on gay establishments were not 
uncommon at the time, as it was not uncommon for undercover police officers to pose 
as potential gay partners at such establishments in order to arrest men who took the 
bait (D’Emilio 2000).  In June of 1969, however, Stonewall patrons, along with a 
crowd that had gathered outside the bar during the raid, resisted the police action and 
staged protests that lasted for three days.  The event, which has come to be known as 
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the Stonewall Riots, empowered gay rights activists and brought issues of fair 
treatment of gays and lesbians to national attention (D’Emilio 2000; Wald 2000).    
 The Stonewall Riots ushered in a new era in gay rights politics in the states.  
Organizations like the Lambda Defense and Education Fund were created to 
challenge antigay legislation in state courts (D’Emilio 2000).  In 1975, Pennsylvania 
became the first state to take legal action to protect the rights of gays and lesbians 
when Governor Milton Shapp issued an executive order protecting state employees 
from discrimination (Button, Rienzo, and Wald 2000). Within a decade, close to half 
of the states had repealed their anti-sodomy laws. Laws that protected the civil rights 
of gays and lesbians specifically were introduced in state legislatures in New York, 
Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Colorado, among others (Button, Rienzo, and Wald 1997, 
2000).  In 1982, the Wisconsin legislature became the first state legislature to enact a 
pro-gay rights law when a bill that had been introduced by Democrat David 
Clarenbach in every session since 1975 was finally brought to a vote (Haider-Markel 
1997).  By the late-1990s, eleven state legislatures had passed bills protecting gays 
and lesbians from discrimination and eight governors had issued executive orders 
similar to that of Pennsylvania in 1975 (Button, Rienzo, and Wald 2000).  Focusing 
their efforts on state governments made sense to gay rights activists as many of the 
policy changes they sought, including the right to marry and protection from 
discrimination, fell under state—and sometimes local—jurisdiction.  
 Despite its many victories, however, the gay rights movements suffered some 
defeats in the 1970s and 1980s.  Antigay initiatives were put on the ballot in several 
states in an attempt to repeal anti-discrimination laws. A bill introduced by California 
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state senator John Briggs in 1978 sought to have gay and lesbian teachers fired from 
school districts. Though unsuccessful, the bill signaled an era of increased intolerance 
toward gays (Donovan, Wenzel, and Bowler 2000). This trend continued into the 
1980s at the state and national level with the election of Ronald Reagan and a 
Republican majority in the Senate and with the spread of AIDS among the gay 
community (D’Emilio 2000). In 1986, in a case that involved two Georgia men who 
were arrested for engaging in oral sex in the privacy of one of the men’s bedroom 
reached the Supreme Court. In Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), the Supreme Court ruled 
that state anti-sodomy laws were, in fact, constitutional. This ruling was reversed in 
2003 when the Court ruled in Lawrence v. Texas that anti-sodomy laws violate the 
right to privacy and equal protection under the law guaranteed in the U.S. 
Constitution.    
 Antigay activists continued to make inroads in their efforts to undermine gay 
rights laws in the states into the 1990s.  The Christian Coalition of Maine successfully 
overturned a law that banned discrimination based on sexual orientation in housing, 
employment, and education in a special referendum election and ballot initiatives 
aimed at restricting the rights of gays and lesbians appeared on the ballot in several 
states, including Oregon, Idaho, and Colorado ((Donovan, Wenzel, and Bowler 2000; 
Green 2000).  Yet, the efforts of antigay activists were thwarted in 1996 when the 
Supreme Court found Colorado’s initiative to be unconstitutional.  Writing the 
majority opinion for the 6-3 decision, Justice Anthony Kennedy said the measure was 
“inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class that it affects; it lacks a 
rational relationship to legitimate state interests” (Romer v. Evans 1996).   
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 In light of the Romer ruling, antigay activists changed the focus of their attack 
on gay rights. In 1993, gays and lesbians had scored a partial victory when a Hawaii 
judge ruled that preventing someone from getting married simply based on his or her 
partner’s gender might be a violation of Hawaii’s constitution and agreed to send the 
case to trial.  Thus, in the late-1990s, with their ability to invalidate state anti-
discrimination laws damaged by Romer, antigay advocates began to focus primarily 
on targeting the right of same-sex couples to marry or to enter into civil unions that 
confer the same rights as those of married heterosexual couples (Green 2000; Haider-
Markel 2000).  In 1996, Bill Clinton signed the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), 
which defined marriage as being between a man and a woman and declared that states 
were not required to recognized same-sex marriages sanctioned by other states.  By 
1998, every state legislature, with the exception of Nevada’s and Massachusetts’, had 
either passed or considered passing a state version of DOMA (Haider-Markel 2000).  
In April of 2005, Kansas became the eighteenth state to pass a constitutional ban on 
gay marriage (Peterson 2005).  
 While antigay advocates have been widely successful in their fight against 
same-sex marriage, gay rights advocates have won some battles.  In 2000, Vermont 
became the first state to recognize civil unions between same-sex couples.  In 2004, 
the first same-sex marriage was performed legally in Massachusetts.  In both 
instances, the law allowing gay and lesbian couples to marry or to at least enjoy most 
of the rights of married couples through civil unions came in response to court 
rulings.  On April 20, 2005, Connecticut became the first state in which the state 
legislature approved a bill allowing same-sex couples to enter into civil unions and 
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the governor, Republican Jodi Rell, promptly signed it into law (Altimari 2005).  
And, finally, on January 20, 2006, a Baltimore ruled that a 1973 Maryland law 
defining marriage as a union between a man and a woman is unconstitutional. 
 Gay rights advocates and their opponents have used similar strategies in their 
fight for and against gay rights at the local level as those used at the state and national 
levels.  Yet, defenders of gay rights have been more successful than their 
conservative counterparts at the local level. In the early-1970s, several large cities 
with sizable gay communities, like San Francisco, Seattle, and Minneapolis, and 
college towns, like Berkeley, Boulder, and Ann Arbor, adopted laws that protected 
gays and lesbians against discrimination (Button, Rienzo, and Wald 2000).  
 For much of the 1970s, local anti-discrimination provisions did not see 
significant challenges from antigay groups.  However, by the late-1970s, the situation 
had changed.  In 1977, Baptist singer Anita Bryant staged a massive campaign 
against a Dade County, Florida, anti-discrimination ordinance (D’Emilio 2000). 
Calling it a religious abomination and equating it with an invitation for gays to molest 
children, Bryant generated enough opposition to kill the Dade County measure by 
referendum.  She then took her fight to other cities, including Eugene, Oregon, St. 
Paul, Minnesota, and Wichita, Kansas, where she was joined by other antigay 
Christian conservatives (Button, Rienzo, and Wald 2000).  
 Despite the efforts of antigay activists like Bryant and members of several 
local antigay religious organizations around the country, such as the Concerned 
Texans Inc, which successfully repealed a 1993 measure adopted by the city council 
of Austin, Texas, to provide domestic partnership for same-sex partners of city 
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employees, gay rights activists have won many battles at the local level, especially in 
recent years. As many local pro-gay rights laws were adopted in the 1990s alone as in 
the 1970s and 1980s combined (Button, Rienzo, and Wald 2000).  Button, Rienzo, 
and Wald (2000) attribute this increased tolerance in recent years to more gays and 
lesbians coming out to their family and friends and, consequently, to more people 
realizing that such laws protect someone they know personally.   
Obstacles to Contraception Access  
 The controversy over women’s access to contraceptives is not new.  In fact, 
Elizabeth Cady Stanton and other champions of women’s rights made birth control a 
central issue of the suffrage movement in the 1800s (O’Connor 1996).  From the late-
1800s through the first half of the twentieth century, women’s rights groups were 
engaged in challenges to state laws that prohibited the sale of contraceptives as well 
as the dissemination of birth control information. In 1965, however, in Griswold v. 
Connecticut, the Supreme Court decided in favor of a Planned Parenthood clinic 
director and its doctor, who had been arrested for providing counseling to married 
couples concerning birth control.  The Court ruled that, while the U.S. Constitution 
did not contain an explicit protection of privacy rights, such protection was implicit in 
the Bill of Rights and, therefore, denying a woman the right to use contraceptives was 
unconstitutional (O’Connor 1996). Since then, the focus of the conflict over 
contraceptives between the culturally conservative and the culturally liberal has 
shifted somewhat.  Current debates about contraceptives generally focus on access to 
emergency contraception that can prevent pregnancies after unprotected intercourse 
has taken place, coverage of contraceptives by health insurance companies, and 
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pharmacists’ rights to refuse filling birth control pill prescriptions if doing so 
interferes with their religious beliefs.  
 As with other culture war issues, policy-making regarding women’s access to 
contraception occurs at the federal, state, and local levels.  In recent years, much of 
the debate over the issue has focused on health insurance coverage of birth control 
pills.  In 1998, Maryland became the first state to require private insurers that offer 
prescription plans to cover the cost of birth control pills.  Since then, about half of all 
states, including the southern states of North Carolina, Texas, and Georgia, have 
passed similar bills despite challenges from religious conservative groups (National 
Conference of State Legislatures 2005).  In 2004, the California Supreme Court 
decided against Catholic Charities of Sacramento in ruling that the state’s 
contraceptive coverage requirement did not infringe on the organizations right to 
practice its religion (Egelko 2004).  The U.S. Supreme Court dealt another blow to 
social conservatives later that same year when it refused the organization’s appeal.   
 In Congress, Democrats and moderate conservatives have backed multiple 
versions of bills calling for comprehensive insurance coverage of contraceptives since 
the 1990s.  In 1998, the House and the Senate approved coverage of all Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) approved contraceptives for federal workers under the 
Federal Employee Health Benefits Program.  Shortly after taking the presidential oath 
in 2001, however, George W. Bush undermined the efforts of the Congress when he 
introduced a budget that eliminated coverage of birth control pills for federal 
employees.  His action was reversed when the House voted 334-94 to restore 
coverage.  Most recently, Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid of Nevada, a pro-life 
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Democrat, has introduced the Prevention First Act, which would require all insurance 
companies to offer the same coverage for contraceptives as they do for other 
prescription medications.  Congress has not yet voted on the legislation.  
 Another, and arguably more controversial, piece of the recent contraception 
debate is the availability of emergency contraceptives, which prevents pregnancy 
after sexual intercourse, has taken place.  Even though the FDA has declared that 
emergency contraceptives are not effective if a woman is, in fact, pregnant, 
Concerned Women for America and Focus on the Family, two of the most active 
religious conservative groups, refer to such drugs on their websites as abortifacients, 
thus changing the debate from one about pregnancy prevention to one about 
pregnancy termination, which is a more contentious issue among the American 
public.   
 Since 2000, nineteen bills aimed at expanding women’s access to emergency 
contraception have been introduced in the House and the Senate, including the 2002 
Compassionate Care for Female Sexual Assault Survivors Act, introduced in the 
House by Republican Connie Morella of Maryland and Democrat Louise Slaughter of 
New York, which would deny federal funds to hospitals that refused to provide 
emergency contraceptives to victims of sexual assault.  None of the nineteen bills has 
received a vote on the floor of the House or the Senate.  
 State legislatures have also been slow to act on emergency contraception 
legislation.  Only six states—California, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, South 
Carolina, and Washington—require emergency room to dispense emergency 
contraception upon request (Alan Guttmacher Institute 2005).  In 1997, the state of 
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Washington became the first state to allow pharmacists to dispense such medication 
without a doctor’s prescription.  Only five other states—Alaska, California, Hawaii, 
Maine, and New Mexico—have followed suit (Alan Guttmacher Institute 2005).  
 Finally, a recent controversy has erupted over the right of pharmacists to 
refuse to fill prescriptions for contraceptives if doing so conflicts with their religious 
beliefs.  The recent call by conservative organizations such as Ohio-based 
Pharmacists for Life for “conscience clauses” for pharmacists who refuse to dispense 
birth control is reminiscent of the call for a “refusal clause” that allows doctors to 
refuse to perform abortions, some version of which has been enacted by Congress and 
forty-six states since the Roe v. Wade decision in 1973 (Alan Guttmacher Institute 
2005b).  So far, nine states have passed legislation that allows pharmacists to refuse 
to dispense contraceptives. 
 Since 2004, reproductive rights groups like the Alan Guttmacher Institute and 
Planned Parenthood have reported an increase in the number of cases in which local 
pharmacists refused to fill birth control prescriptions.  Such instances have occurred 
in communities across the country, including in towns in Georgia, Wisconsin, Texas, 
and New Hampshire.  In some instances, like in Fort Worth, Texas, women who have 
had their prescription denied have staged protests in front of pharmacies to alert other 
women to the situation (Jones 2004).  While Congress has not yet acted on the issue 
of pharmacists’ right to refuse to dispense contraceptives, a bill is pending in the 
House and the Senate that would guarantee women the right to have their 
prescriptions filled. The Access to Legal Pharmaceuticals Act of 2005, introduced in 
the House by Carolyn Maloney of New York and in the Senate by Frank Lautenberg 
 
 38
of New Jersey, states that if a pharmacist has a personal objection to contraception, 
another pharmacists in the same facility must be available to fill the prescription 
without delay.    
Talking about Sex in America’s Schools 
 The current battle over sex education focuses less on whether or not students 
should be taught about sex in schools but on what content sex education classes 
should cover.  On the culturally conservative side of the issue are those who believe 
that students should be taught that practicing abstinence is the only way to prevent 
unwanted pregnancies and sexually transmitted diseases and that any other prevention 
method, such as the use of condoms and birth control pills, should not be offered as 
an alternative.  Cultural liberals, on the other hand, support comprehensive sex 
education.  
 These opposing views about the extent to which sex education should teach 
children about different contraception and disease prevention began to take shape 
during the sexual revolution of the1960s. Prior to the sexual revolution, sex education 
in most school districts encompassed teaching boys about masturbation and teaching 
girls about menstruation (Irvine 2004).  But, as sexual norms were relaxed and the 
number of out-of-wedlock births increased, a rift emerged between those who, led by 
the Sex Information and Education Council of the United States (SIECUS), argued 
that access to preventive services, including comprehensive sex education, was the 
only effective way to reverse the trend and those who, led by the Christian Right, 
believed that sex education that included information on abortion and contraceptives 
would encourage students to engage in out-of-wedlock sexual activity (Irvine 2004).  
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Congress weighed in on the controversy in 1981 with the passage of the Adolescent 
Family Life Act (AFLA), a provision drafted by newly-elected conservatives to 
promote sex education that focused on chastity and morality rather than 
contraceptives and abortion (Irvine 2004).  These are the lines along which most 
current battles over sex education are drawn.  Most recently, the two camps have also 
clashed over what students should be taught regarding homosexuality. 
 Because curriculum decisions are typically made by local school boards, it is 
not surprising that the controversy over sex education is often intense at the local 
level.  In Montgomery County, Maryland, an affluent, liberal suburb of Washington, 
DC, for example, a controversy erupted when the county school board unanimously 
approved a new sex education curriculum in 2004.  The new curriculum, geared 
towards eighth and tenth graders, would contain information about abstinence as well 
as safe sex, including a video for tenth graders in which a woman is seen putting a 
condom on a cucumber.  The new curriculum would also discuss homosexuality and 
teach tolerance toward different sexual orientations.  Parents would be allowed to opt 
out of the program for their children.   
 Though most parents welcomed the changes in the Montgomery County sex 
education curriculum, it drew criticism from eight parents who attended the school 
board meeting in which the changes were approved (Dana 2004).  The parents’ 
objection was rooted primarily in religious beliefs.  For example, one father quoted 
by the Washington Post said, "We are a Catholic family and feel strongly that the 
school system has no right or business telling our children that . . . a homosexual 
orientation is acceptable" (Dana 2004).  Within days, parents on both sides of the 
 
 40
issue began a fierce letter-writing campaign to let the school board members know 
how strongly they opposed or supported the new changes and, a few months after the 
new curriculum was approved, two conservative groups, Citizens for a Responsible 
Curriculum and Parents and Friends of Ex-Gays and Gays, successfully sued the 
school system (Aratani and de Vise 2005).  A federal government issued a temporary 
restraining order preventing the school board from implementing the changes until 
new revisions are made.  
 In addition to local school boards, state governments have also been involved 
in the sex education controversy. At the state level, however, the debate has been 
more about funding decisions than about curriculum development.  In 1996, Congress 
included a provision in its welfare reform bill establishing a federal program to fund 
abstinence-only sex education and requiring states that apply for such funds to match 
it (Boonstra 2004).  Since the election for president of George W. Bush, an 
evangelical Christian with close ties to socially conservative groups, in 2000, federal 
funding for state abstinence-only sex education programs has increased significantly.  
This has fueled the controversy in the states. For example, in Ohio, researchers and 
activists have joined forces to challenge the $32 million the state spent on abstinence-
only sex education programs between 2000 and 2005 (McEnery 2005).  Several 
recipients of these state funds are local chapters of religious conservative 
organizations, like the Ohio Right to Life Foundation, that run training programs for 
teachers and often offer seminars in public schools that teach material deemed 
inaccurate by scientists and health professionals (McEnery 2005).  California, on the 
other hand, has refused to accept federal funds that require its public schools to teach 
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abstinence-only and has, instead, established a state-funded comprehensive sex 
education program.  As states become strapped for cash, however, it becomes 
increasingly difficult to reject federal support.  
The Role of Religion in Science Education  
 In 1925, John Scopes, a biology teacher in a Tennessee high school, was 
charged with teaching the theory of evolution in violation of state law. The trial, 
known as the Scopes Monkey Trial, gained national attention, in part because the lead 
prosecutor was three-time Democratic presidential candidate William Jennings Bryan 
(Douglas 2002).  The case was taken to the Tennessee Supreme Court, which ruled in 
favor of Scopes but did not deem Tennessee’s anti-evolution law unconstitutional.  In 
1968, the Supreme Court ruled that anti-evolution laws do, in fact, consist of an 
unconstitutional violation of the First Amendment because they are designed to keep 
a theory out of the classroom simply because it contradicts the biblical account of 
divine creation (Epperson v. Arkansas 1968).  Traditionalists suffered another blow in 
1987 when the Supreme Court ruled against a Louisiana law that stated that neither 
creationism nor evolution was required to be taught in Louisiana schools, but that if 
one was taught the other must also be taught (Edwards v. Aguillard 1987). 
 Like sex education, the teaching of creationism in science classes has been 
primarily a state and local issue.  In 1999, the Kansas Board of Education stirred 
controversy when it removed any mention of evolutionary theory from standardized 
tests and gave local school districts the autonomy to decide whether or not to include 
it in their curriculum (Gunn 2004).  Even though the Kansas Board of Education 
reversed its decision a year later, the fact that it had passed in the first place 
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empowered social conservatives to challenge the teaching of evolution in other states, 
including South Carolina, Louisiana, Missouri, Michigan, Ohio, and municipalities, 
like Blount County, Tennessee, and Cobb County, Georgia.  In 2005, however, 
supporters of intelligent design, a version of creationism that accepts that the earth is 
over four billion years old but that it was created by a higher being, suffered defeat 
when voters in the rural town of Dover, Pennsylvania, ousted eight members of the 
school board who had voted a year earlier to mandate that Dover high schools teach 
the theory of intelligent design in biology classes.   
 Conservative groups have also taken their fight to the U.S. Congress, although 
with much less success than they have enjoyed at the state and local level.  In 2000, 
proponents of intelligent design went to Capitol Hill to share their concern about 
science education with congressional staff and members (AGI Report 2000).  Two 
years later, the Senate rejected an amendment introduced by Rick Santorum of 
Pennsylvania to the No Child Left Behind Act that would have added the disclaimer 
that “Biological evolution is a controversial theory” to the bill (Dunn 2004).  For the 
most part, however, Congress has steered clear of the controversy, thus leaving it up 
to the states and local school boards to decide how to approach the teaching of 
evolution and creationism.   
Protecting the Flag against Free Speech 
Flag desecration first became a contentious issue during the Civil War, when a 
supporter of the Confederacy was convicted and executed for treason for shredding an 
American flag and dragging it through the mud in defiance of the North (Goldstein 
1996).  The issue resurfaced following the 1896 presidential election, when 
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Democrats sometimes destroyed American flags to protest William McKinley’s use 
of the flag as a symbol of his campaign, and again in the 1960s, when demonstrators 
burned the flag to protest the Vietnam War (Goldstein 1996).  Although instances of 
public desecration of the flag have been rare since the end of the Vietnam War, the 
debate has been lively since the Supreme Court ruled in 1989 that a Texas law that 
banned flag desecration violated the constitutional right to free speech (Texas v. 
Johnson 1989). 
 The Johnson case involved a Texas man who set fire to an American flag in 
front of the Dallas City Hall during a protest of the 1984 Republican National 
Convention.  Since the Johnson ruling, there have been few cases of flag desecration. 
According to the Citizens Flag Alliance, an organization that coordinates various 
groups’ efforts to amend the U.S. Constitution to protect the flag and whose website 
lists flag desecration occurrences by year, only 120 cases have been documented 
since 1989, an average of seven per year.8  The number is even smaller if one 
considers that the organization includes in its listing incidents such as that of an 
Oklahoma teenager who used a flag he had in his car to wipe oil from his car’s 
dipstick at a convenience store in 1996.  Still, the low incidence of flag desecration 
has not diminished politicians’ interest in the issue.  In fact, a constitutional 
amendment to ban flag desecration has been introduced in almost every session of 
Congress since the Johnson ruling.  While several versions of the amendment have 
passed in the House of Representatives, most recently in June 2005, it has failed to 
                                                 
8 Citizens Flag Alliance,  
http://www.cfa-inc.org/?section=issues&subsection=issues_acts&content=issues_acts 
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receive a two-thirds majority support in the Senate.  The 2005 House-approved 
amendment is pending in the Senate.  
 Politicians’ attention to flag desecration seems especially high during a 
campaign season.  Candidates who oppose amending the constitution to ban flag 
desecration tend to avoid using the issue during their campaigns out of fear of being 
labeled unpatriotic for opposing a position that has long been defended by veterans’ 
groups like the American Legion and United Veterans of America.  However, they 
are often forced to defend their position by their opponents.  In the 2000 senatorial 
election, for example, George Allen of Virginia used the issue in attacks against his 
Democratic opponent, Senator Chuck Robb, a Vietnam Veteran who had voted 
against the constitutional amendment in the Senate, thus forcing Robb, who had not 
made this position a centerpiece of his campaign, to answer questions from the media 
about it (Peter 2000).   
 More recently, religious conservative organizations have also made the ban on 
flag desecration an important piece of their lobbying efforts at the federal and state 
levels, citing protection of the flag as recognition and protection of America’s 
Christian heritage (Cushman 2003).  By 2002, the legislatures of all fifty states had 
approved non-binding resolutions calling on Congress to pass a flag protection 
amendment and send it to the states for ratification.  With five socially conservative 
freshman senators in the 109th Congress, state legislators may be close to getting their 
wish.     
 
 45
God in the Public Square 
While social conservatives define their positions on every issue in the 
contemporary culture war in religious terms, only a small set of issues explicitly deals 
with the expression of religion in the public square.  These are issues involving the 
display of religious symbols in public places, overt mentions of God in government-
sponsored activities, and government-sponsored prayer.  In recent years, public 
school prayer, Ten Commandments displays in courthouses and other government 
property, and the phrase “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance have been among 
the most strongly disputed expressions of religion in the public square.  Because 
opposition to such expressions is rooted in their constitutionality in light of the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, civil liberties groups like the 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and People for the American Way often 
fight such policies in court.  
 Public school prayer has been a central issue in the culture wars since the 
Supreme Court ruled against it twice in the early-1960s.  In Engel v. Vitale (1962) the 
Court ruled that a prayer approved by the New York State Board of Regents for use in 
New York public schools violated the constitutional separation between church and 
state.  A year later, the Supreme Court declared Bible reading and recitation of the 
Lord’s Prayer in public schools unconstitutional (Abington v. Schemp 1963).  The 
decisions, which prominent conservative religious leaders like Rev. Billy Graham 
equated with the Communist rejection of religion, were not popular among most 
Americans at a time when anti-Communist sentiment was pervasive (Alley 1994).   
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 Following the Supreme Court decisions banning school prayer in public 
schools, the House and the Senate held a series of hearings on proposed amendments 
to reverse the decisions.  While congressional opposition to the decisions was strong, 
members were reluctant to amend the constitution and the proposed amendment 
failed, sometimes on the floor, sometimes in committee (Alley 1994). Similar 
amendments introduced in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s also failed, including an 
amendment proposed by President Ronald Reagan soon after taking office in 1981.  
 In the mid-1990s, the battle over school prayer flared in Galveston, Texas, 
when a group of Mormon and Catholic students, alumni, and their parents challenged 
a prayer recited over the public address system at Santa Fe Independent School 
District football games.  Similar disputes take place in communities across the 
country routinely, but this local controversy received national attention in 2000, when 
the ACLU argued the case on behalf of those opposed to the public prayers before the 
Supreme Court.  The case also captured the interest of a national audience because 
the governor of Texas, George W. Bush, had virtually secured the Republican 
presidential nomination by the time the court decision was announced.  When the 
Supreme Court ruled in June 2000, that it was unconstitutional for public schools to 
hold organized prayer before football games, Bush called the decision disappointing 
and suggested that it violated students’ right to practice their religion (Greenhouse 
2000).  
 While the debate over school prayer has been at the center of the culture wars 
for decades, two controversies dealing with public expressions of religion, public 
displays of the Ten Commandments and the phrase “under God” in the Pledge of 
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Allegiance, have risen to national prominence in recent years.  A national debate 
regarding the appropriateness of the phrase “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance 
ensued following a 2002 ruling by the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in California that 
the phrase, which was inserted in the Pledge by the U.S. Congress in 1954, violated 
the constitutional separation of church and state (Newdow v. U.S. Congress 2002).  
The case was brought by Michael Newdow, a Sacramento atheist who objected to the 
recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance in his daughter’s second grade class at a public 
school because of its mention of God.  Conservative evangelical leaders like Jerry 
Falwell and James Dobson expressed outrage over the decision on cable news shows, 
while representatives from the ACLU and Americans United for Separation of 
Church and State defended the action of the 9th Circuit Court.  In 2004, the Supreme 
Court reversed the Circuit Court’s decision, but did not rule on the constitutionality of 
the Pledge of Allegiance.  Rather, it determined that Newdow did not have standing 
to bring the suit before the 9th Circuit Court because he did not have legal custody of 
his daughter (Elk Grove v. Newdow 2004).  
 Another national debate regarding the separation of church and state emerged 
in 2003, this time concerning the constitutionality of posting the Ten Commandments 
on public property.  Challenges by socially liberal organizations and citizens to Ten 
Commandments displays are not new.  In fact, the Supreme Court ruled in 1980 
against a Kentucky law that required public schools to display the religious document 
(Stone v. Graham 1980).  Legal challenges and protest continued across the country 
in the decades following the ruling.  For example, an organization called the Christian 
Family Association organized a rally in Green Bay, Wisconsin, in 1997 to call for a 
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countywide referendum that would put a Ten Commandments monument in the 
Brown County courthouse despite the Brown County Board’s rejection of the 
religious display (Vogels 1997).  However, these local controversies received little 
national attention until 2003, when Alabama Supreme Court Chief Justice Roy Moore 
refused to comply with a federal judge’s order that he remove a 5,300-pound Ten 
Commandments monument from the Alabama Supreme Court building.  The fact that 
a chief justice had defied the law propelled the story to national news.  Moore 
remained defiant when the U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear his appeal and was 
subsequently removed from office by the Alabama Court of the Judiciary.  Since 
then, Moore has announced that he will challenge Alabama governor Bob Riley in the 
Republican primary in 2006.  
 In June 2005, the Supreme Court ruled on two cases involving Ten 
Commandments displays.  In Van Order v. Perry, the Court decided by a 5-4 vote 
that a Ten Commandments monument that had been place outside of the Texas 
Capitol in 1961 did not violate the constitutional separation of church and state 
because it was part of a larger display that included other historical documents (Lane 
2005).  In the second case, McCreary v. ACLU, however, the Court ruled by the same 
margin that framed copies of the Ten Commandments that had been placed in 
courthouses in two Kentucky counties must be removed because they constituted a 
government endorsement of religion (Lane 2005).  With the rulings, which the Court 
handed down on the same day, the justices established that the constitutionality of 
Ten Commandments displays must be evaluated on a case by case basis. 
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 Congress has weighed in on the Pledge of Allegiance and Ten Commandment 
debates with symbolic gestures, but has not acted on substantive legislation that 
would affect policy regarding the two controversies.  Following the 9th Circuit Court 
ruling regarding the constitutionality of the phrase “under God” in the Pledge of 
Allegiance, for example, the House and the Senate passed bills expressing their 
disagreement with the decision and reaffirming the Pledge of Allegiance.  The bill 
passed unanimously in the Senate.  In the House, where the bill passed by a 401-5 
vote, members protested the court ruling by taking to the steps of the Capitol to recite 
the Pledge, virtually shouting the contested phrase.  Several attempts in the House 
and the Senate to amend the Constitution to protect the Pledge of Allegiance, 
however, have received few or no co-sponsors and have not been given hearings in 
committee.  Congressional action on the Ten Commandments controversy has 
followed a similar pattern.  While Congress has passed resolutions in support of 
Alabama Justice Roy Moore, several attempts to enact legislation requiring that the 
Ten Commandments be posted in the House and Senate chambers as well as in other 
government buildings have been stalled in committee.  
The Politics of Stem Cell Research  
Embryonic stem cell research or, more specifically, the use of federal funds 
for such research, is one of the most recent controversies in the American culture 
wars. Prior to 2001, federal funding of stem cell research was primarily an issue of 
concern for the scientific community.  Despite clashes between conservative 
Republicans in Congress and the Clinton administration over the conditions under 
which the government should fund experiments on human embryos in the mid-1990s, 
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the debate was often technical and did not generate much interest among the 
American public during Bill Clinton’s tenure.  
 On August 9, 2001, George W. Bush addressed the nation during prime time 
to announce that his administration would authorize federal funds to be used only for 
research using twenty-two stem cell lines that had already been created.  The 
scientific community decried the president’s decision which, in addition to limiting 
the research to a few existing lines, also canceled the National Institutes of Health 
review of research grant proposals for embryonic stem cell research, which Clinton 
had approved in 2000 (Dunn 2005).  In his address to the nation, however, Bush shied 
away from the complexities of the scientific research and couched his position, 
instead, in religious terms, declaring that “human life is a sacred gift from our 
Creator.  I worry about a culture that devalues life, and believe as your President I 
have an important obligation to foster and encourage respect for life in America and 
throughout the world.  And while we're all hopeful about the potential of this 
research, no one can be certain that the science will live up to the hope it has 
generated.”9  Since then, opposition to stem cell research has become an important 
part of the agenda of the Christian Right, which sees its position as consistent with 
respect for a “culture of life” that includes opposition to abortion.  
 Despite the advocacy of conservative religious organizations, most Americans 
disagree with the Bush administration’s position on stem cell research.  A May 2005 
CBS News poll shows that 58 percent of all respondents approve of embryonic stem 
cell research and 64 percent of those who approve of the research favor extending 
                                                 
9 For a full transcript of the President’s address, please see 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/08/20010809-2.html 
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federal funding for it.  The overwhelming support for the research among the public 
and the promise embryonic stem cell research holds for treating life-threatening 
illnesses like diabetes, spinal cord injury, and Parkinson’s disease have led even some 
staunch pro-life Republicans in the U.S. Congress to challenge the Bush 
administration on the issue.  In the House, for example, where a bill providing for an 
expansion of federal funding for embryonic stem cell research passed in May 2005, 
pro-life Republican Jim Ramstad of Minnesota has called the comparisons between 
embryonic stem cell research and abortion “a horrible insult to 100 million Americans 
suffering the ravages of diabetes, spinal cord paralysis, heart disease, Parkinson's and 
Alzheimer's disease, multiple sclerosis and Lou Gehrig's disease” (Congressional 
Record, 5/23/2005).  Senator Orrin Hatch of Utah, who consistently receives the 
highest possible rating from the National Right to Life Committee, is leading the fight 
in support of embryonic stem cell research in the Senate despite a veto threat to any 
bill that calls for an expansion of federal funds from George W. Bush.  
 Bush’s opposition to government funding of embryonic stem cell research has 
also been challenged in the states.  In 2004, California voters approved Proposition 
71, an initiative backed by Republican Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger that 
allocated $3 billion over ten years to stem cell research.  Since then, state officials 
across the country have expressed an interest in funding stem cell research in their 
states in order to compete with California, which is likely to benefit financially from 
the biotechnology community’s interest in the research (Jones 2005).  The governors 
of Wisconsin and New Jersey have proposed hundreds of millions of state dollars to 
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fund stem cell research.  The New York state legislature has committed $1 billion and 
similar proposals have been introduced in Massachusetts and Illinois (Jones 2005).   
The Right to Choose Death and the “Culture of Life” 
The culture wars intensified in 2005, when socially conservative members of 
Congress and George W. Bush inserted themselves in a controversy that had been 
brewing in Florida courts and in the state legislature for seven years.  In 1998, the 
husband of a 35-year-old brain damaged woman sought legal action to have his 
wife’s feeding tube removed against her parents’ wishes.  The husband claimed, and 
the court concurred, that the woman, who had been diagnosed as being in a persistent 
vegetative state, would not have wanted to be kept alive artificially in that condition.  
The case received much publicity in Florida, where Schiavo’s parents continued to 
appeal their case, unsuccessfully, before several judges and Governor Jeb Bush and 
Republicans in the state legislature successfully pushed for a bill that would make it 
illegal for a feeding tube to be removed in the absence of a living will only to see it 
ruled unconstitutional by a Pinellas County judge a few months later (Cerminara and 
Goodman 2005).   
 In March 2005, the Schiavo case captured a national audience as members of 
Congress passed and George W. Bush signed a bill requiring federal courts to hear 
the woman’s parents’ appeal again and calling for her feeding tube, which had been 
removed a few days earlier, to be reinserted in the meantime.  Following the actions 
of the national legislative and executive branches, cable news channels directed their 
coverage almost entirely to the case, which continued to play out in several 
courthouses and outside of the hospice where Schiavo was receiving care.  Like their 
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opposition to embryonic stem cell research, religious conservatives attributed their 
opposition to removing Schiavo’s feeding tube to a general concern for a “culture of 
life” and camped out outside of the hospice for days to express their opposition to 
terminating Schiavo’s life (Hull 2005).  Among the most vocal protesters was Randall 
Terry, founder of Operation Rescue, the organization that staged often-violent 
protests outside of abortion clinics in the 1980s and 1990s. 
 Despite intense opposition by prominent Republicans and conservative 
organizations, the American public overwhelmingly supported Schiavo’s husband’s 
decision.  According to an ABC News poll conducted on the day Congress enacted the 
Schiavo bill, 63 percent of all Americans, including 54 percent of conservatives, 
favored removing Schiavo’s feeding tube (Langer 2005).  The courts also sided with 
Schiavo’s husband and the feeding tube was not reinserted.  Schiavo died on April 1, 
2005.       
 The Schiavo case, however, was not the first time the question of whether 
those with a physically or mentally debilitating medical condition should have the 
right to instruct their doctor to terminate their lives generated a national debate.  In 
1976, the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that the parents of 21-year-old Karen Ann 
Quinlan, who had suffered irreversible brain damage and fallen into a persistent 
vegetative state, had the right to have their daughter’s respirator removed despite the 
objection of the woman’s doctors (Humphry and Clement 1998).  The Quinlan 
decision and the advocacy of Quinlan’s parents following her death motivated 
legislation in the states and in Congress as well as judicial decisions in support of 
advanced directives that allow adults to designate a guardian to make medical 
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decisions for them if they are unable to make decisions for themselves (Humphry and 
Clement 1998).  Today, all fifty states recognize advance directives as a legal 
document.   
 More controversial than the right to instruct doctors to disconnect machines 
that keep one alive artificially is whether or not doctors should be allowed to assist a 
suffering patient to commit suicide by administering or prescribing lethal drugs.  In 
1990, this issue gained visibility when Jack Kevorkian, a Michigan doctor, unveiled 
his “suicide machine,” a contraption that allowed patients to inject poison into their 
bloodstream with the push of a button, to the national press (Humphry and Clement 
1998).  Kevorkian’s machine raised ethical questions and led conservative state 
legislators in four states—Iowa, Rhode Island, Virginia, and Oklahoma—to pass laws 
explicitly banning physician-assisted suicide immediately.  Several states followed 
suit in subsequent years despite legal challenges by terminally-ill patients.   
 In 1997, the Supreme Court ruled in Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v. 
Quill that states did have the constitutional right to ban physician-assisted suicide.  
That same year, however, advocates of the practice scored a victory when Oregon 
became the first state to make it legal for doctors to prescribe medication in lethal 
dosages to terminally-ill patients who choose to terminate their lives.  The Death with 
Dignity Act, a citizens’ ballot initiative, received the vote of 60 percent of Oregon 
voters (Humphry and Clement 1998).  In 2001, U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft 
threatened to revoke the licenses of doctors who prescribed lethal doses of federally 
controlled substances under the Oregon physician-assisted suicide law.  Five years 
later, however, the Supreme Court ruled in Gonzales v. Oregon that the attorney 
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general does not have the authority to infringe on a state’s right to regulate medical 
practice.  Although physician-assisted suicide has not made the national headlines as 
consistently as other culture war issues since the late-1990s, this latest ruling by the 
Supreme Court is likely to change that.  State legislatures across the country, 
including in Vermont and California, are currently considering laws that mirror the 
Oregon act and conservatives in Congress are likely to take up the issue as they return 
to Washington for the start of the second session of the 109th Congress.  
Conclusion 
I begin to explore the dynamics of congressional agenda setting on cultural 
issues in the next chapter. The remaining chapters of this project focus on the rise of 
cultural issues on the agenda of the U.S. Congress. Yet, as this chapter reminds us, 
the culture wars are being waged simultaneously in multiple venues.  As in the fight 
for and against abortion and gay rights, two of the most contentious issues in the 
culture wars, struggles between social conservatives and progressives over all cultural 
issues unfold in America’s towns, cities, and states, as well as in the national arena.  
Frequently, the venues in which the culture wars play out reflect the strategies on 
either side of various debates. In the case of abortion, for example, Roe forced 
antiabortion state legislators to be creative in their lawmaking by using the power of 
the purse to restrict abortions, among other legislative strategies.  Romer played a 
similar role in the political battle over gay rights.  Once state governments were 
limited in their ability to ban anti-discrimination laws that protected gays and 
lesbians, antigay activists shifted their strategy to legal challenges against same-sex 
marriage.   
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 Sometimes a culture war controversy unfolds in a particular venue due to the 
nature of the issue at hand.  For example, policies related to school curriculum are 
typically set by local school boards.  Therefore, conflicts over the content of sex 
education and the teaching of creationism in science classes generally play out in 
local communities before they capture the attention of lawmakers at the federal level.  
Yet, while the state and local dynamics of the culture war have been documented 
extensively, the circumstances under which these controversial issues move from the 
state and local level, where they often originate, to the U.S. Congress have not 
received sufficient treatment.  
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Chapter 3:  Bill Sponsorship and the Culture Wars 
 
In 2002, voters in Maine’s 2nd congressional district were treated to an intense 
primary season as Republican and Democratic candidates battled for a chance to run 
for the open-seat previously occupied by Democrat John Baldacci, who vacated the 
seat to serve as Maine’s governor.  On the Democratic side, Michael Michaud, a 22-
year state legislator and president of the state senate, led the field of seven candidates.  
His closest opponent was State Senator Susan Longley, the openly gay daughter of 
former governor James Longley.  Michaud, a former mill worker, appealed to 
Democratic voters on economic issues and received the endorsement of the AFL-
CIO.  Yet, his views on cultural issues were decidedly to the right of his opponents 
and of his party’s primary voters, a point his opponents stressed in debates (Tuttle 
2002).  As a state legislator, he had supported strict restrictions on abortion rights and 
had voted against gay rights bills (Quinn 2002; Tuttle 2002).  While contributions 
from culturally conservative groups accounted for less than 2 percent of the $407,611 
in PAC contributions he received in the primary season, it was unusual for a 
Democrat to receive money from such groups in the first place. Culturally liberal 
groups, on the other hand, threw their support behind Longley and their contributions 
accounted for 69 percent of the $19,627 in PAC contributions her campaign received.  
In June 2002, Michaud won his party’s nomination by a small margin of 3.7 
percentage points.   
 In his general election contest, Michaud also faced opposition from the left on 
cultural issues.  His opponent, Kevin Raye, a pro-choice Republican who had served 
as Senator Olympia Snowe’s Chief of Staff and defeated three other contenders to 
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become the Republican nominee, received the endorsement of abortion rights groups.  
With the strong backing of major labor groups but without the help of liberal cultural 
groups that typically support Democratic candidates, Michaud defeated Raye by only 
four percentage points.  A few months later, as a freshman in the 108th Congress, the 
culturally conservative Democrat sponsored legislation to require the pharmacy 
benefits program of the Department of Defense to cover emergency contraception.  
While Michaud’s bill never received a hearing in committee or a vote on the floor, the 
mere fact that he introduced legislation to make emergency contraceptives accessible 
may have earned him points with Democrats in Maine’s 2nd district. In 2004, 
Michaud was unopposed in the Democratic primary.  
Bill sponsorship is a useful tool for members of Congress seeking to 
demonstrate to constituents that they care about certain issues.  The chairs of 
congressional committees have the ability to advance or to kill a bill by controlling 
the hearing schedule and majority party leaders exert tremendous agenda setting 
power by deciding the order in which legislation is considered on the floor.  However, 
the ability to introduce legislation affords every member of Congress, including those 
who have not attained positions of power within their respective chamber, the ability 
to put items on the congressional agenda and to claim credit for doing so. In this 
chapter, I analyze the circumstances under which members of the House and the 
Senate are likely to sponsor bills, resolutions, and amendments on cultural issues.  I 
posit that the introduction of bills on such issues reflects, in part, electoral 
considerations by members of Congress.  
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Introducing Cultural Issues: The Electoral Connection 
 Even though political scientists have produced a vast literature on the U.S. 
Congress, studies of bill introduction are rare.  Instead, scholars have focused 
primarily on determinants of roll call voting behavior (see for example, Snyder and 
Groseclose 2000) and on the motivations that shape members’ behavior more broadly 
(see for example, Fenno 1973, 1978 and Mayhew 1974).  Still, those who have sought 
to explain patterns of bill sponsorship have provided helpful insights into this 
important aspect of policy-making.  This limited literature shows that political and 
institutional factors, such as seniority, committee assignment, state size, constituency 
characteristics, and proximity of reelection, affect the number of bills a member of 
Congress introduces in a given session of Congress as well as the issue content of 
such bills (Schiller 1995; Woon 2004; Sulkin 2005). Because legislators and their 
staff are engaged in multiple activities, including research, media appearances, 
constituent services, and committee hearings, the decision to sponsor certain bills is 
indicative of a legislator’s priorities in the face of time constraints, limited resources, 
and careful consideration of the political consequences of linking him or herself to 
any given issue (Schiller 1995; Woon 2004).  
 When it comes to cultural issues, it is reasonable to expect members of 
Congress to be particularly mindful of the electoral consequences, both positive and 
negative, of their activities.  Cultural issues are typically controversial and polarizing 
and, as such, they pose a risk for members who worry about alienating part of the 
electorate (Mooney and Lee 1995; Tatalovich and Daynes 1998a; Smith and 
Tatalovich 2003).  On the other hand, members of Congress often resort to symbolic 
issues on which there is little room for compromise as elections approach in order to 
draw clear distinctions between their views and that of their opponents and to force 
their opponents to take a position on an issue they would prefer to avoid (Mouw and 
MacKuen 1992; Gilmour 1995; Davidson and Oleszek 2002).   
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Sulkin’s (2005) study of issue politics in Congress provides a useful 
framework for analyzing the dynamics of bill introduction on cultural issues.  At the 
core of Sulkin’s argument is the idea that reelection-minded members of Congress 
seek to shield themselves from future challenges by acting on the issues that were 
central to their challengers’ campaigns.10  Sometimes, introducing a single bill that 
shows concern with a particular issue raised by one’s challenger during the campaign, 
even if it does not reflect the challenger’s exact proposal, is enough for members to 
claim credit for putting the issue on the agenda, even if the bill never receives a 
hearing or makes it out of committee (Sulkin 2005).  This process of co-opting one’s 
opponent’s campaign issues, which Sulkin calls “issue uptake,” may explain 
Congressman Michaud’s introduction of the emergency contraception bill in the 108th 
Congress.   
A similar scenario took place in 2002 in Michigan’s 6th congressional district, 
where eight-term Republican Representative Fred Upton faced a primary challenge 
from the right.  Even though Upton opposes abortion rights, his exception in the case 
of rape and when the life of the mother is at risk and his support of stem cell research 
prompted State Senator Dale Shugars, a staunch conservative, to enter the race.  
Shugars, who held weekly prayer meetings at his campaign headquarters, made his 
strong antiabortion position the focus of the race and charged that Upton was too 
liberal for the southwest Michigan district in what some call the state’s Bible Belt 
(Pickler 2002; Ryan 2002).  In fact, Shugars contended that there would have been no 
reason for him to enter the race had Upton not voted against a bill that would have 
banned U.S. aid to overseas family planning clinics that provided abortion services 
                                                 
10 Sulkin’s (2005 definition of challengers does not follow the standard definition used in the 
campaigns and elections literature.  In that literature, a challenger is one who runs against an 
incumbent member of Congress.  In Sulkin’s definition, which I adopt in this chapter, a losing 
candidate for congressional office is considered to be a challenger.  For example, Kevin Raye is 
considered the challenger in the 2002 election in Maine’s 2nd district, even though he opposed Michael 
Michaud in an open-seat race.    
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(Pickler 2002).  With his culture war rhetoric, Shugars received 74 percent of the 
$12,427 he received in PAC contributions from culturally conservative groups.  
Nevertheless, Upton had the support of the state Republican Party and was able to run 
a successful campaign against Shugars (Ryan 2002).  When Upton went back to 
Capitol Hill for his ninth term, however, he reassured the religious base in his 
conservative district by introducing the Broadcast Decency Enforcement Act of 2004, 
which increased the fines imposed on radio and television broadcasters who 
transmitted obscene, indecent, and profane material.   
While Sulkin’s study of issue uptake focuses on general election dynamics, 
the examples from Maine’s 2nd district and Michigan’s 6th district suggest that, in the 
case of cultural issues, it is with potential primary challenges that members of 
Congress are most concerned.  Because the Republican and Democratic parties are 
polarized on cultural issues, advocacy groups and voters who are most committed to 
advancing cultural issues on both sides are solidly on the Republican or Democratic 
camp, depending on ideological orientation.  Therefore, the cooptation of cultural 
issues is more likely to occur in response to primary contests, when candidates 
compete for the support of their party’s voters and of major groups in their party’s 
coalition (Galderisi, Ezra, and Lyons 2001; Herrnson 2004; Hacker and Pierson 
2005).  By putting cultural issues on the agenda in response to a primary challenger’s 
attention to such issues, members show that they are deserving of the support of the 
party’s most loyal voters and advocacy groups in the next election, thus staving off 
future competition.  With increased homogeneity that has resulted in one-party 
congressional districts, primary elections, though frequently uncontested, are often 
the only way for voters to hold members of Congress accountable (Galderisi, Ezra, 
and Lyons 2001; Goodliffe and Magleby 2001).  As such, by keeping potential 
primary opponents away, members of Congress are often guaranteed reelection.  
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In this chapter, I test the hypothesis that the more attention a member’s 
primary challenger pays to conservative (liberal) cultural issues, the more likely the 
member is to introduce a bill on a conservative (liberal) cultural issue in the following 
congressional term.  I also hypothesize that members who face a competitive primary 
will be more likely to introduce a cultural issue bill that reflects the position of their 
party’s base in the following term, even if their primary challenger did not rely 
heavily on such issues in his or her campaign.  Again, this is intended to signal to the 
party’s most loyal supporters that the member is deserving of their support the next 
time he or she is up for reelection.  Finally, cultural issues evoke emotional responses 
and can be used effectively by members attempting to distinguish themselves from 
their opponents and to mobilize otherwise disengaged constituents and loyal 
partisans.  Therefore, I posit that members of Congress are more likely to introduce 
bills on such issues as an election nears.  Because House members are said to be 
constantly running for reelection because of the two-year election cycle in that 
chamber, this hypothesis only looks at senators, who are most concerned with 
reelection during the last two years of their six-year term, when voters and the media 
are most likely to be paying attention (Erikson and Wright 2001).  
Of course, issue cooptation on cultural issues may also occur in response to a 
general election challenge.  However, there is no reason to expect a Republican 
(Democrat) to take up a Democratic (Republican) challenger’s position on cultural 
issues unless the election was close, the member’s challenger focused on cultural 
issues, and the positions the challenger took on such issues were closer to that of the 
member’s party than to his or her own party’s position.  While this was the case in 
Congressman Michaud’s 2002 election campaign, it is a rare scenario.  In most cases, 
Republicans will run to the right of their Democratic challengers and Democrats will 
run to the left of their Republican challengers on cultural issues, and co-opting their 
general election challenger’s campaign issues in the term following an election would 
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make members more vulnerable to challenges from their own party in the next 
primary.  In her analysis, Sulkin (2005) offers the example of a Republican whose 
Democratic challenger supports universal health care coverage.  While it would not 
be a politically savvy move for the Republican to subsequently introduce legislation 
calling for universal health care, she can introduce a bill supporting the building of a 
health clinic in the district, thus showing concern for health issues without adopting a 
controversial measure that could alienate her party’s most loyal supporters.  The 
heated rhetoric of the culture wars, however, makes it virtually impossible for 
members to introduce bills that do not move policy in a clearly liberal or clearly 
conservative direction, making strategic maneuvers of the type Sulkin (2005) 
describes unlikely when it comes to cultural issues.   
The Culture Wars in the 108th Congress 
 One hundred fifty-one bills on cultural issues covering nine issue areas were 
introduced in the 108th Congress (2003-2004).  Of those, 99 were introduced in the 
House and 52 in the Senate.  Of the nine cultural issue areas of concern to legislators, 
abortion received the most attention. About one-quarter of all cultural issue bills dealt 
with abortion rights (see Figure 3.1).  Among those were bills that called for a ban on 
late-term abortions and for parental notification for minors seeking abortions as well 
as resolutions expressing support for the pro-choice March for Women’s Lives that 
took place in Washington, DC, in 2004 and bills that affirmed the right of military 
women living on U.S. military bases abroad to seek abortions.  Bills dealing with 
matters of public expressions of religion, such as school prayer, Ten Commandment 
displays, and the use of the phrase “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance, were the 
second most common, followed closely by bills concerning gay rights, which 
included conservative calls for constitutional amendments to ban same-sex marriage 
and liberal calls for the extension of domestic partnership benefits to gay partners. 
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FIGURE 3.1
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Approximately two-thirds of cultural issue bills introduced in each chamber of 
the 108th Congress advocated a conservative position.  As Figure 3.2 illustrates, the 
conservative position was particularly dominant in three issue areas.  Every bill that 
dealt with public expressions of religion sought to weaken the separation of church 
and state.  There was no attempt by legislators to prohibit public displays of religious 
symbols or to reinforce the separation of church and state in any way.  In addition, all 
bills concerning flag desecration and censorship of potentially offensive material 
were conservative.  Flag bills included proposed constitutional amendments to ban 
flag desecration as well as symbolic resolutions that would not affect policy but 
expressed opposition to any physical destruction of the flag.  Censorship bills, for the 
most part, sought to impose harsh penalties on radio and television broadcasts that 
contained material that might be deemed indecent.  
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FIGURE 3.2  
Ideological Position of Cultural Issue Bills in the 108th Congress
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The only issue area in which the liberal position was offered every time was 
stem cell research, which accounts for less than 5 percent of all cultural issue bills 
introduced in the 108th Congress.  Because of the promise it holds for a cure to life-
threatening illnesses like diabetes, heart disease, and spinal cord injury, stem cell 
research has garnered support not only from Democrats and moderate Republicans 
but also from some unlikely allies.  Senator Orrin Hatch, for example, a conservative 
Republican from Utah, has introduced bills to extend federal funding of stem cell 
research to embryonic cells, in spite of protests from conservative Christian groups.  
More recently, Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist from Tennessee, who typically sides 
with religious conservatives on cultural issues, has expressed support for a far-
reaching proposal to fund stem cell research.   
  Despite some crossover, however, the congressional culture wars have been 
fought primarily along party lines (see Figures 3.3 and 3.4).  Republicans sponsored 
88 percent of conservative culture war bills in the House and 92 percent in the Senate.  
Similarly, Democrats introduced 78 percent of liberal House bills on cultural issues 
and 86 percent of Senate bills.  The few defectors tend to be moderates from parts of 
the country that lean away from the ideological position of the members’ party.  For 
example, in the Senate, Republicans Lincoln Chafee of Rhode Island and Olympia 
Snowe of Maine introduced bills to expand access to contraception and Gordon Smith 
of Oregon introduced an amendment to extend protection to gays and lesbians under 
hate crime statutes, while Byron Dorgan, a Democrat from North Dakota, introduced 
bills against flag desecration and in favor of harsher penalties for indecent 
broadcasting.  In the 108th House, Republicans who introduced liberal bills included 
Mike Castle from Delaware and Christopher Shays from Connecticut. Among 
Democrats who introduced conservative bills were two moderate Texans, Gene Green 
and Chet Edwards.   
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Data and Methods  
 
In order to test the extent to which the cooptation of challengers’ issues, 
primary election competition, and the timing of elections affect the likelihood that a 
member of Congress will introduce a bill on cultural issues, I compiled a list of all 
bills, resolutions, and amendments introduced by members of the House and the 
Senate in the 108th Congress (2003-2004) using THOMAS, the congressional 
information database maintained by the Library of Congress.11   I coded each as a 1 if 
it tackles a cultural issue directly and as a 0 if it does not.  I further classified each 
cultural issue bill as a liberal or conservative bill.   Examples of liberal cultural bills 
are those that call for increased funding for family planning programs and that protect 
individuals against discrimination based on sexual orientation.  Conservative bills, on 
the other hand, include those that seek to restrict access to abortions or contraceptives 
and that call for a constitutional amendment to ban same-sex marriage.  I present 
results for liberal and conservative bill sponsorship separately.  For models of liberal 
bill sponsorship, the dependent variable equals 0 if the member did not introduce a 
culturally liberal bill in the 108th Congress and 1 if the member did introduce a liberal 
bill. Likewise, for models of conservative bill sponsorship, a 0 coding indicates that a 
member did not introduce a culturally conservative bill in the 108th Congress and a 1 
coding indicates that he or she did so.  I also present separate models for the House 
and for the Senate.  
Because the dependent variable in this analysis is dichotomous and has a 
considerably higher incidence of zeroes than ones, I employ rare events logistic 
                                                 
11 See Appendix A for a list of keywords used in the search.  THOMAS can be accessed at 
http://thomas.loc.gov/bss/d109query.html. 
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regression to analyze the likelihood of a member of Congress introducing a bill on a 
cultural issue.  Standard logit models often produce biased coefficients in rare events 
data and in samples under 200 (King and Zeng 2001a, 2001b).  The rare events logit 
model estimates robust standard errors and produces unbiased coefficients by 
reducing the mean square error (King and Zeng 2001a, 2001b).  This is not a 
maximum likelihood technique and there is no measure in a rare events logit model 
that corresponds to the maximum likelihood and other goodness of fit measures in the 
standard logit model.  For each relogit model, therefore, I present goodness of fit 
measures for the corresponding logit model in order to show that the model performs 
well.  Although I frame the discussion of results around changes in predicted 
probability of introducing a liberal or conservative cultural bill for ease of 
interpretation, I also present rare events logit coefficients.12    
To measure the effect of issue uptake in the House, I use the percentage of a 
member’s primary election challenger’s total political action committee (PAC) 
contributions that came from liberal or conservative cultural groups as a proxy for 
primary challengers’ attention to cultural issues (contributions by liberal groups are 
used in the model of liberal bill introduction and contributions by conservative groups 
are used in the model of conservative bill introduction).  For example, it is reasonable 
to expect primary challengers who received most of their contributions from 
conservative groups like the National Right to Life Committee and the Traditional 
Values Coalition to be candidates for whom moving cultural issues in a conservative 
direction is a priority during the campaign.  Likewise, it is reasonable to expect those 
                                                 
12 The rare events logit model was estimated using the relogit program available from Gary King’s 
website (http://gking.harvard.edu).  The program is a Stata ado file.  Predicted probabilities were 
computed using the setx and relogitq commands that come with the relogit ado file.    
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who are funded mostly by Planned Parenthood or Human Rights Campaign to be 
particularly concerned with moving cultural issues in a liberal direction.   
The measure of issue priority I employ is different from that used by Sulkin 
(2005).  Sulkin (2005) counts the number of lines of newspaper coverage devoted to a 
particular theme that can be directly attributed to a statement by the candidate or by a 
member of his or her staff in order to identify the issue priorities of Senate candidates.  
Because media coverage of House races is infrequent, Sulkin (2005) relies on CQ 
Weekly’s special election issue to identify the issues that are important to House 
candidates. Unfortunately, when it comes to measuring the issue priorities of House 
primary candidates, neither measure is helpful.  Newspaper coverage of House 
primary challengers is often reduced to articles that list the names of candidates on 
the ballot or that outline candidates’ positions on particular issues.  Only a small 
number of articles attribute statements to candidates or to their campaigns.  Moreover, 
CQ Weekly does not cover primary elections as extensively as it does general 
elections.  In fact, only seven articles on House primaries appeared in the publication 
in 2002, and most focused on a single issue rather than providing an overview of 
candidates’ priorities.  
Ideological PACs tend to give money to candidates who are already 
sympathetic to their cause and are more likely than corporate and other types of PACs 
to fund the bids of non-incumbents, which are often unsuccessful (Herrnson 2005).  
In fact, 70 percent of all primary challengers who received money from conservative 
or liberal cultural PACs lost their race by 10 percentage points or more.  Of those, 
half lost by at least 20 percentage points. The willingness of ideological PACs to 
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invest in candidates that have little chance of being elected suggests that these PACs 
are often as concerned with disseminating their message and raising the visibility of 
issues they consider important as they are with shaping the composition of Congress 
(Herrnson 2005).  Is it, therefore, reasonable to expect cultural issue PACs to give to 
candidates who make cultural issues a campaign priority rather than simply giving to 
candidates who share the groups’ positions on issues.  After all, candidates who hold 
a position on a particular issue but do not make the issue a campaign priority do little 
to raise issue visibility.  For example, in one of the few primary races that received 
extensive newspaper coverage in 2002, the contest for the open-seat vacated by 
Republican Congressman Sonny Callahan in Alabama’s 1st district, neither Jo 
Bonner, the eventual winner of the primary and general elections, nor Tom Young, 
Bonner’s closest primary opponent, received PAC contributions from cultural groups.  
While some newspaper articles mentioned that all seven contenders for the 
Republican nomination shared a conservative position on abortion rights and other 
cultural issues, none of the quotes attributed to the candidates or to their campaign 
staff referred to such issues, suggesting that cultural issues were not central to the 
campaign even though the candidates had taken position on them.13  On the other 
hand, Jim Baker, who ran against Vic Snyder in Arkansas’ 2nd district Democratic 
primary and received 11.4 percent of his PAC contributions from conservative 
groups, made statements in opposition to abortion rights, flag desecration, and 
cloning, but focused most heavily on health care, low wages, highway funding, and 
various issues that appealed to his district’s farming community.    
                                                 
13 Not enough primary races received sufficient newspaper coverage for me to conduct a systematic 
comparison between the two measures of issue priority.  
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It is possible, however, that some House members focused on cultural issues 
during the primary season just as much as their challengers did and that bill 
introduction in the term following the election is a reflection of members’ existing 
priorities.  I account for that possibility by including a measure of members’ attention 
to cultural issues.  For this, I use the percentage of members’ total PAC contributions 
that came from liberal or conservative cultural groups.  All PAC contribution figures 
are based on reports to the Federal Election Commission (FEC).14  I merged FEC 
contribution files, which contain identification numbers for PACs and the candidates 
to which they give contributions in addition to the amount donated and whether the 
contribution was made in the primary or general election season, with PAC and 
candidate master files, which contain the names of PACs and candidates.  I identified 
each PAC as being primarily concerned with conservative cultural issues, liberal 
cultural issues, or not primarily concerned with cultural issues.  Most groups on the 
dataset are well known and easily identifiable as a cultural issue PAC or not.  When I 
was unsure of a group’s focus, I searched for the group’s website or articles that 
mention the group and its mission.  PAC contributions data for House members and 
their primary election candidates are from the 2001-2002 election cycle.   
Unfortunately, limitations in the data make it difficult to test the theory of 
cultural issue uptake in the Senate.  Unlike House races, which are contested in small, 
homogeneous districts, Senate races are statewide affairs that target a more diverse 
electorate and, therefore, rely on more sophisticated and costly campaign 
organizations.  It is difficult, therefore, for cultural interest groups, especially 
religious conservative groups, which typically run grassroots efforts, to be as 
                                                 
14 Data is available for download at http://www.fec.gov/finance/disclosure/ftpdet.shtml.  
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effective in Senate elections as they are in House races (Green and Bigelow 2005).  
Consequently, campaign contributions by cultural issue advocacy groups to 
challengers in senatorial primary election cycles are rare.  In fact, only three senators 
in the 108th Congress had faced primary challengers who received contributions from 
culturally conservative groups and only five had faced primary challengers who 
received contributions from culturally liberal groups.   
An attempt to employ Sulkin’s (2005) measure of challengers’ issue priorities 
was also fruitless.  Even though Senate primaries are statewide races and, as such, of 
interest to a larger audience than House races, they are typically less competitive than 
House primaries (Herrnson 2004).  Newspaper coverage of Senate primaries is, 
therefore, limited.  LexisNexis searches of state newspapers and searches on the 
Internet yielded inconclusive results about the extent to which Senate primary 
challengers paid attention to cultural issues in their campaigns.  Consequently, I do 
not test the extent to which issue uptake affects the introduction of cultural issue bills 
in the Senate.   
I do, however, include the percentage of senators’ total PAC contributions that 
came from culturally liberal and conservative groups in the primary election cycle in 
which they were elected to the Senate.  While the number of primary challengers who 
received such contributions is too small to include in the statistical analysis, 30 
senators received contributions from conservative groups and 40 received primary 
contributions from liberal groups.  Considering the generally low level of 
involvement by such groups in Senate primaries, it is reasonable to assume that 
senators who received the support of cultural groups in the early stages of their 
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campaigns are among the strongest supporters of the positions the groups advocate 
and the most likely to introduce bills on cultural issues.  
The main measure of the effect of electoral considerations on bill sponsorship 
on cultural issues in the Senate is the timing of sponsorship.  If the contention that 
culture war issues are good campaign material is correct, senators should be more 
likely to introduce bills on such issues the closer they get to reelection.  I code 
members who were up for reelection in 2004, at the end of the 108th Congress, as 2.  
Those who will be up for reelection in 2006 are coded as 1 and those who will not 
face reelection until 2008 are coded as 0.  
Following Goodliffe and Magleby (2001), I use a three-point measure to 
determine the level of primary competition members of the House and the Senate 
faced.  For House members, the figure is for the 2002 election.  For the Senate, the 
figure reflects competition in the year in which each member was elected to the 108th 
Congress.  If the vote difference between a member and his or her closest opponent is 
100 percentage points, the election is coded as 0, or uncontested.  If the vote 
difference is between 11 and 99 percentage points, the election is coded as 1, or 
weakly competitive.  Finally, elections in which the margin of victory was 10 
percentage points or less are considered to be competitive and are coded as 2.  
Finally, I use a series of control measures to account for factors other than 
electoral considerations that may affect the likelihood that a member of the House or 
the Senate will sponsor a bill on a cultural issue.  To account for members’ 
responsiveness to their constituents, I include a measure of evangelical adherence in 
each district for House models and in each state for Senate models.  This data was 
 
 76
computed using GIS software to map county level figures provided by the Glenmary 
Research Center onto congressional districts and states.15  It measures the percentage 
of district and state residents who identify as evangelical Christians.  Because the 
culture war rhetoric has been framed from its inception as a conflict between the 
religious orthodox and progressives, religious or otherwise, and the most vocal voices 
on the right are prominent evangelicals like Pat Robertson and Jerry Falwell, 
members who represent overwhelmingly evangelical constituents should be more 
likely to introduce conservative bills on cultural issues. On the other hand, members 
who represent states and districts with a low concentration of evangelicals should be 
more likely to introduce liberal bills on cultural issues.  
The next set of control measures relate to member characteristics.  Member 
religion is coded as 1 if the member is evangelical and as 0 if the member is not.  For 
the Senate, I obtained detailed information about religious affiliation through 
LexisNexis and other Internet-based searches.16 I then used Layman’s (2001) coding 
scheme to determine which religions are evangelical and which are not and coded 
each member accordingly.  This measure is included in all models except for the 
model of liberal bill introduction in the Senate.  The relogit program does not run 
models that include variables that predict failure perfectly in the corresponding 
standard logit model.  Of the fifteen evangelical senators in the 108th Congress, none 
introduced a bill that advocated a liberal position on cultural issues.  
                                                 
15 I thank Nate Bigelow for his generosity in sharing this data with me.  
 
16 The National Journal’s Almanac of American Politics also provides information on member religion.  
However, this information is not specific enough to be helpful for this analysis. For example, a 
member’s religion may be listed simply as “Presbyterian.” However, adherents of Presbyterian Church 
in America are evangelical while adherents of Presbyterian Church (USA) are not. Detailed religion 
data for House members was provide by John  Green at the University of Akron.  
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The next measure of member characteristics is sex, coded as 0 for male and 1 
for female, to account for the possibility of a gender gap effect in the culture war. 
This measure is not included in the model of conservative bill introduction in the 
Senate because it predicts failure perfectly in the corresponding standard logit model.  
None of the twelve women in the sample—eight Democrats and four Republicans—
introduced a bill that moved cultural issues to the right.   
As Figures 3.3 and 3.4 illustrate, the culture war is highly partisan.  Rather 
than including a simple measure of members’ party affiliation in the models, 
however, I control, instead, for whether or not members are Republicans elected in or 
after 1994.  The measure correlates highly with member ideology (r = -.63 in the 
House and r = -.62 in the Senate using ADA scores as a measure of liberalism).  It 
also accounts, however, for the political context of the post-1994 era, a period during 
which the Republican Party has grown increasingly conservative, particularly on 
cultural issues (Hacker and Pierson 2005).  In 1994, under the leadership of then-
House minority whip Newt Gingrich, Republicans regained control of both chambers 
of Congress for the first time in forty years, picking up fifty-four seats in the House 
and eight seats in the Senate.  Although the “Contract with America,” the document 
that is often credited with propelling Republicans to victory in 1994, focused 
primarily on fiscal and institutional reforms, like calls for a balanced budget 
amendment and term limits for lawmakers, the Republican agenda also sought to curb 
abortion rights, deny welfare benefits to children born out of wedlock, and cut 
funding for sex education programs that did not teach abstinence only.   Among the 
members of the Republican freshman class elected to the House in 1994 were Rick 
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Santorum of Pennsylvania and Tom Coburn of Oklahoma, who are now among the 
most socially conservative members of the Senate.  Because no Republican member 
elected to the House in 1994 or later introduced a liberal bill on a cultural issue in the 
108th Congress, the relogit program requires the measure to be excluded from the 
model of liberal bill introduction in the House.  
Finally, I control for the total number of bills a member introduced in the 108th 
Congress.  The total number of bills introduced ranges from 0 to 120 in the House 
and from 4 to 103 in the Senate.  It is reasonable to expect the likelihood of 
introducing a cultural bill to be higher among members who introduce dozens of bills 
than among members who introduce only a handful of bills.   I eliminate from the 
sample any member who was appointed to fill a vacant seat without an election, any 
member who did not serve the full session, and members from Louisiana, where the 
run-off election system makes it difficult to measure primary campaign dynamics.  
The resulting sample is presented in Table 3.1.  
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TABLE 3.1 
Number and Percentage of Members Who Introduced Cultural Issue Bills in the  
108th Congress 
  Number of 
members 
 Percentage of 
members 
     
House     
     Conservative bills  35  8.2 
     Liberal bills  21  5.0 
     Total number of members in sample  424   
     
Senate     
     Conservative bills  16  16.7 
     Liberal bills  14  14.6 
     Total number of members in sample  96   
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Launching the Culture Wars in the House  
 
The models of conservative and liberal cultural bill sponsorship suggest that 
electoral considerations play a significant role in members’ decision to introduce a 
bill on a cultural issue (see Table 3.2).  There is also evidence that members who 
introduce culturally conservative bills and those who introduce culturally liberal bills 
do so in response to their constituents’ views.  Members’ personal characteristics, 
however, are not significant predictors of whether or not they will introduce a bill on 
a cultural issue.   
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TABLE 3.2 
Rare Events Logistic Regression Analysis of Cultural Bill Introduction  
in the House  
  Conservative 
bills 
 Liberal  
bills 
       
Primary challenger’s attention      0.03**      0.04** 
  (0.02)   (0.02) 
Members’ attention      0.08**       0.03** 
  (0.04)    (0.10) 
Primary competition        -0.04  -0.04 
  (0.32)   (0.46) 
Evangelical       0.03***     -0.04** 
  (0.01)   (0.01) 
Member religion  0.08  0.84 
  (0.51)  (0.91) 
Sex  0.45  0.28 
  (0.48)   (0.70) 
Post-1994     0.85**  a 
  (0.37)  -- 
Total bills        0.04***      0.04** 
  (0.01)   (0.02) 
Constant      -4.72***       -3.40*** 
  (0.58)   (0.66) 
     
Log likelihoodb  -103.79  -62.11 
Log likelihood chi-squareb         34.05***        42.95*** 
Percentage correctly classifiedb  92.45  95.05 
N  424  424 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
a Variables dropped from the model because they predict failure perfectly in the 
corresponding logit model.  
b Based on goodness of fit of corresponding logit model. 
*p≤.10; **p≤.05; ***p≤.001. 
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As predicted, members of the House engage in issue uptake when it comes to 
sponsoring bills on cultural issues.  A member whose primary election opponent was 
among the most attentive to liberal cultural issues is 22 percentage points more likely 
than a member whose opponent did not emphasize a culturally liberal agenda to 
introduce a liberal bill in the term following the election when all other variables are 
held at their mean (see Table 3.3).17  Members who introduce conservative bills on 
cultural issues are even more responsive to their primary challengers’ attention to the 
culture wars.  There is a 61-percentage-point increase in the probability of 
introducing a conservative bill from members whose primary opponent did not focus 
on culturally conservative issue to members whose opponents were among the most 
focused on such issues.  
 
                                                 
17 Appendix B contains a list of minimum, maximum, and mean values for all independent variables in 
the House models. 
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TABLE 3.3 
Change in Predicted Probability of Introducing a Cultural Issue Bill  
in the House  
  Conservative 
bills 
 Liberal  
bills 
       
Primary challenger’s attention      0.61**       0.22** 
Members’ attention      0.08**       0.55** 
Primary competition        -0.04  -0.01 
Evangelical       0.26***      -0.09** 
Member religion          0.08   0.04 
Sex  0.03   0.02 
Post-1994      0.05**  a 
Total bills        0.70***       0.58** 
     
N  424  424 
a Variables dropped from the model because they predict failure perfectly in 
corresponding logit model.  
*p≤.10; **p≤.05; ***p≤.001. 
 
 
 84
Members do not seem to respond, however, to primary competitiveness.  The 
measure is not statistically significant in either House model.  Alternative models 
including an interaction term aimed at testing the significance of competitiveness 
among members whose primary challengers’ campaign focused heavily on cultural 
issues did not yield statistical significant results and did not change the effect of the 
other variables significantly.  This suggests that simply having a primary opponent 
who is concerned with either conservative or liberal cultural causes, even one who 
does not receive a large share of the vote, makes members of Congress apprehensive 
about future primary challenges and motivates them to introduce bills on cultural 
issues that reassure party loyalists of their commitment to these partisan causes.   
Partisanship also affects the likelihood of introducing a bill on cultural issues 
in the House.  While Republicans introduced close to 90 percent of all conservative 
bills on cultural issues in the 108th House and Democrats introduced just under 80 
percent of liberal bills, as Figure 3.3 shows, Republicans who were elected in 1994 or 
later are particularly inclined to introduce conservative bills.  Compared to all other 
members, these Republicans were 5 percentage points more likely to introduce 
conservative bills on cultural issues (see Table 3.3).  None of the Republicans elected 
since 1994 introduced a liberal cultural issue bill.  In contrast, three Republicans 
elected prior to the Gingrich-led revolution introduced liberal bills in the 108th House. 
Mike Castle of Delaware introduced legislation in favor of comprehensive sex 
education and stem cell research, James Greenwood of Pennsylvania introduced bills 
in support of funding for family planning programs and cloning, and Christopher 
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Shays of Connecticut introduced a bill opposing employment discrimination based on 
sexual orientation.   
In addition to partisanship and electoral considerations, members also respond 
to their constituents when deciding whether or not to introduce a cultural issue in the 
House.  When it comes to culturally conservative bill introduction, members from 
districts with the highest percentage of evangelicals are 26 percentage points more 
likely than those from districts with the lowest percentage of evangelicals to sponsor 
legislation.  In the case of culturally liberal bills, an increase from the weakest to the 
strongest presence of evangelicals in a member’s district lowers the probability that 
the member will sponsor legislation by 9 percentage points.  Interestingly, the religion 
of members themselves does not play a significant role in the decision to introduce 
cultural bills.  Evangelical members are neither more likely to introduce conservative 
bills nor less likely to introduce liberal bills than those who are not evangelical.  
The Culture Wars in the Senate  
 The Senate models do not perform as well as the House models in predicting 
the factors that make members more likely to sponsor legislation on cultural issues 
(see Table 3.4).  Still, when it comes to the introduction of conservative bills, there is 
evidence that senators take electoral considerations into account.  Senators who 
served the last two years of their term in the 108th Congress were 17 percentage 
points more likely than senators who would not be up for reelection until 2008 to 
pursue a conservative cultural agenda by sponsoring legislation (see Table 3.5).18  
                                                 
18 Appendix B contains a list of minimum, maximum, and mean values for all independent variables in 
the Senate models.  
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The timing of elections does not play a significant role in the decision to sponsor 
culturally liberal legislation.   
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TABLE 3.4 
Rare Events Logistic Regression Analysis of Cultural Bill Introduction  
in the Senate  
  Conservative 
bills 
 Liberal  
bills 
       
Timing      0.61*  0.23 
    (0.35)         (0.45) 
Members’ attention    0.04          0.02 
    (0.03)         (0.04) 
Primary competition  -0.85          0.35 
    (0.56)         (0.57) 
Evangelical   0.01         -0.4* 
    (0.01)   (0.02) 
Member religion   0.73  a 
    (0.77)  -- 
Sex  a  0.47 
  --   (0.74) 
Post-1994      1.45**         -0.06 
   (0.57)   (0.72) 
Total bills  -0.01          0.02 
   (0.01)   (0.01) 
Constant  -4.72**      -1.84** 
   (0.58)   (0.86) 
     
Log likelihoodb  -37.24        -33.00 
Log likelihood chi-squareb     12.02*      13.77** 
Percentage correctly classifiedb  81.25  87.50 
N  96  96 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
a Variables dropped from the model because they predict failure perfectly in the 
corresponding logit model.  
b Based on goodness of fit of corresponding logit model. 
*p≤.10; **p≤.05; ***p≤.001. 
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TABLE 3.5 
Change in Predicted Probability of Introducing a Cultural Issue Bill  
in the Senate  
  Conservative 
bills 
 Liberal  
bills 
       
Timing      0.17*  0.06 
Members’ attention    0.52          0.16 
Primary competition  -0.17          0.09 
Evangelical   0.09         -0.3* 
Member religion   0.11  a 
Sex  a  0.06 
Post-1994      0.23**         -0.01 
Total bills  -0.10          0.25 
     
N  96  96 
a Variables dropped from the model because they predict failure perfectly in 
corresponding logit model.  
*p≤.10; **p≤.05; ***p≤.001. 
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 As in the House, Republicans who were elected in 1994 or later were 
particularly likely to sponsor conservative legislation on cultural issues in the 108th 
Senate.  The probability of introducing a culturally conservative bill is 23 percentage 
points higher for these Republicans than it is for Democrats and for Republicans who 
were elected before their party took back the Senate in 1994.  This measure of 
partisanship did not have a significant effect on the sponsorship of liberal bills in the 
108th Senate, however.  This is likely due to the introduction of liberal bills by three 
moderate Republicans who have been elected since 1994, Lincoln Chafee of Rhode 
Island, Gordon Smith of Oregon, and Olympia Snowe of Maine.   
 When it comes to the introduction of culturally liberal bills, the percentage of 
evangelicals in a senator’s state is the most significant predictor.  Senators from states 
with the highest percentage of evangelicals are 30 percentage points less likely than 
those from states with the lowest percentage of evangelicals to introduce bills that 
move policy on cultural issues in a liberal direction.  Like in the House, evangelical 
senators are no more likely than those who are not evangelical to introduce 
conservative bills.  Evangelical senators did not introduce any culturally liberal bills 
in the 108th Senate.  
Conclusion 
 Although the culture war manifests itself most intensely in Congress in 
committee hearing rooms and when legislation is brought to the floor of the House or 
the Senate for debate and, ultimately, a vote, the agenda-setting process begins with 
the introduction of bills, amendments, and resolutions by individual members.  The 
findings in this chapter suggest that the introduction of bills on cultural issues is 
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guided, in part, by electoral considerations.  In the House, individual members put 
cultural issues on the agenda so they can claim credit for supporting such issues, thus 
discouraging potential competitors when they are up for reelection.  Members of the 
108th Congress were considerably more likely to introduce conservative (liberal) bills 
on cultural issues if they had just faced a primary opponent who advocated a 
culturally conservative (liberal) agenda.   
There is also evidence that electoral considerations play a role in senators’ 
decision to sponsor conservative legislation on cultural issues.  Senators are more 
likely to put culturally conservative items on the agenda as the end of their term 
approaches and they prepare to run for reelection.  Because conservative positions 
like restricting abortion and gay rights are often couched in religious terms and evoke 
strong reactions from people who often do not follow the more intricate issues before 
Congress, they can be useful tools in mobilizing voters who might not participate in 
elections otherwise.  In the next chapter I continue to examine the extent to which 
political considerations affect the rise of cultural issues on the congressional agenda 
with a look at what happens to cultural issue bills once they are referred to a House or 
Senate committee.  
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Chapter 4:  Committee Hearings and the Cultural Agenda 
 
 
Writing as a doctoral candidate in the late-1800s, President Woodrow Wilson 
declared that “Congress in its committee-rooms is Congress at work” (Wilson [1885] 
1963, 69).  Since the time of Wilson’s writing, the workload of committees has 
become increasingly burdensome.  In the 108th Congress, for example, more than ten 
thousand bills were referred to congressional committees.   Despite the benefit of full-
time committee staffs and a subcommittee system that allows for further division of 
labor within each committee, it has become impossible for committee members in the 
modern Congress to give equal consideration to each bill that comes before them.  
The heavy committee workload and other political obligations in Washington and in 
their home districts and states have forced members to be particularly selective about 
which issues will be featured on their committees’ agenda.  In this chapter, I explore 
the circumstances under which cultural issues rise to prominence on the agenda of 
congressional committees.   
Committees are often described as tools of their parent chamber and as 
“gatekeepers.” Among the key institutional functions of committees is the division of 
labor that makes it possible for the House and the Senate to consider a large number 
of issues by relying on the expertise and research of committee members on matters 
under their committees’ jurisdiction.  As gatekeepers, committee members keep 
legislation they do not believe will receive the support of the majority on the floor 
from advancing through the legislative process (Deering and Smith 1997; Davidson 
and Oleszek 2002).  These two views of the function of committees suggest that 
committees react to an existing agenda rather than playing a key role in setting it.  A 
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third view suggests that committees are often tools of the majority party (see, for 
example, Cox and McCubbins 1993 and Matlzman 1997).  When the majority party is 
cohesive, strong party leaders will use committee assignment as a way to reward the 
party’s most loyal members.  Members, for their part, will remain loyal to the party 
leadership in other to maintain their assignments.  
Since the early-1900s, when House members revolted against the Czar rule of 
Speaker Joseph Cannon, committees have become more autonomous and more active 
in the agenda-setting process (Deering and Smith 1997).  In 1974, the agenda-setting 
role of committees was strengthened when the House approved a rule allowing for 
bills to be referred to multiple committees.  Multiple referrals were already allowed in 
the Senate, though its use in that chamber was rare (Sinclair 2000).  In the House, 
however, the possibility of multiple referrals encouraged committee members to seek 
out new, politically advantageous issues that were not previously under their 
committees’ jurisdiction (Deering and Smith 1997; Davidson and Oleszek 2002).  
The key tool available to committees in the agenda-setting process is the 
ability to hold hearings on any issue their members deem important, whether 
legislation has been referred to the committee or not (Murphy 1978; Baumgartner and 
Jones 1993; Talbert, Jones, and Baumgartner 1995). Committee hearings raise the 
visibility of new issues and allow members of Congress to redefine old ones, 
particularly when the issue at hand or the witnesses selected to testify before the 
committee command media attention (Murphy 1978; Sinclair 1986; Talbert, Jones, 
and Baumgartner 1995; Davidson and Oleszek 2002; Rohde 2005).  In 2004, for 
example, the Senate Judiciary Committee drew the attention of the media when it 
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called upon NASCAR star John Andretti to testify on behalf of a proposed 
constitutional amendment to ban flag desecration.19  Andretti delivered an emotional 
testimony in which he talked about what the flag means to his father, an Italian 
immigrant who came to the United States with nothing, and accused those who 
desecrate the flag of having “total disregard for our military.”20 
In addition to raising the visibility of issues, committee hearings also afford 
members of Congress the opportunity to seek exposure for themselves (Payne 1982; 
Davidson and Oleszek 2002).  In a study comparing the behavior of committee 
members during hearings in the 1950s and the 1970s, Payne (1982) finds that 
members increasingly use “lone wolf” techniques, meaning that they use their time to 
deliver statements and to promote themselves rather than to investigate the merits of 
any particular policy issue.  In the 1950s, members interrupted each other more to ask 
follow-up questions and there was more give-and-take during hearings as members 
attempted to change the minds of colleagues and to learn as much as possible from 
witnesses (Payne 1982).  Now, few committee members are present at a time.  Many 
leave the hearing room as soon as their time to question witnesses is over.  Since the 
1970s, the rise in the level of education in the United States and advancements in 
electronic media have made voters more aware of what politicians do in Washington 
which, in turn, has made politicians particularly concerned with the goal of reelection 
(Davidson 1986).  Committee hearings are the perfect venue for reelection-minded 
                                                 
19 See for example, Maureen Gropper, “NASCAR driver waves flag for constitutional amendment,” 
USA Today, March 10, 2004, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2004-03-10-flag-
burn_x.htm. 
 
20 U.S. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Letting the People Decide: The Constitutional Amendment 
Authorizing Congress To Prohibit the Physical Desecration of the Flag of the U.S, Hearing, March 10, 
2004. LexisNexis Congressional.  
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members of Congress to promote their ideas, demonstrate their expertise in certain 
policy areas, and claim credit for advancing legislation in a way that is not always 
possible when they are sharing the stage with hundreds of others on the floor of the 
House and dozens in the Senate (Rohde 2005).  
Between 1981 and 2004, there were 94 legislative hearings on cultural issues 
in the House and 41 in the Senate.  Legislative hearings are those that tackle proposed 
bills, amendments, and resolutions that have been referred to a committee.  
Congressional committee members may also hold non-legislative hearings, which are 
exploratory in nature and do not relate to proposed legislation (Talbert, Jones, and 
Baumgartner 1995). About 49 percent of committee hearings on cultural issues 
between 1981 and 2004 were of this variety.  In this chapter, I combine descriptive 
statistics with logistic regression analysis to examine the various cultural issues 
committee members feature in legislative and non-legislative hearings, the extent to 
which different types of committees use legislative and non-legislative hearings to put 
cultural issues on the agenda, and the conditions under which bills on cultural issues 
are most likely to receive a hearing once they have been referred to a committee.  
Like in the previous chapter, I posit that electoral motivations play a key role in the 
agenda setting process on cultural issues in congressional committees.  More 
specifically, I hypothesize that bills on cultural issues are most likely to receive a 
hearing when they are introduced and referred to committee in a congressional 
election year. Contrary to what the literature suggests, I also expect reelection-minded 
members serving in constituency-oriented committees to actively pursue a cultural 
agenda by holding non-legislative hearings on controversial cultural issues.  
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Members’ Goals, Committee Agendas, and the Culture Wars 
 Early studies of the committee system focused primarily on its institutional 
function and the relationship between committees and their parent chamber and the 
majority leadership.  Since the early-1970s, however, starting with Fenno’s (1973) 
study on the ways in which the political goals of members affect the committee 
assignment they seek, congressional scholars have begun to pay more attention to the 
relationship between members’ committee activities and their individual goals (see, 
for example, Murphy 1978, Deering and Smith 1997, Sinclair 2000).  The model 
developed by Fenno (1973) and corroborated by Bullock (1976) and Deering and 
Smith (1997) suggests that members who have a personal interest in certain policy 
areas seek assignment where they can affect policy decisions, like the Judiciary 
Committee, the International Relations Committee, or the Education and the 
Workforce Committee.  Those who are particularly concerned with reelection seek 
assignment on committees that provide the most service to constituents, like 
Transportation and Infrastructure, Armed Forces, and Agriculture.  Finally, members 
who are particularly interested in power and prestige seek assignment on committees 
whose work affect all other members in the chamber, like the Appropriations, Ways 
and Means, and the Rules Committee in the House.  In the Senate, where members 
can satisfy their goal of acquiring institutional power through other means (e.g. the 
threat of a filibuster or putting a hold on a bill), committee assignments are not 
typically classified as prestige-oriented. Rather, Deering and Smith (1997) classify 
the third set of Senate committees, including the Finance and Armed Service 
Committees, as mixed policy-constituency committees.   
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 Policy-oriented committees often serve as battlegrounds for the Culture Wars.  
Their members are among the most ideological and, therefore, most likely to pursue 
new issues and agendas that highlight the differences between the positions of the two 
parties (Sinclair 1986; Deering and Smith 1997). In 2003, for example, the House 
Judiciary Committee held a contentious hearing on the Unborn Victims of Violence 
Act, also knows as the Laci and Conner’s Law in reference to Laci Peterson, the 
eight-month old California woman whose 2002 murder received wall-to-wall 
coverage on cable news channels for several months.  Proponents of the bill invited 
Tracy Marcimiak, a woman who was violently attacked by her husband just one week 
before she was to give birth, to testify before the committee.  During her emotional 
testimony, Marcimiak held up a picture of herself holding her son’s body and asked 
members of the committee, “Does it show one victim, or two?”21 Also called upon to 
testify, however, was Juley Fulcher, Public Policy Director for the National Coalition 
Against Domestic Violence. Fulcher accused the bill’s proponents of not doing 
enough to protect battered women and to punish those who hurt them and called the 
Unborn Victims of Violence Act a mere attempt by abortion opponents to establish 
the legal rights of fetuses in order to promote an anti-choice agenda.  
Unlike policy-oriented committees, constituency-oriented committees are not 
characterized by strong partisanship.  Rather than being concerned with issues, 
members whose primary goal is reelection tend to be concerned with providing 
services.  Their projects often include highways, military installations, incentives for 
small businesses, farm subsidies, and other services that promote growth and 
                                                 
21 U.S. House. Committee on the Judiciary. Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2003, or Laci and 
Conner’s Law, Hearing, July 8, 2003. LexisNexis Congressional.  
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development in their home districts and states (Deering and Smith 1997).  Because 
the needs of constituents are, for the most part, stable, members of constituency-
oriented committees are not likely to broaden their committees’ agenda unless a 
crisis, like the devastating earthquake in San Francisco in 1989 or the destruction 
caused by Hurricane Katrina in the Gulf region in 2005, forces them to do so (Sinclair 
1986; Deering and Smith 1997).  As such, one might expect these members to shy 
away from symbolic and controversial cultural issues that divide the electorate and do 
not offer material benefits for which reelection-minded members of Congress can 
claim credit. 
Yet, contrary to what the theory suggests, members of constituency-oriented 
committees do not always avoid participation in the culture wars.  Between 1981 and 
2004 these committees held hearings on abstinence-only sex education, the safety and 
effectiveness of the abortifacient drug RU-486, access to contraceptives by low 
income women, and employment discrimination based on sexual orientation.  As 
congressional districts have become increasingly homogeneous in ideological and 
partisan orientation (see, for example, Gimpel and Schuknecht 2003 and Stonecash et 
al. 2003), the potential risks associated with pursuing controversial cultural issues 
have become less of a concern for many members.  In fact, because these issues often 
mobilize the base of both parties, reelection-minded members from increasingly safe 
districts who may see a potential primary challenge as a bigger threat to their seat, as 
Chapter 3 suggests, will likely find it beneficial to raise the visibility of and take a 
position on emotionally-charged issues like gay marriage, abortion rights, and school 
prayer from time to time.  
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Data and Methods  
 The data in this chapter comes from a variety of sources.  For the descriptive 
analysis, I use data collected by Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones and 
distributed through the Center for American Politics and Public Policy at the 
University of Washington.22 The Policy Agenda’s hearings dataset contains detailed 
information on all congressional hearings from 1947 to 2000.  For this project, I was 
particularly interested in the year the hearing took place, the committee in which the 
hearing was held, the description of the topics covered in the hearing, and whether or 
not the hearing pertained to proposed legislation. Using the topic descriptions, I 
created a variable reflecting whether or not the hearing addressed a cultural issue.  
Less than half of one percent of all hearings was classified as cultural issue hearings.  
Hearings that did not deal with cultural issues and hearings that took place prior to 
1981 were excluded from the dataset and data from hearings that took place between 
2001 and 2004 was added.  The recent data was gathered using LexisNexis’ 
Congressional database.  In addition, I coded each committee as a mixed (Senate 
only), policy-, prestige- (House only), or constituency-oriented committee based on 
Deering and Smith’s (1997) classification and added information on which party was 
in control of the House or the Senate when the hearing took place.23  
 The second part of this analysis relies on logistic regression results to measure 
the extent to which the timing of congressional elections affects the likelihood that 
proposed legislation on cultural issues will receive a hearing in committee.  To create 
                                                 
22 The data is available on the website of the Center for American Politics and Public Policy’s Policy 
Agendas Project, http://www.policyagendas.org/datasets/index.html. 
 
23 See Appendix C for a list of committees in each category. 
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the dependent variable, I conducted a keyword search using THOMAS, the 
congressional information database maintained by the Library of Congress, to 
identify every cultural issue bill that was referred to a House or Senate committee 
between 1981 and 2004.24  I then coded each bill as 0 if it did not receive a hearing 
and as 1 if it did.25  The independent variable of interest, election year, is coded as 0 
if the hearing was not held in a congressional election year and as 1 if it was.  
 A series of control variables were also included in the model based on 
findings in previous studies of committee agenda setting and congressional agenda 
setting more generally.  First, I measure the extent to which the president’s agenda 
affects whether or not a bill receives a committee hearing.  This measure has a value 
of 0 to 3, indicating the number of cultural issues the president mentioned in his State 
of the Union address in the year in which the bill was referred to committee. For 
years in which an outgoing president delivered the State of the Union address, I used 
the incoming president’s speech at his party’s convention the previous year as a 
measure of that president’s agenda.   
 It is also possible that committee members respond to public opinion or to 
outside events, rather than to the timing of elections, when deciding to hold a hearing 
on a cultural issue bill.  These two measures reflect the salience of cultural issues and 
outside events that took place one month before the bill was referred to committee.  
Chapter 5 has a more detailed treatment of how these measures were compiled. A list 
of events included in the analysis can be found in Appendix D. 
                                                 
24 See Appendix A for a list of keywords used in the search.  THOMAS can be accessed at 
http://thomas.loc.gov/bss/d109query.html. 
 
25 In the House, most hearings on cultural issues took place in a subcommittee. Bills that receive a 
subcommittee hearing were also coded as 1.  
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 Finally, Republican control is coded as 1 if Congress—and, therefore, 
committees—was under Republican leadership when the bill was referred to 
committees and as 0 if it was under Democratic leadership.  Majority party is coded 
as 1 if the bill was introduced by a member of the majority party and as 0 if it was 
not.  Bills that were referred under Republican leadership should be more likely to 
receive a hearing, as cultural issues, which were first introduced in the political arena 
by conservative groups, are often thought to be more beneficial to Republicans than 
to Democrats.  Bills that are introduced by members of the majority party should also 
fare better than those that are not.  Models for the House and the Senate were run 
separately to account for institutional differences in the two chambers. 
Fighting the Culture Wars in Committee Hearing Room 
 Between 1981 and 2004, the House and the Senate held 176 hearings on 
cultural issues, evenly divided between those that addressed proposed legislation and 
those that did not.  Over three-quarters of all hearings on cultural issues during this 
period took place in a policy-oriented committee (see Figure 4.1). Members of policy-
oriented committees are typically among the most partisan in their chamber and, as 
such, it is not surprising that they would be the most likely to pursue controversial 
issues like abortion, gay rights, and other cultural issues.  Moreover, because cultural 
issues often relate to constitutional matters regarding privacy rights and separation 
between church and state and proposed legislation on such issues is often in the form 
of constitutional amendments, bills on cultural issues are often referred to the policy-
oriented House and Senate Judiciary Committees.  The Judiciary Committee held 
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seventy-one percent of all legislative hearings on cultural issues in the House and the 
Senate between 1981 and 2004.   
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FIGURE 4.1 
Congressional Hearings on Cultural Issues by 
Committee Type, 1981-2004
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 Policy-oriented committees are not the only ones that hold hearings on 
cultural issues, however.  About 20 percent of the hearings between 1981 and 2004 
took place in constituency-oriented committees.  Of those, 17 percent dealt with 
proposed legislation and 83 percent did not, indicating that, contrary to what the 
literature suggests, members of constituency-oriented committees, those who are 
most concerned with reelection, actively seek out these controversial issues.  For 
example, on March 18, 1994, the House Committee on Small Businesses conducted a 
hearing on the impact of the high prices of long-term contraceptives like Norplant and 
Depo-Provera on the use of such products by and their availability to low-income 
women.  The committee, under Democratic leadership, called upon six witnesses, all 
of whom were women and all of whom testified in support of making long-term 
contraceptive more widely accessible.  On February 16, 2004, the Republican-
controlled Senate Appropriations Committee held a non-legislative hearing to 
examine educational programs that encourage sexual abstinence among adolescents.  
Among the witnesses, almost all of whom supported abstinence-only sex education, 
were a pastor and several leaders of grassroots organizations that promote sexual 
abstinence.  Constituency-oriented committees are especially likely to seek out 
cultural issues under Republican control.  The proportion of non-legislative hearings 
held in constituency-oriented committees in the House and Senate is 14 percentage 
points higher under Republican leadership than under Democratic leadership (see 
Figure 4.2).  This difference is even higher for hearings that took place in policy-
oriented committees (see Figure 4.3), suggesting that the most partisan Republicans 
tend to pursue a cultural agenda more aggressively than partisan Democrats.  
 
 104
Prestige-oriented committees in the House and mixed policy- and constituency-
oriented committees in the Senate are not key players in the culture wars.  Together, 
these committees held only five hearings on cultural issues in the twenty-four year 
period between 1981 and 2004.  
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FIGURE 4.2 
Legislative and Non-Legislative Hearings 
on Cultural Issues in Constituency-
Oriented Committees, House and Senate
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FIGURE 4.3
Legislative and Non-Legislative Hearings 
on Cultural Issues in Policy-Oriented 
Committees, House and Senate
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Of the cultural issues on which congressional committees have held hearings, 
abortion is the most prevalent.  Close to 30 percent of all hearings on cultural issues 
in the House and in the Senate dealt with some aspect of abortion rights, including 
parental notification for minors undergoing the procedure, the extent to which fetuses 
feel pain, and protection for abortion clinics against violent protests (see Figure 4.4). 
Following abortion, matters concerning public expressions of religion, gay rights, and 
pornography were featured most widely in congressional hearings between 1981 and 
2004. In the Senate, cloning and stem cell research received a lot of attention in non-
legislative hearings, making up 16 and 24 percent of such hearings, respectively.  
Overall, only eight percent of congressional hearings on cultural issues addressed 
cloning and only six percent addressed stem cell research.   
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FIGURE 4.4 
Cultural Issues Covered in Committee Hearings as a 
Percentage of All Hearings on Cultural Issues in the House 
and Senate, 1981-2004
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 Abortion remains the most prevalent issue among the cultural issues members 
of Congress address in committee hearings when the sample is divided between 
hearings that took place under Republican and Democratic leadership.  About 27 
percent of all hearings on cultural issues that took place under Republican control and 
30 percent of those that took place under Democratic control between 1981 and 2004 
dealt with abortion rights (see Figure 4.5).  The most noticeable difference in the 
issues Democrats and Republicans pursue is the Democrats’ concern with family 
planning and access to contraceptives and the Republicans’ concern with obscenity 
and pornography.  Of the hearings on cultural issues held under Democratic 
leadership, 19 percent addressed issues related to the accessibility of contraceptives 
and funding for domestic and international family planning programs.  Only 3 percent 
of committee hearings on cultural issues under Republican leadership dealt with such 
issues. On the other hand, issues regarding potentially obscene and pornographic 
material featured more prominently on the agenda of Republican-controlled 
committees. Fourteen percent of committee hearings on cultural issues under the 
party’s leadership were concerned with topics like sexually explicit content on cable 
and broadcast television, regulation of pornographic content on the Internet, and the 
effect of pornography on sexual abuse.  In Democratic-controlled committees, only 5 
percent of hearings on cultural issues dealt with obscene and pornographic material.  
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FIGURE 4.5 
Cultural Issues Covered in Committee Hearings as a 
Percentage of All Hearings on Cultural Issues by Party 
Control, 1981-2004
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The Decision to Hold Legislative Hearings 
 Of the 176 committee hearings on cultural issues between 1981 and 2004, 90 
tackled proposed legislation.  Yet, during that time, over a thousand bills on cultural 
issues were referred to a committee in the House or the Senate.  Some hearings 
addressed more than one piece of legislation, making the number of bills on cultural 
issues that received a hearing 94 out of 763 referred bills in the House (12 percent) 
and 41 out of 270 referred bills in the Senate (15 percent).  Although there is little 
evidence that the decision to hold a legislative committee hearing on a cultural issue 
in the Senate is motivated by electoral considerations, there is some support for the 
electoral consideration hypothesis in the House.   
 Contrary to expectations, being referred to a committee in a congressional 
election year makes a cultural issue bill less likely to receive a hearing in the House 
(see Table 4.1).  Holding all other variables at their mean, the likelihood that a bill 
will receive a hearing if it referred to a committee in an election year decreases by 
nine percentage points.  Because congressional districts have become more 
homogeneous and, therefore, more likely to be either solidly Democratic or solidly 
Republican, it is possible that committee leaders are most likely to schedule hearings 
on polarizing cultural issues that appeal to a party’s most loyal voters in non-election 
years, in time for these issues to become important in the party’s primary.  
  It is also surprising that cultural issue bills referred to House committees 
under Republican leadership are less likely to receive a hearing, although this is 
likely, at least in part, due to an unusually high number of bills on flag desecration 
introduced in 1989.  In that year, with Congress under Democratic control, the 
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Supreme Court ruled in Texas v. Johnson that a Texas law banning flag desecration 
violated the constitutional right to free speech, a decision that was greeted with 
protests around the country and was unpopular in public opinion polls (Goldstein 
1996). Following the decision, amendments to ban flag desecration and symbolic 
resolutions expressing disapproval of the ruling were offered in the House, most of 
them by Republicans.  While only one hearing was held on the issue in the House in 
the 101st Congress, the hearing considered several of the proposed bills, amendments, 
and resolutions. 
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TABLE 4.1 
Logistic Regression Estimates for Likelihood that a Cultural Issue Bill  
Will Receive a Hearing in a House Committee, 1981-2004 
  Logit 
coefficients 
 Change in 
predicted 
probability  
     
Election year  -1.34**    -0.09** 
  (0.55)   
President’s agenda    0.66***       0.20*** 
  (0.18)   
Public opinion  0.04  0.08 
  (0.04)   
Outside events  -0.41  -0.03 
  (0.52)   
Republican control     -1.40***       -0.12*** 
  (0.35)   
Majority  0.31  0.03 
  (0.23)   
Election year * Republican control  1.60**      0.23** 
  (0.72)    
Constant     -2.85***   
   (0.37)   
     
LR chi-square       41.88***   
Percent predicted correctly  87.7   
N  763   
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *p≤.10; **p≤.05; ***≤.001. 
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Even though bills referred to House committees in an election year and when 
the House is under Republican control are less likely to receive a hearing, an 
interaction term shows that bills referred to committee in an election year in which 
the Republican Party is in the majority are 23 percentage points more likely to receive 
a hearing (Table 4.1).  This finding supports the notion that cultural issues are most 
likely to be put on the agenda of the U.S. Congress when it is most advantageous 
from an electoral perspective for members to put them there.  In this case, it appears 
that Republican committee leaders in the House are most likely to feature such issues 
in congressional committee hearings in an election year, when voters are most likely 
to pay attention to what politicians are doing in Washington. Finally, House 
committees are also responsive to the president’s agenda when it comes to holding 
hearings on cultural issues.  Bills referred to a committee in a year in which the 
president mentioned three different cultural issues in his State of the Union address, 
the most any president mentioned between 1981 and 2004, are 20 percentage points 
more likely to receive a hearing than are bills referred to committee in a year when 
the president did not mention a cultural issue in his address.  
 In the Senate, a different pattern emerges. Like in the House, being referred to 
a Senate committee at a time when the chamber is under Republican control or in an 
election year do not improve the chance that a bill on a cultural issue will receive a 
hearing (see Table 4.2). Yet, contrary to the House model, there is no indication that 
cultural issue bills introduced in an election year in which Republicans control the 
Senate are more likely to receive a hearing. This is likely due to the fact that only 
one-third of all senators are up for reelection in a given election year, making the 
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timing of elections not as critical in the Senate as it is in the House, where all 435 
members are up for reelection every two years.  Moreover, the Senate model shows 
that a bill that is introduced by a member of the majority party, whether the chamber 
is under Democratic or Republican control, is 23 percentage points more likely to 
receive a hearing than a bill that is introduced by a member whose party is in the 
minority (Table 4.2).  The committee activity of senators is also more responsive than 
that of their counterparts in the House to events in the culture war that take place 
outside the Congress.  A bill that is introduced the month after a highly publicized 
cultural battle, including controversial court decisions and actions by state 
legislatures, is 10 percentage points more likely to receive a hearing in a Senate 
committee.   
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TABLE 4.2 
Logistic Regression Estimates for Likelihood that a Cultural Issue Bill  
Will Receive a Hearing in a Senate Committee, 1981-2004 
  Logit 
coefficients 
 Change in 
predicted 
probability  
     
Election year   -0.48  -0.04 
    (0.77)   
President’s agenda    0.06  0.01 
    (0.22)   
Public opinion   -0.03  -0.04 
    (0.05)   
Outside events      0.91*    0.10* 
    (0.53)   
Republican control   -0.32         -0.03 
    (0.45)   
Majority        3.00***       0.23*** 
   (0.76)   
Election year * Republican control  -0.31         -0.02 
  (0.97)    
Constant      -3.74***   
   (0.82)   
     
LR chi-square       36.81***   
Percent predicted correctly  85.9   
N  270   
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *p≤.10; **p≤.05; ***≤.001. 
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 The differences between the House and the Senate in the factors that improve 
the likelihood that a bill on a cultural issue will receive a hearing in committee are 
likely due to procedural differences in the two chambers.  Under the restrictive floor 
rules of the House, individual members do not have many opportunities to shape the 
congressional agenda on the floor.  For example, the Rules Committee defines the 
number of amendments and which members are allowed to offer them before a 
measure reaches the floor.  Moreover, amendments cannot stray from the topic of the 
original bill.  This, combined with the large number of members one must share the 
stage with on the floor of the House, makes committees a key venue for members 
seeking to mold the agenda and to raise their own visibility.  In the Senate, on the 
other hand, the rules allow members to make speeches and to offer amendments on 
any issue they deem important, thus allowing individual senators to use the floor as a 
platform from which to promote themselves and their political goals.  
Conclusion 
Committees play an important role in the congressional agenda setting 
process.  By deciding which bills to hold hearings on among the thousands that are 
sent to them in each session and by scheduling non-legislative hearings on issues that 
are sometimes outside of the committee’s official jurisdiction, committee members 
can attract media attention and change the national political discourse.  This is 
especially the case when committees take up controversial issues that generate 
contentious hearings with passionate witnesses on both sides.   
 The analysis in this chapter suggests that the rise of cultural issues on the 
agenda of House committees is connected, in part, to electoral considerations.  
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Cultural issue bills that are referred to committee have a better chance of receiving a 
hearing in a congressional election year in which Republicans are in control of the 
chamber.  This suggests that Republicans use committee hearings to raise the 
visibility of and to highlight the differences between their position and that of their 
opponents on symbolic cultural issues at a time when voters are most likely to be 
paying attention.   
This chapter also challenges the contention in the morality policy literature 
that risk-averse politicians are unlikely to take up controversial and divisive cultural 
issues on their own.  In congressional committees, members will sometimes seek out 
issues like abortion, flag desecration, and other contentious cultural issues when no 
such legislation has been submitted for their consideration.  Non-legislative hearings 
on cultural issues take place even in constituency-oriented committees, where less 
ideological members who are most concerned with reelection seek assignment.  This 
is particularly the case in Republican-controlled committees.  In the next chapter, I 
examine the extent to which partisanship, electoral considerations, and other factors 
affect the fate of cultural issue bills once they leave committees and are put on the 
floor calendar.   
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Chapter 5:  Culture War Battles on the Floor  
 
 In September of 2004, just three weeks before Congress adjourned and with 
less than two months to go in a contentious election campaign for control of the 
House, the Senate, and the White House, House Majority Leader Tom DeLay and 
Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist announced that their respective chambers would 
hold votes on a series of cultural issues before the end of the session.  The plan 
included a vote on constitutional amendments banning flag desecration and same-sex 
marriage and on a bill to protect the phrase “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance 
against legal challenges by curtailing the jurisdiction of federal courts.  Republican 
lawmakers knew the controversial legislation, some of which had been defeated in the 
past, was not likely to pass.  Yet, they pushed for the votes, a move Democratic Whip 
Steny Hoyer decried as an attempt to “give issues they think will score them political 
points at the polls first-class tickets to nowhere” at the expense of important issues 
like homeland security and health care.  DeLay, for his part, defended the votes as 
“part of the process to get members on record” (quoted in Stone 2004).   
The move by Republican leaders in the 108th Congress to set the floor agenda 
with an eye to upcoming elections is not a new phenomenon.  In the late-1800s, the 
House approved a special rule that allowed legislation to be brought to the floor 
regardless of the order in which it had been placed on the calendar, thus giving 
majority party leaders a prominent role in the agenda-setting process (Sinclair 2000).  
Since the 1970s, a series of congressional reforms that weakened the committee 
system and allowed party leaders to make committee assignments and increasing 
party polarization have further enabled leaders to manipulate the floor schedule for 
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political gain (Smith 1989; Sinclair 1995).  In this chapter, I examine the role of floor 
politics in the culture wars since the 1970s.   More specifically, I analyze the extent to 
which the timing of elections, presidential politics, leadership style, outside events, 
and public opinion shape the cultural agenda on the floor of the House and the Senate.   
The Culture War as Political Tool  
 Despite the heated rhetoric from candidates, office holders, political activists, 
and the media, culture war confrontations on the floor of the House and the Senate 
happen infrequently.  Since the late-1970s, when religious conservative groups first 
became involved in election campaigns, there has been an average of six roll call 
votes a year on cultural issues in the House and two in the Senate.26  When cultural 
issues do come up, however, they spark controversy and expose the polarization 
between the parties.  It is, therefore, reasonable to expect party leaders to act 
strategically when deciding when to keep such issues off the floor and when to bring 
them to the floor for a vote.  In this chapter, I test four main hypotheses: that the 
number of roll call votes on cultural issues increases as congressional elections near, 
that the number of roll call votes on cultural issues is higher under divided 
government, that the number of roll call votes on cultural issues is higher in the two 
months before a presidential election, and that the leadership style of individual 
leaders affects the number of roll call votes on cultural issues.  
 The theory of strategic disagreement developed by Gilmour (1995) is 
particularly useful for understanding when cultural issues appear on the floor agenda.  
Gilmour suggests that politicians bring up issues they know will generate 
                                                 
26 During the same period (1977-2004), the House held an average of 547 roll call votes and the Senate 
held an average of 383 votes.  
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disagreement from their opponents when “political advantages of maintaining 
disagreements outweigh the benefits of a modestly better policy achieved through 
compromise” (Gilmour 1995, 3). The political advantage of strategic disagreement is 
most pronounced as elections near and each party is motivated to show its most loyal 
constituents that it is unwilling to compromise on issues that are important to its 
political base and to show the broader electorate that there are, in fact, important 
distinctions between the two parties (Mouw and MacKuen 1992; Gilmour 1995; 
Davidson and Oleszek 2002).   
 Yet, the lead-up to congressional elections is not the only time strategic 
disagreement is likely to be used as a political tool.  Presidential politics also plays an 
important role in this decision.  For example, under divided government, the majority 
party in Congress sometimes passes measures it knows the president will veto in 
order to highlight the differences between its position and that of the president’s when 
it believes the public will side with Congress (Gilmour 1995).  In the culture war, the 
most recent example of this is the battle between Republicans in Congress and 
President Bill Clinton over late-term abortions, a procedure that takes place after the 
first trimester of pregnancy.27  In April of 1996, Clinton vetoed the Partial Birth 
Abortion Ban Act, citing the absence of a provision to allow the procedure when 
continuing the pregnancy would put the health of the mother at risk as his reason for 
doing so.  The following year, the Republican Congress sent the president a bill that 
was virtually identical to the 1996 bill with full knowledge that the president would, 
again, veto it because it did not include an exception for the health of the mother.  As 
                                                 
27 Those opposed to the procedure often prefer the term “partial birth abortion” to “late term abortion,” 
the term most widely used by the medical community. 
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John Feehery, communications director for then-House Majority Whip Tom DeLay, 
put it, the Republican leadership sent the bill to the president to “draw brighter lines 
between their views and those of the president and the congressional Democrats” 
(quoted in McDonald 1997).  On October 8, 1997, the new version of the Partial Birth 
Abortion Ban cleared the Congress.  Clinton vetoed it just two days later.  
 The timing of presidential elections is also likely to intensify the use of 
strategic disagreement as members of Congress are likely to bring controversial 
issues they believe will help their party’s candidate to the floor in order to bring 
national attention to those issues and to force the other party’s candidate to take a 
position (Davidson and Oleszek 2002).  This is especially likely to be the case when a 
member of Congress is running for president.  For example, on July 14, 2004, just 
one week after Senator John Kerry, the Democratic nominee, announced his choice of 
Senator John Edwards as his running-mate, Republicans pushed for a vote on S.J. 
Res. 40, a constitutional amendment to ban same-sex marriage.  Both Kerry and 
Edwards had previously stated that they believed marriage is between a man and a 
woman.  However, the vote on the Federal Marriage Amendment put them in the 
uncomfortable position of having to choose between casting a vote in favor of the 
amendment, a move which would alienate many Democratic voters, or voting against 
the amendment, which stated precisely the position the Democratic senators had 
claimed to hold, that marriage is a union between a man and a woman.  When five 
Republicans joined forty-five Democrats in a successful filibuster of S.J. Res. 40, 
Kerry and Edwards were the only two senators who did not cast a vote.     
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 Senator Robert Dole, the Republican presidential nominee in 1996, might 
have faced a similarly difficult choice when he ran for president had he not resigned 
from his Senate seat several months before the election.  In the summer of 1996, 
Dole, an opponent of abortion rights except in the case of rape and incest and when 
the pregnancy might pose a threat to the life of the mother, expressed support for the 
inclusion of a “declaration of tolerance” in the Republican platform.  The declaration 
would recognize that, while the party took an official stance against abortion, there 
was room for those with a differing view on the issue in the Republican tent.  Dole’s 
support for the declaration drew opposition from conservative Christian leaders who 
had been influential in the Republican Party since the late-1970s.  The Christian 
Coalition threatened to instruct its members to stay home on Election Day if Dole 
continued to push for a declaration of tolerance.28  Ultimately, the declaration was left 
out of the Republican platform.  Had Dole stayed in the Senate during his 
unsuccessful run for the presidency, Democrats would likely have taken advantage of 
the tension between the Republican nominee and a key Republican constituency 
group.  Just three years earlier, Dole and eighteen Republicans had joined fifty-one 
Democrats to pass a bill to protect abortion providers and women seeking abortions 
from physical and verbal intimidation.  In 1996, a similar bill would have posed a 
difficult political dilemma for the Republican nominee.  
 Finally, the use of strategic disagreement depends, in part, on the willingness 
of individual leaders to employ the tactic for political gain.  Not every congressional 
leader agrees that disagreement is the most effective style of leadership.  In the 1950s, 
                                                 
28 More information on the backlash against Dole, including quotes from conservative Christian 
leaders, can be found on the website of the Republican National Coalition for Life, 
http://www.rnclife.org/reports/1996/july96/july.html.  
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Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson ignored the pleas of liberal Democrats in the 
Senate who wanted him to bring far-reaching civil rights legislation to the floor over 
President Dwight Eisenhower’s veto threat to underscore the differences between 
Democrats and Republicans (Gilmour 1995).  Johnson was more interested in passing 
bills through compromise than he was in advancing issues through confrontation.  His 
willingness to compromise with southern Democrats and conservative Republicans to 
pass a civil rights bill that did not address school desegregation and other 
controversial provisions angered liberals, who believed that having an all-
encompassing bill filibustered by conservatives would do more to advance their cause 
than passing a weakened bill ever could (Gilmour 1995).  
 Since the 1970s, however, party leaders have been empowered by increased 
ideological cohesion within each party and, while some have been more willing than 
others to force disagreement on the floor, those who have chosen this tactic often 
enjoy strong support from their caucus (Smith 2005).  Among leaders of recent years 
who have been especially inclined to use strategic disagreement are Jim Wright, the 
Democratic Speaker of the House in the late-1980s, and Newt Gingrich, who led the 
Republican takeover of the House in 1994 and served as Speaker from 1995 to 1998.  
Wright highlighted the differences between the Democratic majority in the House and 
President Ronald Reagan and the Republican majority in the Senate by forcing votes 
on issues like the environment and homelessness, which tended to unite Democrats 
and divide Republicans (Roberts and Smith 2003; Sinclair 2005).  Gingrich, on the 
other hand, began to use confrontation as an electoral strategy while his party was in 
the minority as a way to show voters that there were clear differences between the 
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two parties.  His effort paid off and he continued to push for controversial votes, 
especially on cultural and welfare issues, as Speaker of the House (Gilmour 1995; 
Sinclair 2005). 
Beyond Strategic Disagreement 
While the theory of strategic disagreement provides a good framework for 
understanding when cultural issues are likely to be brought to the floor for a vote, 
other factors may also contribute to the timing of such votes.  For example, Kingdon 
(1995, 23) argues that "the president can single handedly set the agendas, not only of 
people in the executive branch, but also of people in Congress, and outside the 
government" (see also Neustadt 1991).  While early studies of presidential influence 
suggest that Congress is particularly inclined to respond to the president’s foreign 
policy initiatives (see, for example, Wildavsky’s 1966 “two presidencies” theory), 
more recent studies find that the president also plays a significant role in setting the 
domestic policy agenda (see, for example, Sigelman 1979, Taylor 1998, and Edwards 
and Wood 1999).     
 Another possibility is that Congress puts items on its agenda in response to 
events members perceive as having serious consequences for the country (see, for 
example, Walker 1977).  In the case of the culture war, these events are likely to 
come in the form of court decisions, actions by state legislatures, and other events that 
capture the attention of the national media.  For example, the bombing of abortion 
clinics may put pressure on legislators to act swiftly on legislation that protects 
abortion providers against violence.  Conservative proposals for a constitutional 
amendment defining marriage as a union between a man and a woman may come 
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soon after a court decision in favor of same-sex marriage, which cultural 
conservatives see as a threat to the institution of marriage.    
 Finally, it is possible that cultural issues reach the floor in response to shifts in 
public opinion.  There is a suggestion in the political science literature that politicians 
are unlikely to push controversial cultural issues onto the agenda without being 
prompted to do so by the public because of the potential political fallout (see Mooney 
and Lee 1995, Tatalovich and Daynes 1998, and Smith and Tatalovich 2003). Thus, 
in addition to the three hypotheses that rest on the theory of strategic disagreement, I 
test three alternative hypotheses: that the number of roll call votes on cultural issues 
increases as the president’s attention to such issues increases, that the number of roll 
call votes on cultural issues increases in the aftermath of widely publicized cultural 
conflicts outside of Congress, and that the number of roll call votes on cultural issues 
increases as the public’s attention to cultural issues increases.   
Bringing the Culture War to the Floor  
 Cultural issues arrive on the floor of the House and the Senate directly, in the 
form of bills, resolutions, and amendments that deal strictly with cultural issues, or 
indirectly, as provisions in legislation that is not designed primarily to address such 
issues.  These are most often appropriations bills that include provisions prohibiting 
the use of funds allocated in the bill for abortion services or to enforce court decisions 
that prohibit organized prayer in public schools or to fund abstinence-only sex 
education, for example.  Because Congress must pass far-reaching appropriations 
bills every year, including controversial items in the bill gives those items a better 
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chance of being adopted than if they had been introduced as separate pieces of 
legislation.   
Prior to the Republican takeover of 1994, cultural issues were brought to the 
floor of the House for a vote primarily through indirect means (see Figure 5.1).  In the 
mid-1990s, however, under Newt Gingrich’s leadership, there was a surge in the 
number of roll call votes that took on issues like abortion, religion, and gay rights 
directly.  The number of votes that dealt with cultural issues indirectly did not 
fluctuate significantly between 1977 and 2004, with the exception of a considerable 
drop in 2002.  That same year also saw a drop in the number of votes that dealt 
strictly with a cultural issue, which suggests that the terrorist attacks on the World 
Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, and real wars in Afghanistan 
and Iraq pushed the symbolic culture war aside temporarily.   
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FIGURE 5.1 
Number of Votes on Cultural Issues in the House, 1977-2004
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In the Senate, where roll call votes on cultural issues are more infrequent than 
in the House, the pattern has been different.  With the exception of a small bump in 
the number of votes that dealt with cultural issues directly in 1984, there were 
virtually no votes on cultural issues, direct or otherwise, between 1977 and 1987 (see 
Figure 5.2).  Between the late-1980s and mid-1990s, however, the number of roll call 
votes that were strictly about cultural issues exceeded the number of votes on broader 
legislation that included provisions on cultural issues.  Although conservatives have 
typically pursued the culture war agenda more aggressively than liberals, this increase 
in the number of roll call votes on cultural issues coincided with a period of 
Democratic control of the Senate.  It is possible that during this time, a contentious 
period in congressional politics that started with Democrats taking back the Senate in 
1986 and culminated with the Republican Revolution of 1994, Republican lawmakers 
forced controversial cultural issues onto the floor agenda in the Senate to draw 
distinctions between the parties, a feat Republican members of the House could not 
accomplish with as much success because of the tight control the majority party 
exerts over the floor schedule in that chamber.  
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FIGURE 5.2 
Number of Votes on Cultural Issues in the Senate, 1977-2004
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Data and Methods 
 
 Looking at annual patterns of the incidence of roll call votes on cultural issues 
provides an interesting snapshot of the dynamics of the culture war on the floor of the 
House and the Senate.  However, one year often feels like a lifetime in politics.  For 
example, the priorities of members in February or March of an election year are likely 
to differ from their priorities in September and October, when the campaign is in full 
swing and voters are more likely to pay attention to what is going on in Washington.  
In order to capture these variations, I use months rather than years as the unit of 
analysis. Thus, for every year between 1977 and 2004 in the House and 1979 and 
2004 in the Senate, there are twelve observations, for a total of 336 and 312 
observations, respectively.29 
 The dependent variable in this analysis is the number of bills, resolutions, and 
amendments on cultural issues on which each chamber took roll call votes each 
month of each year since 1977 (House) and 1979 (Senate).  I compiled this 
information using the search engine in THOMAS, the congressional information 
database maintained by the Library of Congress.30 Votes on appropriations and other 
far-reaching bills that contain provisions regarding cultural issues but that are not 
primarily about these issues are not included because the circumstances under which 
such legislation is brought to the floor are likely to be related to the political 
dynamics of issues that are more central to the bill than to the dynamics of the culture 
                                                 
29 Data from 1977 and 1978 were not included in the Senate model because information on the number 
of days the chamber was in session each month, an important control variable, is not available for the 
95th Senate.  No roll call votes on cultural issues were taken in the Senate in 1977 and 1978 and, as 
such, the absence of those years does not affect the analysis.  
 
30 See Appendix A for a list of keywords used in the search.  THOMAS can be accessed at 
http://thomas.loc.gov/bss/d109query.html. 
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wars.  I also exclude any procedural vote that was taken in the course of considering 
legislation on cultural issues.  While procedural votes can be as political and 
polarizing as substantive votes, they can only occur after the original proposal has 
been brought to the floor and, as such, do not provide an accurate count of the number 
of times a cultural issue was put on the agenda each month.  For example, a month in 
which two bills received roll call votes could also include three procedural votes on 
each of the bills, for a total of eight votes.  Meanwhile, a month in which four bills 
received votes but only one procedural vote was taken on each would also register as 
having eight votes, even though cultural issues were brought to the floor on twice as 
many occasions in the second example.31  I use a negative binomial regression model 
to test the seven hypotheses I have posited.  The negative binomial model is 
appropriate when the dependent variable is a count of events and there is significant 
evidence of overdispersion, meaning that the variance of the count variable is greater 
than its mean (Long and Freese 2003).32 
 To test the effect of congressional elections on the number of roll call votes on 
cultural issues, I measure the number of months between the previous election and the 
month in which the vote took place.  This measure ranges from 0 (November of a 
given election year) to 23 (October of the following election year) so that higher 
values represent closer proximity to an upcoming election.  I expect this to be 
positively correlated with the number of votes on cultural issues, with a particularly 
strong effect in election years.  
                                                 
31 An alternative model including procedural votes in the Senate did not yield significantly different 
results.  
 
32 House: G2 = 59.04, p < .001; Senate: G2 = 12.32, p < .001 
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 I use two different measures to test the extent to which the dynamics of 
presidential politics affects the number of votes taken each month on cultural issues.  
First, I look at the effect of divided government, which is coded as 1 if the party of the 
president does not also controls the House or the Senate, depending on the model, and 
as a 0 if it does.   I also include a dummy variable for presidential election, which is 
coded as 1 for September and October of a presidential election year, after each party 
has held its national convention and the campaign is in full swing.  All other months 
are coded as 0.  I expect both measures of presidential politics to have a positive 
effect on the number of roll call votes on cultural issues.  
 Cultural issues are controversial and likely to be brought to the floor as part of 
a strategy to elicit disagreement for political gain.  As such, I expect the leadership 
style of the Speaker of the House to matter because not all leaders are equally 
committed to the practice of strategic disagreement.  For example, I expect the 
number of votes on cultural issues in the House to be particularly high under New 
Gingrich’s leadership and lower under the leadership of Democrat Tom Foley, who 
was not known to be a particularly aggressive agenda-setter (Sinclair 2005).  Leaders 
are particularly likely to matter in the House, where bills are brought to the floor 
under guidelines stipulated by the Rules Committee, whose membership is selected 
by the Speaker and typically includes some of the most loyal members of the majority 
party.  I include dummy variables for each Speaker of the House, with the exception 
of Tip O’Neill.  The period in which the House was under O’Neill’s leadership is 
used as the comparison group.  In the Senate, where bills are brought to the floor 
under rules set by unanimous consent and where any senator is typically allowed to 
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offer amendments that are not germane to the bill at hand, there is little reason to 
expect the leader of the majority party to affect the number of floor votes on cultural 
issues each month.  Because unanimous consent requests can be blocked by any 
individual senator, unanimous consent agreements are often the product of 
negotiations between the majority and minority leaders (Sinclair 2000).  Therefore, I 
leave leadership variables out of Senate models.     
 Finally, I look at factors that are not contingent on the theory of strategic 
disagreement but that may affect the number of roll call votes in the House and the 
Senate.  To measure the extent to which Congress responds to the president’s agenda, 
I record the number of cultural issues the president mentioned in his State of the 
Union address in January of a given year.  Because the address is typically given at 
the end of January, every month from February until December is coded accordingly.  
For years in which an outgoing president delivered the State of the Union address, I 
used the incoming president’s speech at his party’s convention the previous year as a 
measure of that president’s agenda.    
 I also account for the effect of outside events on the number of roll call votes 
on cultural issues.  Cultural conflicts take place across the country everyday, making 
it impossible to document every battle in the culture war.  Instead, I have looked at 
timelines compiled by various advocacy groups on both sides of cultural conflicts and 
made available on the groups’ websites to identify key events.  Internet searches also 
yielded timelines on a number of cultural issues compiled by major news 
organizations, including CBS and ABC. I considered events that appeared on at least 
three different timelines to be significant events. I recorded the year and month in 
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which the event took place and lagged the variable by one month to allow for reaction 
time between the event and action by Congress.33 
 As a measure of public opinion on cultural issues, I use the aggregate 
percentage of Gallup poll respondents who indicated that a particular cultural issue 
(in most polls, abortion was the only specific issue mentioned) or cultural issues in 
general (e.g. “decline of religious values” or “decline in morality”) were the most 
important problem facing the country.  Unfortunately, the “most important problem” 
question is not asked in every poll.  In 2004, for example, the question was asked 
every month except for August and November. In 1995, on the other hand, it was 
only asked in January and July.  I fill in the missing months with the results of the last 
month in which the question was asked.  Although this is not the most accurate 
measure, it is useful because that would be the last indicator of the salience of cultural 
issues available to a staff member in a congressional office who was tasked with 
tracking poll numbers.  I then lag the variable to reflect public opinion one month 
prior to the month in question.   
 Lastly, I include two control measures to account for circumstances that may 
affect whether or not cultural issues are brought to the floor for a vote.  First, I use the 
number of days each chamber was in session each month.  This information is 
archived in THOMAS.  The number of days in session varies ranges from 0 to 27 in 
the House and from 0 to 24 in the Senate. The number of roll call on cultural issues 
                                                 
33 See Appendix D for a list of events included in this measure.  
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should be higher in months with longer legislative sessions.34  I also include the 
misery index for each month in the model.  The misery index is the unemployment 
rate added to the inflation rate.35 A high misery index typically indicates a period of 
economic and social downturn for the country.  I expect the number of votes on 
cultural issues to be lower in months with a high misery index, when economic issues 
are more likely to be a priority for members of Congress.    
Strategic Disagreement in the House and in the Senate 
 At first glance, there appears to be little evidence that strategic disagreement 
plays a significant role in the scheduling of roll call votes on cultural issues.  In the 
Senate, none of the variables associated with a strategy of disagreement are 
significant predictors of the number of roll call votes each month.  In the House, 
neither proximity to an upcoming congressional election nor the presence of divided 
government affects the number of roll call votes significantly, while an upcoming 
presidential election has a small but negative effect (see Table 5.1, column 1).36  It is 
clear, however, that the willingness of individual leaders to bring cultural issues to the 
floor plays an important function in setting the culture war agenda in the House.   
 
 
                                                 
34 The analysis was previously conducted using an additional control measure to account for whether 
or not the chamber was controlled by the Republican Party.  However, this measure is left out of the 
model presented here because it is correlated with more than one leadership measure.  
 
35 Annual and monthly misery index figures are available at http://www.miseryindex.us/.  
 
36 An interaction term accounting for the effect of divided government in the two months prior to a 
presidential election on the number of roll call votes is also statistically insignificant and was, 
therefore, not included in the final model.  
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TABLE 5.1 
Negative Binomial Regression Analysis of Number of Roll-Call Votes on Cultural Issues in 
the House  
  All years  Election 
years 
 Non-election 
years 
       
Number of months since election  0.02      0.14**  0.03 
  (0.02)   (0.06)  (0.06) 
Divided government       -0.19  -0.57  0.06 
       (0.31)  (0.46)  (0.47) 
Presidential election       -1.43*    -1.73**  -- 
       (0.77)  (0.79)   
Leadership       
    Wright       -0.63  -0.43  -0.52 
       (0.70)   (0.99)   (0.99) 
    Foley        1.00**  1.01   1.00 
      (0.47)  (0.67)   (0.73) 
    Gingrich       1.83***    1.44*      2.74** 
      (0.61)   0.83   (0.95) 
    Hastert       1.03*   0.90  1.07 
      (0.60)   (0.77)  (1.00) 
President’s agenda       0.31**   0.27     0.75** 
      (0.16)    (0.22)  (0.32) 
Outside events      -0.38  -0.79  0.03 
      (0.39)   (0.56)  (0.57) 
Public opinion       0.07*   0.04    0.10* 
      (0.36)   (0.04)   (0.06) 
Days in session       0.15***        0.14***        0.13*** 
      (0.02)   (0.04)   (0.04) 
Misery index      -0.02  -0.11   0.10 
      (0.08)   (0.12)   (0.12) 
Constant    -4.34***      -5.09**    -6.47** 
      (1.36)   (2.04)  (2.26) 
       
Log likelihood  -260.46  -111.54  -141.35 
Log likelihood chi-square      86.06***       56.73***         43.23*** 
N  336  168  168 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses.  O’Neill used as comparison group for leadership 
variables.  *p≤.10; **p≤.05; ***≤.001. 
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 As expected, the number of votes on cultural issues was particularly high 
under Newt Gingrich’s leadership.  The first Republican Speaker following forty 
years of Democratic domination in the House, Gingrich came to his new post  ready 
to make up for the time his party spent in the minority by bringing as many 
conservative initiatives to the floor as possible.  It is not surprising, then, that holding 
all other variables at their mean, the expected number of votes on cultural issues 
increased by a factor of 6.24 during Gingrich’s tenure as Speaker of the House 
relative to the number of votes on cultural issues under Democrat Tip O’Neill’s 
leadership (see Table 5.2, column 1).  The House also held more votes on such issues 
under Tom Foley and Dennis Hastert than under O’Neill, but the magnitude of the 
increase was considerably smaller compared to the increase under Gingrich’s 
leadership.  On the other hand, there was no significant change in the number of votes 
on cultural issues in the House under Jim Wright’s leadership compared to the period 
in which the chamber was under O’Neill’s leadership.  Even though Wright is 
generally seen as a Speaker who employed strategic disagreement tactics in order to 
put Ronald Reagan and Senate Republicans on the defensive on a number of issues 
(Roberts and Smith 2003; Sinclair 2005), the findings of this analysis suggest that 
cultural issues were not among his chosen weapons.   
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TABLE 5.2 
Factor Change in the Expected Count of Roll-Call Votes on Cultural Issues in the House  
  All years  Election 
years 
 Non-election 
years 
       
Number of months since election   1.02       1.15**    1.03 
Divided government   0.83   0.57    1.06 
Presidential election    0.24*      0.18**  -- 
Leadership       
    Wright   0.53   0.65     0.59 
    Foley      2.73**   2.74     2.72 
    Gingrich       6.24***     4.22*      15.45** 
    Hastert   2.79*   2.45    2.92 
President’s agenda     1.37**   1.31       2.15** 
Outside events  0.68   0.46   1.03 
Public opinion   1.07*   1.04     1.11* 
Days in session       1.16***        1.16***         1.14*** 
Misery index  0.98  0.89   1.10 
       
N  336  168  168 
Notes:  O’Neill used as comparison group for leadership variables.  *p≤.10; **p≤.05; 
***≤.001. 
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That Wright did not pursue a cultural agenda is not surprising since it is 
generally believed that cultural issues help Republicans and hurt Democrats. After all, 
it was conservative groups like the Moral Majority and the Christian Coalition that 
first launched the culture war in the political arena.  Yet, it is somewhat surprising 
that the number of votes increased by virtually the same magnitude under Foley’s and 
Hastert’s leadership relative to the number of votes under O’Neill’s leadership.  The 
number of votes might have increased more dramatically under Hastert had he not 
presided over the House in the post-9/11 period, when security issues and the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq became particularly salient.     
The Political Dynamics of Election Years 
 Although the politics of strategic disagreement did not perform as well as 
expected as a predictor of the number of roll call votes on cultural issues, there is 
evidence that it plays a bigger role in the culture war in congressional election years 
in the House.  When only election years are considered, Newt Gingrich becomes the 
only Speaker actively committed to pushing cultural issues onto the agenda and 
closeness to a presidential election remain significantly and negatively correlated with 
the number of votes in the House.  Unlike in the full model however, the number of 
months since the previous congressional election is a significant predictor of the 
number of votes on cultural issues when only congressional election years are 
considered (see Tables 5.1, column 2)  
In the House, for each additional month away from the previous election or, in 
other words, for each month closer to the upcoming election, the expected number of 
roll call votes on cultural issues increases by a factor of 1.15, holding all other 
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variables at their mean (see Table 5.2, column 2).  In the second half of 1998, for 
example, the House held eight votes on cultural issues.  For much of the year, 
Republicans had hoped to make President Bill Clinton’s affair with a White House 
intern and the possibility of the president’s impeachment a winning issue in the 
congressional election.  However, a strong economy and a general feeling among the 
public that the country was headed in the right direction under the Democratic 
president undermined the Republican agenda (Jacobson 1999).  Instead, as the 
campaign season heated up, Republicans in the House stepped up the culture war 
rhetoric that had helped them take back the House in 1994.  Between July and 
October of 1998, the House voted on abortion, access to family planning, and 
adoptions by single people or unmarried couples, an issue that is often brought up by 
conservatives who are not only opposed to single parenthood but who also seek to 
undermine the ability of same-sex couples to adopt.   
The timing of elections is particularly relevant in election years when the 
House is under Republican leadership (see Table 5.3, column 2).  Models that look at 
the House under Republican and Democratic control separately without the variables 
for individual leaders show that, under Republican leadership, the expected number 
of roll call votes on cultural issues increases by a factor of 1.27 (see Table 5.4, 
column 2).  Under Democratic control, on the other hand, none of variables related to 
strategic disagreement is significantly correlated with the number of roll call votes on 
cultural issues, in an election year or otherwise (see Tables 5.5 and 5.6).  
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TABLE 5.3 
Negative Binomial Regression Analysis of Number of Roll-Call Votes on Cultural Issues in 
the House under Republican Leadership 
  All years  Election 
years 
 Non-election 
years 
       
Number of months since election  0.03        0.24**   0.08 
  (0.02)    (0.10)   (0.09) 
Divided government        0.30    0.28   0.36 
       (0.36)    (0.47)   (0.72) 
Presidential election       -1.26        -1.197**  -- 
       (0.86)    (0.84)   
President’s agenda        0.00    0.37   -0.22 
       (0.22)        (0.29)     (0.51) 
Outside events       -0.52        -0.73   -0.45 
       (0.45)    (0.54)    (0.75) 
Public opinion        0.09   -0.01    0.19 
       (0.06)    (0.07)    (0.12) 
Days in session        0.13***        0.11**        0.11** 
       (0.03)        (0.04)    (0.05) 
Misery index        0.41   -0.10     1.00* 
       (0.32)    (0.39)   (0.59) 
Constant    -6.15**     -5.76*    -11.31** 
       (2.82)    (3.12)   (5.44) 
       
Log likelihood  -145.16  -57.30   -80.68 
Log likelihood chi-square        25.38**       26.57***    10.87 
N  120  60     60 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses.  *p≤.10; **p≤.05; ***≤.001. 
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TABLE 5.4 
Factor Change in the Expected Count of Roll-Call Votes on Cultural Issues in the House  
under Republican Leadership 
  All years  Election 
years 
 Non-election 
years 
       
Number of months since election  1.03         1.27**   1.08 
Divided government        1.34     1.32   1.45 
Presidential election        0.28         0.14**  -- 
President’s agenda        1.00     1.45    0.80 
Outside events        0.60          0.48    0.64 
Public opinion        1.09     0.99    1.21 
Days in session        1.14***        1.12**        1.12** 
Misery index        1.51    0.90      2.72* 
       
N  120  60    60 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses.  *p≤.10; **p≤.05; ***≤.001. 
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TABLE 5.5 
Negative Binomial Regression Analysis of Number of Roll-Call Votes on Cultural Issues in 
the House under Democratic Leadership 
  All years  Election 
years 
 Non-election 
years 
       
Number of months since election    0.02     0.11   0.04 
    (0.03)     (0.11)   (0.08) 
Divided government         -0.30     0.07   -0.16 
         (0.13)      (0.79)    (0.52) 
Presidential election       -23.35   -17.88  -- 
     (74549.15)    (4532.39)   
President’s agenda           0.13    -0.34      0.86** 
         (0.22)         (0.33)   (0.39) 
Outside events         -0.06       -17.74   0.60 
         (0.78)    (5245.80)    (0.86) 
Public opinion          0.07    0.3    0.07 
         (0.12)     (0.19)    (0.15) 
Days in session          0.16***        0.15**        0.17** 
         (0.04)        (0.06)    (0.06) 
Misery index         -0.14**      -0.30**     0.03 
         (0.07)    (0.14)     (0.10) 
Constant     -2.60*    -1.180        -5.80** 
         (1.45)    (2.93)      (2.08) 
       
Log likelihood  -117.08  -50.16   -61.00 
Log likelihood chi-square      27.64***       24.10**       13.69** 
N  216  108    108 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses.  *p≤.10; **p≤.05; ***≤.001. 
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TABLE 5.6 
Factor Change in the Expected Count of Roll-Call Votes on Cultural Issues in the House  
under Democratic Leadership 
  All years  Election 
years 
 Non-election 
years 
       
Number of months since election  1.02    1.12    1.04 
Divided government        0.74    1.07    0.86 
Presidential election        0.00    0.00  -- 
President’s agenda        1.34    0.71        2.37** 
Outside events        0.94          0.00    1.82 
Public opinion        1.08    1.03    1.07 
Days in session        1.18***        1.16**        1.18** 
Misery index        0.87**        0.74**     1.03 
       
N  216  108    108 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses.  *p≤.10; **p≤.05; ***≤.001. 
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 In the Senate, all variables associated with a strategy of disagreement remain 
insignificant when only years in which a congressional election took place are 
considered (see Table 5.7).  With only one-third of the Senate up for reelection in any 
given election year and with senators’ ability to introduce any measures they want on 
the floor of the Senate in the form of non-germane amendments, it is possible that 
floor politics on cultural issues in that chamber is more responsive to members’ 
individual goals than to the institutional-level explanations explored in this analysis.  
Because the majority party leadership does not have strict control of floor activity in 
the Senate as it does in the House, I do not present separate models for Democratic- 
and Republican-led Senates.   
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TABLE 5.7 
Negative Binomial Regression Analysis of Number of Roll-Call Votes on Cultural Issues in 
the Senate 
  All years  Election 
years 
 Non-election 
years 
       
Number of months since election   -0.07   -0.50  0.60 
    (0.38)    (0.56)  (0.58) 
Divided government    0.01   -0.02  0.06 
    (0.03)    (0.07)  (0.06) 
Presidential election    0.45   0.57  -- 
    (0.74)   (0.90)   
President’s agenda      -0.36**  -0.21   -0.34 
   (0.17)   (0.24)    (0.26) 
Outside events  -0.12  -0.77    0.55 
   (0.53)   (0.95)    (0.60) 
Public opinion  -0.07  -0.04   -0.10 
   (0.05)   (0.07)    (0.07) 
Days in session        0.16***      0.19**        0.13** 
   (0.04)   (0.07)    (0.05) 
Misery index     -0.19**    -0.18*     -0.18* 
   (0.07)   (0.11)    (0.11) 
Constant  -1.21  -1.50   -1.74 
   (1.26)  (1.93)    (1.90) 
       
Log likelihood  -149.53   -69.40   -75.48 
Log likelihood chi-square      36.27***       15.97**        26.95*** 
N  312  156   156 
Notes: Byrd used as comparison group for leadership variables Standard errors in 
parentheses.  *p≤.10; **p≤.05; ***≤.001. 
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The Influence of the President’s Agenda, Outside Events, and Public Opinion 
 In addition to the effect of leadership and, in the case of congressional election 
years, the proximity to elections, on the number of roll call votes in the House, 
members of the House also take cues from the president and from the public when 
deciding to bring cultural issues to the floor for a vote.  Holding all other variables at 
their mean, the expected number of roll call votes increases by a factor of 1.37 in the 
House for each additional cultural issue the president mentions in his previous State 
of the Union address or nomination acceptance speech (see Table 5.2, column 1).  
The president’s agenda is especially influential in a non-election year, when the 
expected number of roll call votes increases by a factor of 2.15 for each additional 
cultural issue the president mentions.  In election years, however, the House is not 
responsive to the president’s agenda on cultural issues.  Interestingly, in the Senate, 
the president’s agenda has a negative effect on the number of roll call votes on 
cultural issues when all years are considered.  For each additional cultural issue on 
the president’s agenda, the expected number of votes decreases by a factor of 0.7 (see 
Tables 5.8, column 1).   As expected, the number of days the House and the Senate 
were in session each month are positively correlated with the number of roll call votes 
taken in each chamber.  In addition, the misery index is negatively correlated with the 
number of votes on cultural issues in the Senate, suggesting that senators are less 
likely to hold votes on cultural issues when the country is facing an economic 
downturn that requires the attention of lawmakers. In the House, however, the misery 
index is only significant when the chamber is under Democratic control (see Table 
5.6).  
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TABLE 5.8 
Factor Change in the Expected Count of Roll-Call Votes on Cultural Issues in the Senate 
  All years  Election 
years 
 Non-election 
years 
       
Number of months since election  0.93   0.61    1.82 
Divided government        1.01   0.98    1.06 
Presidential election        1.57   1.76  -- 
President’s agenda        0.70**   0.81     0.71 
Outside events        0.89         0.46    1.73 
Public opinion        0.93   0.96    0.90 
Days in session        1.17***       1.21**        1.14** 
Misery index        0.82**     0.83*      0.84* 
       
N  312  156    156 
Notes:  Byrd used as comparison group for leadership variables. Standard errors in 
parentheses.  *p≤.10; **p≤.05; ***≤.001. 
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In regard to public opinion, the House is considerably more responsive than 
the Senate, as is to be expected.  House members face reelection every two years and 
serve smaller, more homogenous constituencies.  Surprisingly, however, the influence 
of public opinion is statistically insignificant in the Senate, both in the full model and 
when only congressional election years are considered.  In the House, for each 
additional percentage of Gallup poll respondents who cite cultural issues as the most 
important problem facing the country, the expected number of roll call votes 
increases by a factor of 1.07 (see Table 5.2, column 1).  Public opinion is not 
significant in election years, however.  
 Finally, events that take place outside of Congress, such as court decision and 
laws enacted by state legislatures do not seem to affect the number of roll call votes 
on cultural issues in the subsequent month.  Despite the lack of statistical 
significance, however, it is interesting to note that the coefficient for outside events in 
most models is negative, contrary to expectations. Alternative models that include 
lags of up to three months confirmed the negative relationship and showed statistical 
significance in some cases (results are not presented as they do not change the effect 
of the other variables significantly).  This fits the notion that escalation of the culture 
war in Congress is guided, in part, by a desire to increase the visibility of cultural 
issues.  If a controversial court decision, like the 2002 9th Circuit Court ruling that 
the phrase “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance is unconstitutional, or a local 
development, like the decision by San Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsom to issue 
marriage licenses to same-sex couples in his city in early-2004, generate media 
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coverage and direct the public’s attention to cultural conflicts, there is no need for 
Congress to do so.  
Conclusion 
 This chapter examined two sets of hypotheses concerning the number of roll 
call votes on cultural issues in the House and the Senate.  The first set of hypotheses 
suggested that legislators put these items on the agenda, even when they know there 
is no chance an item will pass, with the purpose of generating conflict.  Drawing 
distinctions between one’s positions and those of his or her opponents on issues one’s 
party dominates often brings political rewards.  I found evidence to support this set of 
hypotheses in the House, where individual leaders and proximity to an election, 
particularly in a congressional election year and particularly when the House is under 
Republican control, affect the number of votes on cultural issues.   
 In the Senate, however, there is little evidence that cultural issues are brought 
to the floor as part of a broader strategy of disagreement.  It is possible that culture 
war battles on the floor of the Senate, where any senator can typically offer an 
unlimited number of amendments on any subject he or she chooses and where 
majority party leaders do not have as much control of floor proceedings as their 
counterparts in the House do, reflect the political agenda of individual senators.  This 
would explain, in part, why institutional-level indicators are not good predictors of 
the number of roll call votes on cultural issues in that chamber. 
 The second set of hypotheses focused on forces outside of Congress that have 
the potential to shape the congressional agenda. Contrary to the first set of 
hypotheses, which suggest that legislators actively seek out cultural issues, these 
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hypotheses focus on events Congress does not control and to which it can only react.  
I find evidence the House and responds positively to the president’s agenda.  As the 
number of cultural issues the president mentions in his State of the Union or 
acceptance speech increases, the number of votes on cultural issues increases. In the 
Senate, however, contrary to expectations, the president’s agenda has a negative 
effect on the number of votes on cultural issues.  It could be that senators put cultural 
issues on the agenda in order to raise the visibility of such issues rather than to shape 
policy and that they believe that the public and the media will pay sufficient attention 
to these issues if the president addresses them in his State of the Union address, thus 
freeing the Senate to work on more substantive legislation.  
 Congress also responds to shifts in public opinion, though not to the same 
extent that it responds to the president’s agenda.  In the House, public opinion is 
significant predictor of the number of roll call votes on cultural bills in the full model, 
but it loses its significance when only congressional election years are analyzed.  
Public opinion has no significant effect in the Senate.  This, combined with the 
findings in the first part of the analysis, suggests that Congress may seek to shape 
public opinion on cultural issues rather than follow it.  More work is needed to 
identify if this is, indeed, the case.  
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Chapter 6:  Conclusion 
 
 At a conference on party polarization at Princeton University in 2004, former 
Republican Congressman Vin Weber of Minnesota observed that “the cultural 
differences that are driving a lot of polarization in the country are more evident in the 
rhetoric of the candidates and officeholders than they are in the policy outcomes 
we’re seeing out of the United States Congress.”37  The data compiled for this study 
shows that, when it comes to the introduction of legislation, committee hearing 
activity, and the number of floor votes on cultural issues, Weber’s observation is 
absolutely correct.  For example, in the 108th Congress, only 151 out of more than ten 
thousand bills, resolutions, and amendments introduced in the House and the Senate 
dealt with either a culturally conservative or culturally liberal issue.  Of those, only 
about 6 percent received a hearing and 12 percent received a vote on the floor.  
 That the level of legislative activity on cultural issues does not match the 
intense culture war rhetoric in Congress is not surprising.  In recent years, scholars 
have suggested that Republicans often use these controversial issues to secure the 
support of working-class voters in rural states but that, once in office, Republicans 
turn their attention to fiscal policies that hurt those culturally conservative voters who 
helped to elect them (see, for example, Frank 2004 and Hacker and Pierson 2005).  
And, while the political uses of cultural issues by Democrats have not been studied as 
extensively, Democrats have come under attack by progressive activists for using 
cultural issues for electoral gain.  For example, a simple Internet search yields several 
                                                 
37 A full transcript of Weber’s comments are available at http://www.princeton.edu/~csdp/events/pdfs/, 
Panel 3 PDF.  
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comments on gay rights message boards and liberal “blogs” criticizing Democratic 
officeholders for their inactivity on issues that matter to the gay community.  One 
writer on the Independent Gay Forum says, “Despite all the gay money Democrats 
receive, their pro-gay actions at the national level have been mostly rhetorical.”38 A 
commenter on a message board, expressing wavering support for John Kerry in 2004, 
writes, “Clinton reached out to gays in his '92 campaign and then dropped them like a 
hot potato in one of his first acts as president in '93 with his political savvy ‘don't ask, 
don't tell’ policy.”39 And, following a recent announcement by Virginia’s newly-
elected Democratic governor that he will not veto a measure by the Republican 
legislature to put a referendum on a constitutional ban to same-sex marriage on the 
ballot in 2006, a headline on a popular liberal website read, “Kaine to gays: Thanks 
for your votes. Please disappear.”40 
The findings in the previous chapters show that suggestions that Republicans 
and Democrats turn their attention to cultural issues when it is political expedient to 
do so are not unfounded.  There is evidence, however, that when it comes to setting 
the agenda in the U.S. Congress, Republican members and leaders are particularly 
likely to consider the electoral benefits of promoting a culture war agenda.  House 
members who introduced culturally conservative bills in the 108th Congress, about 90 
percent of which were introduced by Republicans, were more inclined to do so if they 
had faced a primary opponent in the 2002 election whose campaign featured 
                                                 
38 http://www.indegayforum.org/culturewatch/2005_05_15_archive.shtml 
 
39 http://www2.usenetarchive.org/Dir3/File850.html 
 
40 http://www.dailykos.com/story/2006/1/14/14428/5591 
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conservative culturally issues prominently.  This conforms to Sulkin’s (2005) theory 
of issue uptake, which suggests that members of Congress adopt their opponents’ key 
issues in order to shield themselves from future competition.  Those who introduced 
liberal legislation on cultural issues in the 108th House, most of whom were 
Democrats, also responded to how much of a priority culturally liberal causes were to 
their primary opponents, although their engagement in uptake was not as pronounced 
as that of their conservative counterparts.  In the Senate, members were more likely to 
introduce culturally conservative bills if the 108th Congress coincided with the last 
two years of their term, a time when senators are particularly focused on the 
upcoming election and constituents are more attuned to the activities of their senators.  
The timing of elections is not a significant predictor of whether or not a member 
introduces a culturally liberal bill, however.   
In congressional committees, where members can raise the visibility of issues 
by holding hearings and inviting compelling witnesses whose testimony is likely to 
attract media attention, there is also some evidence that the rise of cultural issues on 
the agenda is connected to electoral considerations.  Bills on cultural issues that were 
referred to a House committee between 1981 and 2004 were more likely to receive a 
hearing in a congressional election year in which Republicans were in control of the 
chamber and, therefore, of committee chairmanships.  This finding supports the 
notion that Republicans are more inclined to see the culture wars as a helpful theme 
in an election year.  In Senate committees, on the other hand, bills on cultural issues 
that were introduced in an election year were no more likely to receive a hearing than 
those that were not introduced in an election year, regardless of which party was in 
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control.  Instead, bills were most likely to receive a hearing if a member of the 
majority party introduced them.  Senate committees also responded to widely 
publicized events in the culture wars outside of Congress, like court rulings, passage 
of controversial measures by state legislatures, and violent acts, like the bombing of 
abortion clinics and the murder of an abortion doctor.  This suggests that Senate 
committees may be more likely than House committees to react to an existing agenda 
than to set their own when it comes to cultural issues.  
Finally, once bills are reported out of committee and placed on the floor 
calendar, the majority party leadership has another opportunity to decide which items 
to put on their chamber’s agenda.  Because legislation does not have to be brought to 
the floor for a vote in the order in which it was placed on the calendar, majority party 
leaders often make political calculations when deciding when to schedule certain 
votes.  When it comes to cultural issues in the House, the timing of elections once 
again plays a role.  In congressional election years between 1977 and 2004, the 
number of votes on cultural issues in the House was higher in the months 
immediately preceding the election, when the media and the public are most likely to 
be paying attention, than it was in earlier months.  This is particularly the case in an 
election year when the House is under Republican leadership.  This was not the case 
in the Senate, however, where electoral considerations again did not seem to play a 
significant role in the rise of cultural issues on the agenda.   
The differences between the dynamics of agenda setting on cultural issues in 
the House and the Senate suggest that the House may be more likely than the Senate 
to play politics with the culture wars.  However, it is possible that in the Senate, 
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where there are more opportunities for individual members to set the agenda, the 
decision to schedule votes at a certain time or to hold committee hearings on certain 
issues is not as crucial as it is in the House, where the majority leadership has a 
tighter grip.  For example, while the House Rules Committee, an arm of the majority 
leadership, governs floor activity in that chamber, including the number of 
amendments that can be offered, who is allowed to offer amendments, and the length 
of debate, senators are free to talk about and offer amendments on any issue they wish 
to promote.  The evidence that electoral considerations play a role in senators’ 
decision to introduce bills, resolutions, and amendments on culturally conservative 
issues indicates that, while the Senate as an institution may not politicize cultural 
issues to the extent that the House does, its individual members do.   
Advancing the Literature 
As Chapter 2 shows, policy on cultural issues, what scholars refer to as 
morality policy, is set in several different venues, including local school boards, state 
legislatures, and the U.S. Congress.  Thus far, empirical studies of morality policy 
have focused primarily on policy adoption at the state level and have found a strong 
link between policy adoption and public opinion on controversial cultural issues (see, 
for example, Cohen and Barrilleux 1993 and Mooney and Lee 1995).  The few 
studies that examine the dynamics of policymaking on cultural issues in Congress are 
mostly concerned with the choices legislators make when casting roll call votes on 
these issues (see, for example, Chressanthis, Gilbert, and Grimes 1991, Gohmann and 
Ohsfeldt 1994, and Haider-Markel 1999).  Both sets of studies—those that focus on 
policy adoption at the state level and those that focus on roll call voting behavior in 
 
 157
Congress—have found a strong link between constituency preferences and policy 
decisions on cultural issues.  Because politicians are risk-averse, some have 
concluded, it is unlikely that they would pursue such controversial measures without 
being prompted by the public to do so (see, for example, Mooney and Lee 1995, 
Tatalovich and Daynes 1998 and Smith and Tatalovich 2003). 
 I do not challenge the previous findings in the literature.  Most members of 
Congress do not seek out controversial cultural issues, as evidenced by the small 
percentage of members of the House and the Senate who introduce legislation on 
such issues.  Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that, when faced with the decision to 
cast a “yes” or “no” vote on these polarizing issues, these members would take cues 
from their constituents.  Cultural conflicts often attract the attention of the media 
because they are easy for most people to understand and generate controversy which, 
in turn, boosts ratings.  Voters who may not understand the complexities of most 
issues before Congress often have an opinion on most cultural issues.  It would be 
unwise, then, for most members to ignore the position of voters in their districts or 
states when deciding how to vote on such issues. Yet, an important part of the 
puzzle—how cultural issues become part of the legislative agenda in the first place—
has been largely ignored in the morality policy literature. 
 The research I present here advances this literature by looking at decisions 
that take place in the legislative process before a bill on a cultural issue is before 
members of Congress for a vote. While the study of morality policymaking at the 
state level has contributed much to our understanding of the differences in policy 
outcomes across the country, Congress is a more appropriate venue for the study of 
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agenda setting on cultural issues.  The activities of Congress play a key role in 
framing the national political debate and any decision to put these issues on the 
agenda, even if no legislation is enacted, contributes to this debate.  The activities of 
state legislatures on cultural issues, on the other hand, do not usually capture national 
headlines until a controversial measure is adopted.  
 The agenda-setting process starts with the simple decision by individual 
members to introduce legislation.  Committees help to intensify the debate by 
choosing to hold hearings on certain issues.  And finally, majority party leaders 
determine when these issues are presented to the chamber for a vote.  In all three 
instances, I find significant evidence that the decision to put cultural issues on the 
agenda of the Congress is guided more by electoral motivations than by demands 
from the public.  
What This Means for Democracy 
 In addition to advancing the scholarly literature on morality policy, the 
findings in this study also have implications for the functioning of representative 
democracy.  It is certainly not unusual for politicians to make promises during a 
campaign season that they do not intend to keep once in office.  This may disillusion 
voters and turn some away from the political process if they feel that their priorities 
are always the ones that are ignored.  The problems created by the manipulation of 
cultural issues by politicians, however, go beyond the familiar pattern of candidates 
who do not deliver on their campaign promises.   
 Frank (2004) and Hacker and Pierson (2005) present a compelling argument 
that Republicans have developed the culture war narrative as a coordinated effort to 
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stir up support among those who, for the most part, would not back their party.  As a 
consequence, conservative social and economic policies, including tax cuts for the 
wealthy and the elimination of social programs that benefit many of the voters who 
helped put the Republican Party in office, have been adopted by the Republican-led 
Congress since the party’s victory in 1994 (Hacker and Pierson 2005).   
 A series of e-mails disclosed at a recent hearing of the Senate Indian Affairs 
Committee suggest that there is, indeed, a deliberate attempt on the part of 
conservatives to manipulate those who adhere to traditional cultural values for the 
promotion of political and financial goals that have little to do with these values.  In 
an e-mail exchange between lobbyist Michael Scanlon, a former aide to Republican 
House Majority Leader Tom DeLay, and the lawyer for the Coushatta tribe, whose 
gaming interests he represented, Scanlon outlined a strategy to defeat a referendum 
that sought approval for the building of a Pinnacle Entertainment casino in Louisiana.  
Scanlon discussed the production of advertisements to be played on Christian radio 
giving “biblical reasons” for blocking Pinnacle.  “The wackos,” Scanlon wrote, “get 
their information through the Christian right, Christian radio, mail, the internet and 
telephone trees. Simply put, we want to bring out the wackos to vote against 
something and make sure the rest of the public lets the whole thing slip past them.”41   
 While this dissertation does not address the extent to which members of 
Congress or other elected officials who are elected on a culture war platform change 
priorities once in office, it does offer evidence that there is little attention paid to 
cultural issues in the legislative branch.  This is not in itself a bad thing. As Fiorina 
                                                 
41 A PDF document containing a full transcript of all e-mails released by the Senate Indian Affairs 
Committee on tribal lobbying matters is available on the committee’s website, http://indian.senate.gov. 
 
 
 160
(2004), Green (2004), and others have suggested, there is little reason to believe that 
Americans are, in fact, engaged in a culture war or that most Americans want their 
elected officials to make cultural issues a priority.  That Congress, especially under 
Republican leadership, is more likely to direct its attention to cultural issues when an 
election approaches, however, suggests that the attempt to divide Americans into two 
camps based on cultural values is primarily a top-down approach guided by political 
motivations that do not necessarily benefit those who are most vulnerable to the 
culture war rhetoric.   
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Appendix A 
 
List of keywords used in search of full text of bills (a * indicates that both the 
singular and plural forms of the word were searched: 
 
Abortion* 
Reproduction 
Reproductive choice 
Roe v. Wade 
Choice 
Life 
Unborn 
Embryo 
Embryonic 
Fetus 
Fetal 
Family planning 
Contraceptive* 
Contraception 
Birth control 
Condom* 
Church 
Religion* 
Religious 
Stem cell 
Prayer* 
Pray 
Silence 
Meditation 
Ten Commandments 
Cloning 
God 
Pledge of Allegiance 
Flag* 
Domestic partner* 
Domestic partnership 
Civil union* 
Unmarried 
Marriage 
Gay* 
Lesbian* 
Homosexual* 
Homosexuality 
Abstinence 
Sex education 
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Sex 
Sexual 
Obscenity 
Obscene 
Pornography 
Pornographic 
Suicide 
Right to die 
Euthanasia 
Evolution 
Creationism 
Intelligent design 
 
Notes on keyword search:  
 
• The text of each bill identified through this search was analyzed to ensure that the 
legislation does, in fact, deal with a cultural issue. For example, “suicide” is used 
as a keyword in hopes of detecting bills dealing with physician-assisted suicide. 
Bills that dealt with suicide prevention were excluded.  
• Bills that deal with pornography in the context of child pornography were 
excluded. 
• Bills that deal with abortion in the context of forced abortions were excluded 
(most of these dealt with forced abortions in China). 
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Appendix B 
 
 
TABLE B.1 
Values of Independent Variables for House Models 
  Mean  Minimum  Maximum 
         
Primary challenger’s attention   0.63  0  69.04 
Members’ attention   0.85  0  13.87 
Primary competition  0.38  0  2 
Evangelical  30.78  0  86.70 
Member religion  0.21  0 (not evangelical)  1 (evangelical) 
Sex  0.14  0 (male)  1 (female) 
Post-1994  0.32  0  1 
Total bills  17.54  0  120 
 
 
 
TABLE B.2 
Values of Independent Variables for Senate Models 
  Mean  Minimum  Maximum 
         
Timing   1.0  0  2 
Members’ attention   2.44  0  51.10 
Primary competition  0.5  0  2 
Evangelical  31.16  2.65  75.46 
Member religion  0.15  0 (not evangelical)  1 (evangelical) 
Sex  0.14  0 (male)  1 (female) 
Post-1994  0.33  0  1 
Total bills  37.34  4  103 
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Appendix C 
 
House Committees: 
 
Constituency-oriented committees: 
 
• Agriculture Committee 
• Armed Services Committee (National Security Committee 1995-1998; Armed 
Services Committee 1947-1994) 
• District of Columbia Committee 1947-1994) (became subcommittee of 
Government Reform and Oversight Committee in 1995) 
• Resources Committee (Natural Resources 1993-1994; Interior and Insular Affairs 
Committee 1951-1992; Public Lands, 1947-1951) 
• Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 1947-1994 (Jurisdiction merges with 
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee in 1995, see 118; prior to 1957, no 
standing subcommittees) 
• Post Office and Civil Service Committee (1947-1994) (merged with Government 
Reform and Oversight in 1995) 
• Transportation and Infrastructure Committee (Public Works and Transportation 
1975-1994; Public Works, 1947-1975) 
• Science Committee (Science, Space, and Technology, 1987-1994; Science and 
Technology, 1975-1987; Science and Astronautics, 1959-1975) 
• Small Business Committee (Select Committee on Small Business 1947-1974) 
• Veterans Affairs Committee 
 
Policy-oriented committees: 
 
• Banking and Financial Services Committee (Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs 
Committee 1978-1994; Banking, Currency, and Housing, 1975-1977; Banking 
and Currency, 1947-1975)  
• Education and the Workforce Committee (Economic and Educational 
Opportunities 1995-1996; Education and Labor 1947-1994) 
• Commerce Committee (Energy and Commerce Committee, 1981-1994; Interstate 
and Foreign Commerce Committee, 1947-1981) 
• International Relations Committee (Foreign Affairs Committee, 1979-1994; 
International Relations Committee, 1975-1979; Foreign Affairs Committee, 1947-
1975) 
• Government Reform and Oversight Committee (Government Operations 
Committee, 1953-1992; Expenditures in the Executive Departments, 1947-1952) 
• House Oversight Committee (House Administration Committee 1947-1994) 
• Judiciary Committee 
 
Prestige-oriented committees: 
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• Appropriations Committee 
• Budget Committee 
• Rules Committee 
• Ways and Means Committee 
 
Senate committees: 
 
Constituency-oriented committees: 
 
• Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry Committee (Agriculture and Forestry 1947-
1977) 
• Appropriations Committee 
• Commerce, Science, and Transportation (Commerce 1963-1977; Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce 1947-1963) 
• Energy and Natural Resources (Interior and Insular Affairs 1950-1977; Public 
Lands 1947-1950) 
• Environment and Public Works (Public Works 1947-1977) 
• Post Office and Civil Service Committee (1949-1976) (Jurisdiction moved to 
Government Reform and Oversight Committee in 1977, Civil Service, 1947-
1949) 
 
Policy-oriented committees: 
 
• Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs 
• Budget Committee 
• Foreign Relations Committee 
• Governmental Affairs Committee (Government Operations 1953-1977; 
Expenditures in the Executive Departments 1947-1953) 
• Judiciary Committee 
• Health, Education, Labor and Pensions (Labor and Human Resources Committee, 
1979-1998, Human Resources, 1977-1979; Labor and Public Welfare, 1947-
1977) 
 
Mixed: 
 
• Armed Services Committee 
• Finance Committee 
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Appendix D 
 
List of events used to create “outside events” variable: 
 
Dec. 1976—Massachusetts Supreme Court overturns the conviction of a Boston 
abortion doctor convicted of manslaughter, citing that a fetus is not a “live and 
independent person” 
 
June 1977—Supreme Court rules that states are not required to fund abortion 
 
Feb. 1978—First bombing of an abortion clinic (Cincinnati, OH) 
 
Nov. 1979—Supreme Court rules that a Kentucky law requiring that the Ten 
Commandments be displayed in public school classroom is unconstitutional 
 
Feb. 1980—Supreme Court rules that states can fund abortions under Medicaid 
 
Feb. 1982—Wisconsin becomes the first state to pass legislation to outlaw 
discrimination based on sexual orientation 
 
June 1986—Supreme Court rules that anti-sodomy laws are constitutional 
 
June 1989—Supreme Court rules that a Texas law banning flag desecration violates 
the constitutional right to free speech 
 
July 1989—Supreme Court rules that a Missouri law imposing significant restrictions 
on abortion rights is constitutional 
 
June 1990—Jack Kevorkian’s suicide machine is used for the first time to end the life 
of a patient suffering from dementia 
 
June 1992—Supreme Court rules that a Pennsylvania law imposing significant 
restrictions on abortion rights in constitutional 
 
March 1993—First murder of an abortion doctor (Pensacola, FL) 
 
Ma 1993—Hawaii Supreme Court rules that banning same-sex marriage could be 
unconstitutional 
 
May 1996—Supreme Court rules that a Colorado ballot initiative banning laws 
protecting gays and lesbians against discrimination is unconstitutional 
 
July 1996—FDA advisory committee recommends approval of RU-486 
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Nov. 1996—Supreme Court refuses to hear challenge of a Mississippi federal court 
ruling that a school prayer law in that state was unconstitutional 
 
Jan. 1997—Twin bombs go off at Atlanta abortion clinic 
 
June 1997—Supreme Court issues two rulings against physician-assisted suicide 
 
Nov. 1997—Oregon voters approve a ballot measure in support of the state’s Death 
with Dignity Act 
 
Jan. 1998—Fatal bombing of abortion clinic (Birmingham, AL) 
 
Oct. 1998—Matthew Shepard is brutally murdered in Wyoming; abortion doctor 
murdered (Buffalor, NY) 
 
Aug. 1999—Kansas Board of Education decides to delete references to evolution 
from science standards 
 
April 2000—Vermont Governor Howard Dean sign’s the country’s first law granting 
civil union rights to same-sex couples 
 
June 2000—Supreme Court rules against prayer in Texas public school events 
 
Sept. 2000—FDA approves RU-486 
 
June 2002—9th Circuit Court rules that the phrase “under God” in the Pledge of 
Allegiance is unconstitutional 
June 2003—Supreme Court rules that anti-sodomy laws are unconstitutional 
 
Aug. 2003—Alabama Supreme Court Chief Justice Roy Moore suspended for 
refusing to remove a Ten Commandments display from the courthouse 
 
Nov. 2003—Massachusetts Supreme Court rules that same-sex marriage ban is 
unconstitutional 
 
Feb. 2004—Massachusetts Supreme Court rules that civil unions are not an 
appropriate substitute for same-sex marriage; San Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsom 
begins to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples 
 
May 2004—First legal same-sex marriage performed in Massachusetts 
 
June 2004—Supreme Court rules that a father who did not want his daughter to be 
required to recite the Pledge of Allegiance does not have standing to sue but refuses 
to rule on the constitutionality of the phrase “under God” in the Pledge.  
 
 168
Bibliography 
 
Abington School District v. Schemp. 1963. 374 U.S. 203.   
 
Adams, Greg D. 1997. “Abortion: Evidence of Issue Evolution.” American Journal of  
 Political Science 41: 718-737.  
 
Alan Guttmacher Institute. 2005a. “Emergency Contraception.” State Policies in 
 Brief.  June 1, 2005.  
 
Alan Guttmacher Institute. 2005b. “Refusing to Provide Health Services.” State 
 Policies in Brief.  
 June 1, 2005.  
 
Aldrich, John H. 1995. Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political 
 Parties in America. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
 
Aldrich, John A. 2001. “Congress: The Electoral Connection”: Reflections on Its First 
 Quarter-Century.” PS: Political Science and Politics 34 (June): 255-256. 
 
Allen, Mike. 2005. “Counsel to GOP Senator Wrote Memo On Schiavo; Martinez 
 Aide Who Cited Upside For Party Resigns.” The Washington Post, April 7, 
 2005, A01.  
 
Alley, Robert S. 1994. School Prayer: The Court, the Congress, and the First 
 Amendment. Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books. 
 
Altimari, Daniela. 2005. “A Gay Rights Milestone: Rell Signs Civil Unions Bill; 
 Opponents Call It a Sad Day.” Hartford Courant. April 21, 2005. Online. 
 LexisNexis Academic. 29 June 2005. 
 
American Geological Institute. 2000. “Evolution Opponents Hold Congressional 
 Briefing.” Government Affairs Program Special Update. May 11, 2000. 
 Online. http://www.agiweb.org/gap/legis106/id_update.html. 29 June 2005.  
 
Aratani, Lori, and Daniel De Vise. 2005. “Supporters of Sex-Ed Fear Retreat; 
 Conservatives Making Inroads in Montgomery.” The Washington Post. May 
 7, 2005. Online. LexisNexis Academic. 29 June 2005.   
 
Arnold, Douglas R. 1990. The Logic of Congressional Action. New Haven, CT: Yale 
 University Press. 
 
Bauer, Raymond, Ithiel de Sola Pool, and Lewis Anthony Dexter. 1963. American 
 Business and Public Policy: The Politics of Foreign Trade. New York: 
 Atherton Press. 
 
 169
 
Baumgartner, Frank R. and Bryan D. Jones. 1993. Agendas and Instability in 
 American Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Boonstra, Heather. 2004. "Abstinence Promotion and the U.S. Approach to 
 HIV/AIDS Prevention Overseas." The Alan Guttmacher Institute. 
 
Bowers v. Hardwick. 1986. 478 U.S. 186. 
 
Bullock, Charles S. III. 1976. “Motivations for U.S. Congressional Committee 
 Preferences: Freshmen of the 92nd Congress.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 1 
 (May): 201-212.  
 
Button, James W., Barbara A. Rienzo, and Kenneth D. Wald. 1997. Private Lives, 
 Public Conflicts: Battles over Gay Rights in American Communities. 
 Washington, DC: CQ Press. 
 
Button, James W., Barbara A. Rienzo, and Kenneth D. Wald. 2000. “The Politics of 
 Gay Rights at the Local and State Level.” In The Politics of Gay Rights, eds. 
 Craig A. Rimmerman, Kenneth D. Wald, and Clyde Wilcox. Chicago: 
 University of Chicago Press. 
 
Carmines, Edward G. and James A. Stimson. 1980. “The Two Faces of Issue 
 Voting.” The American Political Science Review 74 (March): 78-91. 
 
Carmines, Edward G. and James A. Stimson. 1989. Issue Evolution: Race and the  
 Transformation of American Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
 Press. 
 
Carsey, Thomas, John C. Green, Rick Herrera, and Geoffrey Layman. 2003. “The 
 New Party Professionals? An Initial Look at National Convention Delegates 
 in 2000 and Over Time.” Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American 
 Political Science Association.  
 
Cerminara , Kathy L. and Kenneth W. Goodman. 2005.  “Key Events in the Case of 
 Theresa Marie Schiavo.” Online. 
 http://www.miami.edu/ethics/schiavo/timeline.htm. 29 June 2005. 
 
Chressantis, George A., Kathie S. Gilbert, and Paul W. Grimes. 1991. “Ideology, 
 Constituent Interests, and Senatorial Voting: The Case of Abortion.” Social 
 Science Quarterly 72 (3): 588-600. 
 
Clarke, Susan E. 1999. “Ideas, Interests, and Institutions Shaping Abortion Politics in 
 Denver.” In Culture Wars and Local Politics. Elaine B. Sharp, ed. Lawrence, 
 KS: University Press of Kansas.  
 
 
 170
Cobb, Roger W. and Charles D. Elder. 1972. Participation in American Politics: The 
 Dynamics of Agenda-Building.  Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.   
 
Cox, Gary and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1993.  Legislative Leviathan: Party Government 
 in the House. Stanford: University of California Press. 
 
Congressional Record. 2005. 109th Cong., 1st sess., p. H1721. 
 
Congressional Record. 2005. 109th Cong., 1st sess., p. H3749. 
 
Cohen, Jeffrey E., and Charles Barrilleaux. 1993. “Public Opinion, Interest Groups, 
 and Public Policy Making: Abortion Policy in the American States.” In 
 Understanding the New Politics of Abortion. Malcolm L. Goggin, ed.. 
 Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 
 
Converse, Philip E. and Gregory Markus. 1979. “Plus ça Change…: The New CPS 
 Election Study Panel,” American Political Science Review 73: 32-49.  
 
Crespin, Michael H., Suzanne M. Gold, and David W. Rohde. 2003. “Ideology, 
 Electoral Incentives, and Congressional Politics.” Paper presented at the 
 Southern Political Science Association annual meeting, New Orleans, 
 Louisiana, January 8-10, 2004. 
 
Cushman, Candi. 2004. “Honor the Flag and the Virtues It Represents.” Citizen. June 
 2004. Online. 
 http://www.family.org/cforum/citizenmag/departments/a0032300.cfm. 29 
 June 2005.  
 
Dailard, C. 2000. “Courts Strike Partial Birth Abortion Ban, Decisions Presage Future 
 Debates.” Guttmacher Report on Public Policy 7 (4): 1-3.  
 
Dana, Rebecca. 2004. “Montgomery Expands Sex-Ed Curriculum.” The Washington 
 Post. Nov. 10, 2004. Online. LexisNexis Academic. 29 June 2005.  
 
Davidson, Roger H. 1986. “Congressional Committees as Moving Targets.” 
 Legislative Studies Quarterly 11 (February): 19-33. 
 
Davidson, Roger H. and Walter J. Oleszek. 2002. Congress and Its Members, 8th 
 edition. Washington, DC: CQ Press.  
 
Deering, Christopher J. and Steven S. Smith. 1997. Committees in Congress, 3rd 
 edition. Washington, DC: CQ Press. 
 
 
 
 
 
 171
D’Emilio, John. 2000. “Cycles of Change, Questions of Strategy: The Gay and 
 Lesbian Movement after Fifty Years.” The Politics of Gay Rights, eds. Craig 
 A. Rimmerman, Kenneth D. Wald, and Clyde Wilcox. Chicago: University of 
 Chicago Press. 
 
Donovan, Todd, Jim Wenzel, and Shaun Bowler. 2000. “Direct Democracy and Gay 
 Rights Intiatives after Romer.” The Politics of Gay Rights, eds. Craig A. 
 Rimmerman, Kenneth D. Wald, and Clyde Wilcox. Chicago: University of 
 Chicago Press. 
 
Dunn, Kyla. 2005. “The Politics of Stem Cells.” NOVA ScienceNOW. April 13, 2005. 
 Online. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nola/sciencenow/dispathces/050413.html. 
 29 June 2005.  
 
Dye, Thomas R. 2001. Top Down Policymaking. New York: Chatham House. 
 
Easton, David. 1965. A Systems Analysis of Political Life. New York: John Wiley.  
 
Edelman, Murray. 1964. The Symbolic Uses of Politics. Urbana, IL: University of 
 Illinois Press. 
 
Edwards, George C. III and B. Dan Wood. 1999. “Who Influences Whom? The 
 President and the Public Agenda.” American Political Science Review 93(2): 
 327-344. 
  
Edwards v. Aguillard. 1987. 482 U.S. 578. 
 
Egelko, Bob. 2004. “Court Backs Coverage for Birth Control, Catholic Charities 
 Can’t Claim Religious Exemption.” San Francisco Chronicle. March 2, 2004. 
 Online. LexisNexis Academic. 29 June 2005. 
 
Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow. 2004. 000 U.S. 02-1624. 
 
Engel v. Vitale. 1962. 370 U.S. 421. 
 
Epperson v. Arkansas. 1968. 393 U.S. 97. 
 
Epstein, Lee and Joseph F. Kobylka 1992. The Supreme Court and Legal Change: 
 Abortion and the Death Penalty. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
 Press.  
 
Erikson, Robert S. and Gerald C. Wright. 2001. “Voters, Candidates, and Issues in 
 Congressional Elections.” In Congress Reconsidered, eds. Lawrence C. Dodd 
 and Bruce I. Oppenheimer. Washington, DC: CQ Press.  
 
 
 
 172
Fenno, Richard F., Jr. 1973. Congressmen in Committees. Boston: Little, Brown. 
 
Fenno, Richard F., Jr. 1978. Home Style: House Members in their Districts. Boston: 
 Little, Brown. 
 
Finer, Jonathan. 2004. “Kerry Says He Believes Life Starts at Conception.” The 
 Washington Post. July 5, 2004. Online. LexisNexis Academic. 10 January 
 2006.   
 
Fiorina, Morris P. 1986. “Legislator Uncertainty, Legislator Control, and the 
 Delegation of Legislative Power.” Journal of Law, Economics and 
 Organization 2 (1): 133-51. 
 
Fiorina, Morris P., Jeremy C. Pope, and Samuel J. Abrams. 2004. Culture War? The 
 Myth of a Polarized America. White Plains, NY: Longman. 
 
Frank, Thomas. 2004. What’s the Matter with Kansas: How Conservatives Won the 
 Heart of America. New York: Metropolitan Books. 
 
Galderisi, Peter F., Marni Ezra, and Michael Lyons. 2001. “Introduction: Nomination 
 Politics and Congressional Representation.” In Congressional Primaries and 
 the Politics of Representation, eds. Galderisi, Peter F., Marni Ezra, and 
 Michael Lyons. 2001.. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. 
 
Gilmour, John B. 1995. Strategic Disagreement: Stalemate in American Politics. 
 Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.  
 
Gimpel, James and Jason E. Schuknecht. 2003. Patchwork Nation: Sectionalism and 
 Political Change in American Politics. Ann Arbor, MI: University of 
 Michigan.  
 
Glick, Henry R. and Amy Hutchinson. 2001. “Physician-Assisted Suicide: Agenda 
 Setting and the Elements of Morality Policy.” In The Politics of Morality 
 Policy: The Public Clash of Private Values, ed. Christopher Z. Mooney. New 
 York: Seven Bridges Press. 
 
Goggin, Malcolm L. 1993. “Introduction: A Framework for Understanding the New 
 Politics of Abortion.” In Understanding the New Politics of Abortion, ed. 
 Malcolm L. Goggin. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, Inc. 
 
Gohmann, Stephan F. and Robert L. Ohsfeldt. 1994. “Voting in the U.S. House on 
 Abortion Funding Issues: The Role of Constituents’ and Legislators’ Ideology 
 Before and After the Webster Decision.” American Journal of Economics and 
 Sociology 53 (4): 455-74. 
 
 
 173
Goldstein, Robert Justin. 1996. Desecrating the Flag: Key Documents of the 
 Controversy from the Civil War to 1995. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University 
 Press. 
 
Gonzales v. Oregon. 2006. 546 U.S. _. 
 
Goodliffe, Jay and David B. Magleby. 2001. “Campaign Finance in U.S. House 
 Primary and General Elections.” In Congressional Primaries and the Politics 
 of Representation, eds. Galderisi, Peter F., Marni Ezra, and Michael Lyons. 
 2001. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. 
 
Green, John C. 2000. “Antigay: Varieties of Opposition to Gay Rights.” The Politics 
 of Gay Rights, eds. Craig A. Rimmerman, Kenneth D. Wald, and Clyde 
 Wilcox. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Green, John C. 2004. “The American Religious Landscape and Political Attitudes.” 
 Pew Forum Survey Report. Washington, D.C.: The Pew Forum on Religion 
 and Public Life.  
 
Green, John C. and Nathan S. Bigelow. 2005. “The Christian Right Goes to 
 Washington: Social Movement Resources and the Legislative Process.” In The 
 Interest Group Connection:  Electioneering, Lobbying, and Policymaking in 
 Washington, 2nd ed., eds. Paul S. Herrnson, Ronald G. Shaiko, and Clyde 
 Wilcox. Washington, DC: CQ Press. 
 
Greenhouse, Linda. 2000. “Student Prayers Must Be Private, Court Affirms.” The 
 New York Times. June 19, 2000. Online. LexisNexis Academic. 29 June 2005.  
 
Griswold v. Connecticut. 1965. 381 U.S. 479. 
 
Gunn, Angus M. 2004. Evolution and Creationism in the Public Schools: A 
 Handbook for Educators, Parents, and Community Leaders. Jefferson, NC: 
 McFarland.  
 
Gusfield, Joseph R. 1986. Symbolic Crusade: Status Politics and the American 
 TemperanceMovement. Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press.  
 
Hacker, Jacob S. and Paul Pierson. 2005. Off Center: The Republican Revolution and 
 the Erosion of American Democracy. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.  
 
Haider-Markel, Donald P. 1999. “Redistributing Values in Congress: Interest Group 
 Influence under Sub-Optimal Conditions.” Political Research Quarterly 52 
 (March): 113-144. 
 
 
 
 
 174
Haider-Markel, Donald P. 2000. “Lesbian and Gay Politics in the States: Interest 
 Groups, Electoral Politics, and Policy.” The Politics of Gay Rights, eds. Craig 
 A. Rimmerman, Kenneth D. Wald, and Clyde Wilcox. Chicago: University of 
 Chicago Press. 
 
Hallow, Ralph Z. 2005. “Weyrich Fears ‘Cordial’ Ties between GOP and the Right.” 
 The Washington Times. June 17, 2005. Online. LexisNexis Academic. 10 
 January 2006.   
 
Halva-Neubauer, Glen. 1993. “The States after Roe: No “Paper Tigers.” In 
 Understanding the New Politics of Abortion, ed. Malcolm L. Goggin.  
 Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, Inc. 
 
Herrnson, Paul S. 2004. Congressional Elections: Campaigning at Home and in 
 Washington, 4th ed. Washington, DC: CQ Press. 
 
Herrnson, Paul S. 2005. “Interest Groups and Campaigns: The Electoral Connection.” 
 In The Interest Group Connection: Electioneering, Lobbying, and 
 Policymaking in Washington, 2nd ed., eds. Paul S. Herrnson, Ronald G. 
 Shaiko, and Clyde Wilcox. Washington, DC: CQ Press.  
 
Hertzke, Allen D. 1988. Representing God in Washington. Knoxville, TN: The 
 University of Tennessee Press. 
 
Hofstadter, Richard. 1964. “The Pseudo-Conservative Revolt.” In The Radical Right, 
 ed. Daniel Bell. New York: Doubleday Anchor. 
 
Hull, Anne. 2005. “Beloved Wife and Daughter Became Face of a Public Debate.” 
 The Washington Post. April 1, 2005. Online. LexisNexis Academic. 29 June 
 2005.  
 
Humphry, Derek and Mary Clement. 1998. Freedom to Die: People, Politics, and the 
 Right-to-Die Movement. New York: St. Martin’s Press. 
 
Hunter, James Davison. 1991. Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America. New 
 York: Basic Books. 
 
Inglehart, Ronald. 1990. Culture Shift in Advance Industrial Society. Princeton: 
 Princeton University Press.  
 
Irvine, Janice M. 2004. Talk About Sex: The Battles over Sex Education in the United 
 States. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.  
 
Jacobson, Gary C. 1999. “Impeachment Politics in the 1998 Congressional 
 Elections.” Political Science Quarterly 114 (Spring):31-51. 
 
 
 175
Jones, Charisse. 2004. “Druggists Refuse to Give Out Pill.” Nov. 8, 2004. Online.  
 http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2004-11-08-druggists-pill_x.htm. 29 
 June 2005. 
 
Jones, Roland. 2005. “After California, More States Eye Stem Cell Research.” 
 MSNBC. Feb. 9, 2005. Online. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6847933. 29 
 June 2005. 
 
Key, V.O. 1961. Public Opinion and American Democracy. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 
 
King, Gary and Langche Zeng. 2001a. “Logistic Regression in Rare Events Data.”  
 Political Analysis 9 (2): 137-163. 
 
King, Gary and Langche Zeng. 2001b. “Explaining Rare Events in International 
 Relations.” International Organization 55 (3): 693-715. 
 
Kingdon, John W. 1995. Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, 2nd Edition.  
 Boston: Little, Brown. 
 
Lane, Charles. 2005. “Court Split over Ten Commandments; Justices Forbid Copies 
 on Walls of Courthouses but Allow Monument.” The Washington Post. June 
 28, 2005. Online. LexisNexis Academic. 29 June 2005.  
 
Langer, Gary. 2005. “Poll: No Role for Government in Schiavo CaseFederal 
 Intervention in Schiavo Case Prompts Broad Public Disapproval.” ABC News. 
 March 21, 2005. 
 Online.http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/PollVault/story?id=599622&page=2. 
 29 June 2005.  
 
Larana, Enrique, Hank Johnston, and Joseph R. Gusfield. 1994 “Identities, Grievance, 
 and New Social Movements.” In New Social Movements: From Ideology to 
 Identity, eds. Enrique Larana, Hank Johnston, and Joseph R. Gusfield. 
 Philadelphia: Temple University Press.  
 
Lawrence v. Texas. 2003. 000 U.S. 02-102. 
 
Layman, Geoffrey C. 1997. “Religion and Political Behavior in the United States: 
 The Impact of Beliefs, Affiliations, and Commitment from 1980 to 1994.”The 
 Public Opinion Quarterly 61 (Summer): 288-316. 
 
Layman, Geoffrey C. 2001. The Great Divide: Religious and Cultural Conflict in 
 American Party Politics. New York: Columbia University Press.  
 
Layman, Geoffrey C. and Edward G. Carmines. 1997. “Cultural Conflict in American 
 Politics: Religious Traditionalism, Postmaterialism, and U.S. Political 
 Behavior.” Journal of Politics 59: 751-77. 
 
 176
 
Layman, Geoffrey C. and Thomas M. Carsey. 2002. “Party Polarization and “Conflict 
 Extension” in the American Electorate.” Journal of Political Science 46 
 (October): 786-802. 
 
Linder, Douglas. 2002. “The Scopes Trial: An Introduction.” University of Missouri, 
 Kansas City, Law School. Online. 
 http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/scopes/scopes.htm. 29 June 
 2005.  
 
Long, J. Scott and Jeremy Freese. 2003. Regression Models for Categorical 
 Dependent Variables using Stata. College Station, TX: Stata Press. 
 
Maltzman, Forrest. 1997. Competing Principals: Committees, Parties, and the 
 Organization of Congress.  Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.  
 
Matter of Quinlan. 1976. 70 NJ 10, 355 A. 2d. 647 
 
Mayhew, David R. 1974. Congress: The Electoral Connection. New Haven, CT: Yale 
 University Press.  
 
McCreary v. ACLU. 2005. 000 U.S. 03-1693. 
 
McDonald, Greg. 1997. “GOP Looks to Distinguish Itself from Clinton Stance.” 
 Houston Chronicle. August 31, 1997. Online. LexisNexis Academic. 3 
 November 2005.  
 
McEnery, Regina. 2005. “Abstinence-only Programs under Fire; State Funding 
 Should Stop until Approach Is Proved Effective, Agencies Say.” Plain 
 Dealer. May 21, 2005. Online. LexisNexis Academic. 29 June 2005.  
 
Meier, Kenneth J. 1994. The Politics of Sin. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.  
 
Miller v. California. 1973. 413 U.S. 15. 
 
Moen, Matthew C. 1984. “School Prayer and the Politics of Life-Style Concern.” 
 Social Science Quarterly 65: 1065-71.  
 
Mooney, Christopher Z. 2001. “The Public Clash of Private Values.” In The Politics 
 of Morality Policy: The Public Clash of Private Values.  New York: Seven 
 Bridges Press. 
 
Mooney, Christopher Z. and Mei-Hsien Lee. 1995. “Legislative Morality in the 
 American States: The Case of Pre-Roe Abortion Regulation Reform.” 
 American Journal of Political Science 39 (August): 599-627. 
 
 
 177
Mouw, Calvin J. and Michael B. MacKuen. 1992. “The Strategic Agenda in 
 Legislative Politics.” American Political Science Review 86: 87-105. 
 
Murphy, Thomas P. 1978. The Politics of Congressional Committees: The Power of 
 Seniority. Woodbury, NY: Barron’s.  
 
National Conference of State Legislatures. 2005. “50 State Summary of 
 Contraceptive Laws.”  Online. 
 http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/50states.htm. 28 June 2005.  
 
Neustadt, Richard E. 1991. Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The 
 Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan. New York: Free Press.  
 
Newdow v. U.S. Congress. 2002. 292. F.3d 597. 
 
O’Connor, Karen. 1996. No Neutral Ground? Abortion Politics in an Age of 
 Absolutes.  Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
 
Payne, James L. 1982. “Rise of Lone Wolf Questioning in House Committee 
 Hearings.” Polity 14 (Summer): 626-640. 
 
Peter, Jennifer. 2000. “Flag Proposal Splits Candidates; Robb, Allen Take Opposite 
 Sides as Senate Approaches Vote on Amendment.” The Virginian-Pilot. 
 March 28, 2000. Online. LexisNexis Academic. 29 June 2005.  
 
Peterson, Kavan. 2005. “Same-Sex Unions: A Constitutional Race.” Stateline.org. 
April 14, 2005. Online. 
 http://www.stateline.org/live/ViewPage.action?siteNodeId=136&languageId=
 1&contentId=20695. 29 June 2005.  
 
Pickler, Nedra. 2002. “Congressional Races Affected by Redistricting and Term 
 Limits.” Associated Press State and Local Wire. July 9, 2002. Online. 
 LexisNexis Academic. 5 August 2005. 
 
Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth. 1976. 428 U.S. 52. 
 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey. 1992. 505 U.S. 833. 
 
Quinn, Francis X. 2002. “Michaud Congressional Bid Sharply Focused.” Associated 
 Press State and Local Wire. May 23, 2002. Online. LexisNexis Academic. 5 
 August 2005.  
 
Roberts, Jason M., and Steven S. Smith. 2003. “Procedural Contexts, Party Strategy, 
 and Conditional Party Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1971-
 2000” American Journal of Political Science 47 (April): 305-317.  
 
 
 178
Rohde, David W. 2005. “Committees and Policy Formulation.” In The Legislative 
 Branch, eds. Paul J. Quirk and Sarah A. Binder. New York: Oxford 
 University Press. 
 
Roe v. Wade. 1973. 410 U.S. 113. 
 
Romer v. Evans. 1996. 000 U.S. U10179. 
 
Ryan, Richard A. 2002. “Abortion Issue Turns Congressional Race Ugly.” The 
 Detroit News.  Aug. 4, 2002. Online. 
 http://www.detnews.com/2002/politics/0208/06/a10-553335.htm. 5 
 August 2005.  
 
Schiller Wendy J. 1995. “Senators as Political Entrepreneurs: Using Bill Sponsorship 
 to Shape Legislative Agendas. American Journal of Political Science 39 
 (February): 186-203. 
 
Scott, Wilbur J. 1985. ‘‘The Equal Rights Amendment as Status Politics.’’ Social 
 Forces 64: 499-506. 
 
Sharp, Elaine B. 1999. “Introduction.” In Culture Wars and Local Politics, ed. Elaine 
 B. Sharp. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas.  
 
Sigelman, Lee. 1979. “A Reassessment of the Two Presidencies Thesis.” Journal of 
 Politics 41: 1195-1205. 
 
Sinclair, Barbara. 1986. “The Role of Committees in Agenda Setting In the U.S. 
 Congress.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 11 (February): 35-45. 
 
Sinclair, Barbara. 1995. Legislators, Leaders, and Lawmaking: The U.S. House of  
 Representatives in the Postreform Era. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
 Press. 
 
Sinclair, Barbara. 2000. Unorthodox Lawmaking: New Legislative Processes in the 
 U.S. Congress, 2nd ed. Washington, DC: CQ Press. 
 
Sinclair, Barbara. 2005. “Parties and Leadership in the House.” In The Legislative 
 Branch, eds. Paul J. Quirk and Sarah A. Binder. New York: Oxford 
 University Press. 
 
Smith, Steven S. 1989. Call to Order: Floor Politics in the House and Senate. 
 Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. 
 
Smith, Steven S. 2005 “Parties and Leadership in the Senate.” In The Legislative 
 Branch, eds. Paul J. Quirk and Sarah A. Binder. New York: Oxford 
 University Press. 
 
 179
Smith, T. Alexander and Raymond Tatalovich. 2003. Cultures at War: Moral 
 Conflicts in Western Democracies. Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 
 Ltd. 
  
Snyder, James M., Jr. and Tim Groseclose. 2000. “Estimating Party Influence in 
 Congressional Roll-Call Voting.” American Journal of Political Science 44 
 (April): 193-211. 
 
Stone, Andrea. 2004.  “Upcoming Votes Have Eye on Nov. 2: GOP Loads 
 Congressional  Calendar with Hot Topics to Play to Voters.” USA Today. 
 September 15, 2004. Online. 
 http://www.usatoday.com/printedition/news/20040915/a_votes15.art.htm . 3 
 November 2005. 
 
Stone, Deborah. 2002. Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making, 
 Revised Edition. New York: Norton.  
 
Stone v. Graham. 1980. 449 U.S. 39. 
 
Stonecash, Jeffrey M., Mark D. Brewer, and Mack D. Mariani. 2003. Diverging 
 Parties: Social Change, Realignment, and Political Polarization. Westview 
 Press. 
 
Studlar, Donley T. 2001. “What Constitutes Morality Policy? A Cross-National 
 Analysis.” In The Politics of Morality Policy: The Public Clash of Private 
 Values, ed. Christopher Z. Mooney.  New York: Seven Bridges Press. 
 
Sulkin, Tracy. 2005. Issue Politics in Congress. New York: Cambridge University 
 Press. 
 
Talbert, Jeffery, Bryan D. Jones, and Frank R. Baumgartner. 1995. “Nonlegislative 
 Hearings and Policy Change in Congress.” American Journal of Political 
 Science 39 (May): 383-406. 
 
Tatalovich, Raymond and Byron W. Daynes. 1988. Social Regulatory Policy. 
 Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
 
Tatalovich, Raymond and Byron W. Daynes. 1998. “Introduction: Social Regulations 
 and Moral Conflict.” In Moral Controversies in American Politics: Cases in 
 Social Regulatory Policy, eds. Raymond Tatalovich and Byron W. Daynes. 
 Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc.  
 
 
 
 
 
 180
Tatalovich, Raymond and David Schier. 1993. “The Persistence of Ideological 
 Cleavage in Voting on Abortion Legislation in the House of Representatives, 
 1973-1988.” In Understanding the New Politics of Abortion, ed. Malcolm L. 
 Goggin. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, Inc. 
 
Taylor, Andrew. 1998. “Domestic Agenda Setting, 1947-1994.” Legislative Studies 
 Quarterly 23  (August): 373-397. 
 
Texas v. Johnson. 1989. 491 U.S. 397. 
 
Tuttle, Jeff. 2002. “Expert: Michaud’s Pro-Life Stance Could Stall Bid for U.S. 
 House Seat.”  BangorDaily News. March 30, 2002. Online. LexisNexis 
 Academic. 5 August 2005. 
 
Vacco v. Quill. 1997. 521 U.S. 793.  
 
Van Order v. Perry. 2005. 351 F.3d 173. 
 
Vogels, Lee. 1997. “Judge Who Displayed Ten Commandments To Be in Green Bay; 
 He Plans to Attend Rally Seeking Similar Display in Brown County Court.” 
 Milwaukee Journal Sentinel. Nov. 2, 1997. Online. LexisNexis Academic. 29 
 June 2005. 
  
Wald, Kenneth D. 2000. “The Context of Gay Politics.” In The Politics of Gay 
 Rights, eds. Craig A. Rimmerman, Kenneth D. Wald, and Clyde Wilcox. 
 Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Wald, Kenneth D., Dennis E. Owen, Samuel S. Hill, Jr. 1989. "Evangelical Politics 
 and Status Issues," Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 28: 1-16. 
 
Walker, Jack L. 1977. “Setting the Agenda in the U.S. Senate: A Theory of Problem 
 Selection.” British Journal of Political Science 7 (October): 423-445. 
 
Washington V. Glucksberg. 1997. 000 U.S. 96-110. 
 
Weber, Max. 1946. “Class, Status, Power.” In From Max Weber: Essays in 
 Sociology, eds. H.H.Gerth and C.W. Mills, C.W. New York: Oxford 
 University Press. 
 
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services. 1989. 492 U.S. 490. 
 
White, John Kenneth. 2003. The Values Divide: American Politics and Culture in 
 Transition. New York: Chatham House.  
 
Wilson, Woodrow. [1885] 1963. Congressional Government: A Study in American 
 Politics. Cleveland: World Publishing. 
 
 181
 
Woliver, Laura R. 1999. “Abortion Conflicts and City Governments: Negotiating 
 Coexistence in South Carolina.” In Culture Wars and Local Politics. Elaine B. 
 Sharp, ed. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas.  
 
Woon, Jonathan. 2004. “Issue Attention and Legislative Proposals in the U.S. 
 Senate.” Stanford University Graduate School of Business. Typescript.  
 
 
